From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 444A792 for ; Wed, 21 Oct 2015 08:31:54 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f181.google.com (mail-wi0-f181.google.com [209.85.212.181]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6ACB6A6 for ; Wed, 21 Oct 2015 08:31:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wicll6 with SMTP id ll6so63005309wic.1 for ; Wed, 21 Oct 2015 01:31:52 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=feCJX4prG922ErLZPqgPiAYDpKX+xWgK9scA5SWSjpI=; b=W43x2kXjFo85pSQii4BSik8p6/34J9tHONasJANLQlk20l7VbViZWPPkM3pe5bq95v CmPiTbH0hu4t69KHwwsJjAKuwCj6f230xJcgfkZ7S6/OSEXqgwOMvKi2n4Mjrzyds6tA mjPU7Z02YOOG4ZZH2tMFzZENx/bImz/yWyOySyzIEbXouVDsjPRsiNhf2eQDT/Roz2/j zPkX2mbL2hnY5LTkC7/YUddbbB36JMMsFuF3WeUwUdARh6vKMuxx8lp9hedvHKomb18e ckGBKAo/wwmPJ2OFgU0ebpb+bqbDCFpB5F3301xwxImIm2HNO72PptHcCYMgsWdBkOVs gEgA== X-Received: by 10.194.11.71 with SMTP id o7mr9205208wjb.75.1445416312087; Wed, 21 Oct 2015 01:31:52 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <201510210618.56159.luke@dashjr.org> <201510210752.17527.luke@dashjr.org> In-Reply-To: <201510210752.17527.luke@dashjr.org> From: Christian Decker Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2015 08:31:42 +0000 Message-ID: To: Luke Dashjr Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7b4508ded5aca00522993528 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [BIP] Normalized transaction IDs X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2015 08:31:54 -0000 --047d7b4508ded5aca00522993528 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Wed, Oct 21, 2015 at 9:52 AM Luke Dashjr wrote: > On Wednesday, October 21, 2015 7:39:45 AM Christian Decker wrote: > > On Wed, Oct 21, 2015 at 8:19 AM Luke Dashjr wrote: > > > This doesn't completely close malleability (which should be documented > in > > > the BIP), so I'm not sure it's worth the cost, especially if closing > > > malleability later on would need more. How about specifying flags > upfront > > > in the UTXO-creating transaction specifying which parts the signature > > > will cover? This would allow implementation of fully malleability-proof > > > wallets. > > > > As far as I see it the only remaining venues for malleability are the use > > of sighash flags that are not SIGHASH_ALL, as mentioned in the BIP. Any > use > > of non-sighash_all flags is already an explicit permission to modify the > > transactions, by adding and removing inputs and outputs, so I don't see > how > > these can be made non-malleable. Am I missing something? > > Signer malleability is still a notable concern needing consideration. > Ideally, > wallets should be trying to actively CoinJoin, bump fees on, etc any > pending > transactions in the background. These forms of malleability affect nearly > as > many real use cases as third-party malleability. > > Luke > How is signer malleability still a problem if we remove the signatures from the transaction ID of the transaction and all preceding transactions? The signer can re-sign a transaction but it won't change the transaction ID. It is still possible to double-spend transactions that do not have enough fees, so just starting a new round of CoinJoin is sufficient to bump fees for all parties that participate, and that would also result in the double-spent low fee transaction to be discarded, resolving the state of all coins in the first CoinJoin tx. --047d7b4508ded5aca00522993528 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Wed, Oct 21= , 2015 at 9:52 AM Luke Dashjr <luke@d= ashjr.org> wrote:
On Wedne= sday, October 21, 2015 7:39:45 AM Christian Decker wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 21, 2015 at 8:19 AM Luke Dashjr <luke@dashjr.org> wrote:
> > This doesn't completely close malleability (which should be d= ocumented in
> > the BIP), so I'm not sure it's worth the cost, especially= if closing
> > malleability later on would need more. How about specifying flags= upfront
> > in the UTXO-creating transaction specifying which parts the signa= ture
> > will cover? This would allow implementation of fully malleability= -proof
> > wallets.
>
> As far as I see it the only remaining venues for malleability are the = use
> of sighash flags that are not SIGHASH_ALL, as mentioned in the BIP. An= y use
> of non-sighash_all flags is already an explicit permission to modify t= he
> transactions, by adding and removing inputs and outputs, so I don'= t see how
> these can be made non-malleable. Am I missing something?

Signer malleability is still a notable concern needing consideration. Ideal= ly,
wallets should be trying to actively CoinJoin, bump fees on, etc any pendin= g
transactions in the background. These forms of malleability affect nearly a= s
many real use cases as third-party malleability.

Luke

How is signer malleability still a= problem if we remove the signatures from the transaction ID of the transac= tion and all preceding transactions? The signer can re-sign a transaction b= ut it won't change the transaction ID.

It is s= till possible to double-spend transactions that do not have enough fees, so= just starting a new round of CoinJoin is sufficient to bump fees for all p= arties that participate, and that would also result in the double-spent low= fee transaction to be discarded, resolving the state of all coins in the f= irst CoinJoin tx.
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