Well I think empirical game-theory observed on the network involves more types of strategy than honest vs dishonest.  At least 4, maybe 5 types of strategy and I would argue lumping the strategies together results in incorrect game theory conclusions and predictions.

A) altruistic players (protocol following by principle to be good network citizens, will forgo incremental profits to aid network health) eg aim to decentralize hashrate, will mine stuck transactions for free, run pools with zero fee, put more effort into custom spam filtering, tend to be power users, or long term invested etc.

B) honest players (protocol following but non-altruistic or just lazy/asleep run default software, but still leaving some dishonest profit untaken). Eg reject spy mining, but no charitable actions, will not retaliate in kind to semi-honest zero sum attacks that reduce their profits.

C) semi-honest (will violate protocol if their attack can be plausibly deniable or argued to be not hugely damaging to network security). Eg spy mining, centralised pools increasing other miners orphan rates.

D) rational players (will violate the protocol for profit: will not overtly steal from users via double spends, but anything short particularly disadvantaging other miners even if it results in centralisation is treated as fair game) eg selfish mining. Would increase block size by filling with pay to self transactions, if it increased orphans for others.

E) dishonest players (aka hyper-rational: will actually steal from users probabilistically if possible, not as worried about detection). Eg double spend and probabilistic double spends (against onchain gambling games).  Would DDoS competing pools.

In part the strategies depend on investment horizon, it is long term rational for altruistic behavior to forgo incremental short term profit to improve user experience.  Hyper-rational to buy votes in a "ends justify means" mentality though fortunately most network players are not dishonest.

So called meta-incentive (unwillingness to risk hurting bitcoin due to intended long term ho dling coins or ASICs) can also explain bias towards honest or altruistic strategies. 

Renting too much hashrate is risky as it can avoid the meta-incentive and increase rational or dishonest strategies.

In particular re differentiating from 51% attack so long as > 50% are semi-honest, honest or altruistic it won't happen.  It would seem actually that > 66-75% are because we have not seen selfish mining on the network.  Though I think conveniently slow block publication by some players in the 60% spy mining semi-honest cartel was seen for a while, the claim has been it was short-lived and due to technical issue.

It would be interesting to try to categorise and estimate the network % engaging in each strategy.  I think the information is mostly known.

Adam