From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Z5y6G-0005n2-Hq for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 15:21:00 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of coinbase.com designates 74.125.82.41 as permitted sender) client-ip=74.125.82.41; envelope-from=adrian@coinbase.com; helo=mail-wg0-f41.google.com; Received: from mail-wg0-f41.google.com ([74.125.82.41]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Z5y6E-0007Sr-PS for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 15:21:00 +0000 Received: by wgfq1 with SMTP id q1so45788442wgf.1 for ; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 08:20:52 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=5buOKqYSSZXHaii5PgW+QDjJW1sUlJKIq9MYyo3s3Vc=; b=JIRAr09F6cmn5nBnc4Mp/LKQeFuxBfW8e7rcDmEuID/rckJQdUDMNVGA20h4DoIaMX XylTNcMMhgAVgUJCERLB5vX6kXVA/EwmMpVTCnMcPPknKUokpUfMxibpAoSUB1NggsT0 nhzObX1JWMIR/YMjkaV+3SvEZSD0uf/YUCJYMvAN9oXv8RE7SE1TiKns2EoBI+4ItTRU Zvxgl0pQpQ7HCpoCaqos6Uiwrd4fBaN5VyB8Lyfs8/8yrwvNSgnTkcf6Rq58NZwIvFV2 prcMirKoLEDdFjWaP4SlqcQaO7IEyXFPxFaFrwkWDN6iz4H1byYKsHVi0pntUsHjTgoY kpzg== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQl2F5W33MKqTCZaeSG28+0BKzhNUygFAybU1zj1xkNnHEL4qSAXL+ouYpoagMraMJQF6GLL MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.181.11.193 with SMTP id ek1mr7655521wid.15.1434727252728; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 08:20:52 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.27.177.99 with HTTP; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 08:20:52 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <20150619145940.GB5695@savin.petertodd.org> References: <20150619103959.GA32315@savin.petertodd.org> <20150619135245.GB28875@savin.petertodd.org> <20150619140815.GA32470@savin.petertodd.org> <20150619145940.GB5695@savin.petertodd.org> Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2015 08:20:52 -0700 Message-ID: From: Adrian Macneil To: Peter Todd Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d043bdeda3faf3f0518e078ec X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Z5y6E-0007Sr-PS Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2015 15:21:00 -0000 --f46d043bdeda3faf3f0518e078ec Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Unless you're sybil attacking the network and miners, consuming valuable > resources and creating systemic risks of failure like we saw with > Chainalysis, I don't see how you're getting "very small" double-spend > probabilities. > So connecting to many nodes just because we can and it's not technically prevented is bad for the network and creating systemic risks of failure, but relaying harmful double spend transactions just because you can and it's not technically prevented, is good for everyone? > You know, you're creating an interesting bit of game theory here: if I'm > a miner who doesn't already have a mining contract, why not implement > full-RBF to force Coinbase to offer me one? One reason might be because > other miners with such a contract - a majority - are going to be asked > by Coinbase to reorg you out of the blockchain, but then we have a > situation where a single entity has control of the blockchain. > If someone did enter into contracts with miners to mine certain transactions, and had a guarantee that the miners would not build on previous blocks which included double spends, then they would only need contracts with 51% of the network anyway. So it wouldn't really matter if you were a small time miner and wanted to run full-RBF. > For the good of Bitcoin, and your own company, you'd do well to firmly > state that under no condition will Coinbase ever enter into mining > contracts. > I don't personally see what good this does for bitcoin. Now you are suggesting that we should prevent a 51% attack by using policy and promises, rather than a technical solution. How is this any better than us relying on existing double spend rules which are based on policy and promises? --f46d043bdeda3faf3f0518e078ec Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Unless you're sybil attacking the network an= d miners, consuming valuable
resources and creating systemic risks of failure like we saw with
Chainalysis, I don't see how you're getting "very small" = double-spend
probabilities.

So connecting to many no= des just because we can and it's not technically prevented is bad for t= he network and creating systemic risks of failure, but relaying harmful dou= ble spend transactions just because you can and it's not technically pr= evented, is good for everyone?
=C2=A0
You know, you're creating an interesting bit of game theory he= re: if I'm
a miner who doesn't already have a mining contract, why not implement full-RBF to force Coinbase to offer me one? One reason might be because
other miners with such a contract - a majority - are going to be asked
by Coinbase to reorg you out of the blockchain, but then we have a
situation where a single entity has control of the blockchain.

If someone did enter into contracts with miners to = mine certain transactions, and had a guarantee that the miners would not bu= ild on previous blocks which included double spends, then they would only n= eed contracts with 51% of the network anyway. So it wouldn't really mat= ter if you were a small time miner and wanted to run full-RBF.
= =C2=A0
For the good of Bitcoin, and you= r own company, you'd do well to firmly
state that under no condition will Coinbase ever enter into mining
contracts.

I don't personally see w= hat good this does for bitcoin. Now you are suggesting that we should preve= nt a 51% attack by using policy and promises, rather than a technical solut= ion. How is this any better than us relying on existing double spend rules = which are based on policy and promises?

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