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From: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
To: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
Cc: "bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net"
	<bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] SIGHASH_WITHINPUTVALUE
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2015 16:17:25 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALqxMTH2F5-Aj+U-D5KAtbJAAejCxmKgi+8knYAmSKJ_De0kyg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALqxMTGTUYgA9OebK7aaTnrMEf=OMaW=e36m_0BMyprCX=yFQw@mail.gmail.com>

Issues like that particular one (simple elegant fix, strong utility
justification) plus previously more privacy stuff (like committed tx,
homomorphic encrypted values) was what got me wondering about a way to
do a live beta (one-way peg) and then to get excited about the 2wp &
Greg's mechanism for that.

I think it would be hypothetically possible to make a "special"
singleton sidechain which is merge mined, and has a consensus rule to
require some proportion of reward be sent to it via coinbase tx (a
mechanism to address incentive incompatibility) and a general timeline
eg 12mo to next version +/- etc. might be an interesting thing to
explore as a place to store live versions of "hard fork wishlist"
items where people who need them early can help validate them.

I am not sure that helps the full network upgrade issue though.

Adam

On 23 January 2015 at 16:12, Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org> wrote:
> its an always offline node, so it knows nothing really other than a
> BIP 32 hierarchy of keys & a signature request.
>
> So the signature request has to drag with it information to validate
> what the value is, in order to be sure not to sign away 99% to fees.
> Signing the transaction value and having the network validate that the
> value in the sig matches full nodes view of the tx value avoids that
> issue.  Simple, elegant, but... we have no live beta mechanism, and
> hence risk & testing makes that tricky.  Plus the full network upgrade
> issue if its not backwards compatible.
>
> Adam
>
> On 23 January 2015 at 16:08, Tamas Blummer <tamas@bitsofproof.com> wrote:
>> You mean an isolated signing device without memory right?
>>
>> An isolated node would still know the transactions substantiating its coins,
>> why would it sign them away to fees ?
>>
>> Tamas Blummer
>>
>> On Jan 23, 2015, at 4:47 PM, slush <slush@centrum.cz> wrote:
>>
>> Correct, plus the most likely scenario in such attack is that the malware
>> even don't push such tx with excessive fees to the network, but send it
>> directly to attacker's pool/miner.
>>
>> M.
>>
>> On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 4:42 PM, Alan Reiner <etotheipi@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Unfortunately, one major attack vector is someone isolating your node,
>>> getting you to sign away your whole wallet to fee, and then selling it to a
>>> mining pool to mine it before you can figure why your transactions aren't
>>> making it to the network.  In such an attack, the relay rules aren't
>>> relevant, and if the attacker can DoS you for 24 hours, it doesn't take a
>>> ton of mining power to make the attack extremely likely to succeed.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 01/23/2015 10:31 AM, Tamas Blummer wrote:
>>>
>>> Not a fix, but would reduce the financial risk, if nodes were not relaying
>>> excessive fee transactions.
>>>
>>> Tamas Blummer
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
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>>



      reply	other threads:[~2015-01-23 16:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-01-23 14:51 [Bitcoin-development] SIGHASH_WITHINPUTVALUE slush
2015-01-23 15:24 ` Alan Reiner
2015-01-23 15:40   ` slush
2015-01-23 16:05   ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-01-23 16:18     ` slush
2015-01-23 16:52       ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-01-23 17:40         ` slush
2015-01-23 18:51           ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-01-23 19:19             ` slush
2015-01-23 16:23     ` Alan Reiner
2015-01-23 16:27     ` Alan Reiner
2015-01-23 16:33       ` Alan Reiner
2015-01-23 16:35       ` slush
2015-01-23 17:49         ` Peter Todd
2015-01-23 15:31 ` Tamas Blummer
2015-01-23 15:42   ` Alan Reiner
2015-01-23 15:47     ` slush
2015-01-23 16:08       ` Tamas Blummer
2015-01-23 16:12         ` Adam Back
2015-01-23 16:17           ` Adam Back [this message]

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