From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B06081171 for ; Thu, 8 Mar 2018 20:08:05 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-it0-f50.google.com (mail-it0-f50.google.com [209.85.214.50]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DBD16576 for ; Thu, 8 Mar 2018 20:08:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-it0-f50.google.com with SMTP id v194-v6so61347itb.0 for ; Thu, 08 Mar 2018 12:08:04 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=blockstream.io; s=google; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=iH2ys7tCIPDJDz/J2WpWDOiSxZmwKN7PKWf9gUxgQ04=; b=SRv73oQCP5cON3wIYnx39bjJDShz1HyuwGsCF99X+wEf0OdON6uBzh/o8w80TZh53B uel7aCoKKwb7xRQm5jgGvaTS/vCFpxjKrZUaoVOwUxqxtI7Hh+bJC34vJJtfHggl4NiV DAPVYlWBgClytodVJ9AmfRaPRXbUrvh9VvTcw= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=iH2ys7tCIPDJDz/J2WpWDOiSxZmwKN7PKWf9gUxgQ04=; b=KsHLQpZ2MQc77dnGJvBbgqGvLQW1sfT+QvUM9QBfb5zg+3pZqPlFsW4s/oDlKoCeBL zZG/ljav3rlMpCdCc0h/Gr1tbfdOLlrMI0rf7Fb16QETeklUWPBB0cCVuwAeY51TLMD4 7i+y0G9gYe41KvvceAVXHo5+Ngqpb3fWIQoGaDQADSVm9+XZqc31ihNwsrjMJwP7PyWA Hu16ZVIlHRou9S/a/ddgbwAFF/DAvBeM8ApDQMTJljwhZ8nngZH/NjImEdZg7VWH/xfG RpHlRKQTEhSD/nUtaOGd0gtCBrG9Wwzo4sezsmYzOCHKkLyqzp9jn2BmHtzcVjsHuFgF aCnA== X-Gm-Message-State: AElRT7F4gCTu3Udh9Wg0J9KhSQY+e+POZ4woEd8lHPZkFEkoMuWGjjm4 vJ4wa60ilGVyhZqTBJvbQkj7B4Br0mX3xjh/fhaul/uZlBY= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AG47ELtGUbz93aDfnMt7zzrFu0Vlpg46d3UvnrrPoO9vhYYlo32KIdYQmGqNqMmuMVQlhowts6Cb1QJwawxqlVlRGv4= X-Received: by 10.36.249.203 with SMTP id l194mr62628ith.81.1520539684060; Thu, 08 Mar 2018 12:08:04 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.2.166.10 with HTTP; Thu, 8 Mar 2018 12:07:43 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: <20180308183426.GA1093@fedora-23-dvm> References: <20180212225828.GB8551@fedora-23-dvm> <20180212234225.GA9131@fedora-23-dvm> <20180301151129.GA9373@fedora-23-dvm> <20180308183426.GA1093@fedora-23-dvm> From: "Russell O'Connor" Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2018 15:07:43 -0500 Message-ID: To: Peter Todd Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="94eb2c110a54bc82860566ec3b47" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Revisiting BIP 125 RBF policy. X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 08 Mar 2018 20:08:05 -0000 --94eb2c110a54bc82860566ec3b47 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 1:34 PM, Peter Todd wrote: > On Thu, Mar 08, 2018 at 10:39:46AM -0500, Russell O'Connor wrote: > > On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 10:11 AM, Peter Todd wrote: > > > I mean, I think in general solving this problem is probably not > possible. > > > Basically, the fundamental problem is someone else has consumed network > > > bandwidth that should be paid for with fees. What you're trying to do > is > > > replace a transaction without paying those fees, which is identical to > > > what an > > > attacker is trying to do, and thus any such scheme will be as > vulnerable to > > > attack as not having that protection in the first place. > > > > > > ...which does give you an out: maybe the attack isn't important enough > to > > > matter. :) > > > > > > > Thanks, that makes sense. > > > > I still think it is worthwhile pursuing this proposed change in RBF > policy > > as it would seem that the current policy is problematic in practice today > > where participants are just performing normal transactions and are not > > trying to attack each other. > > But that's not a good argument: whether or not normal users are trying to > attack each other has nothing to do with whether or not you're opening up > an > attack by relaxing anti-DoS protections. > I'm not suggesting removing the anti-DoS protections. I'm suggesting that replaced transaction require a fee increase of at least the min-fee-rate times the size of all the transactions being ejected (in addition to the other proposed requirements). > Equally, how often are normal users who aren't attacking each other > creating > issues anyway? You can always have your wallet code just skip use of RBF > replacements in the event that someone does spend an unconfirmed output that > you sent them; how often does this actually happen in practice? Just ask rhavar. It happens regularly. Not many wallets let you spend unconfirmed outputs that you didn't create. > The problem is with institutional wallets sweeping incoming payments. It seems that in practice they are happy to sweep unconfirmed outputs. Setting all of the above aside for a moment. We need to understand that rational miners are going to prefer to transactions with higher package fee rates regardless of whatever your personal preferred RBF policy is. If we do not bring the RBF policy to alignment with what is economically rational, then miners are going to change their own policies anyways, probably all in slightly different ways. It behooves everyone to develop a reasonable standard RBF policy, that is still robust against possible DoS vectors, and aligns with miner incentives, so that all participants know what behaviour they can reasonably expect. It is simply a bonus that this change in RBF policy also partially mitigates the problem of pinned transactions. --94eb2c110a54bc82860566ec3b47 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 1:34 PM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>= ; wrote:
On Thu, = Mar 08, 2018 at 10:39:46AM -0500, Russell O'Connor wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 10:11 AM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
> > I mean, I think in general solving this p= roblem is probably not possible.
> > Basically, the fundamental problem is someone else has consumed n= etwork
> > bandwidth that should be paid for with fees. What you're tryi= ng to do is
> > replace a transaction without paying those fees, which is identic= al to
> > what an
> > attacker is trying to do, and thus any such scheme will be as vul= nerable to
> > attack as not having that protection in the first place.
> >
> > ...which does give you an out: maybe the attack isn't importa= nt enough to
> > matter. :)
> >
>
> Thanks, that makes sense.
>
> I still think it is worthwhile pursuing this proposed change in RBF po= licy
> as it would seem that the current policy is problematic in practice to= day
> where participants are just performing normal transactions and are not=
> trying to attack each other.

But that's not a good argument: whether or not normal users are = trying to
attack each other has nothing to do with whether or not you're opening = up an
attack by relaxing anti-DoS protections.

I'm not suggesting removing the anti-DoS protections.=C2=A0 I'm s= uggesting that replaced transaction require a fee increase of at least the = min-fee-rate times the size of all the transactions being ejected (in addit= ion to the other proposed requirements).
=C2=A0
Equally, how often are normal users who aren't attacking each other cre= ating
issues anyway? You can always have your wallet code just skip use of RBF
replacements in the event that someone does spend an unconfirmed output tha= t
you sent them; how often does this actually happen in practice?

Just ask rhavar.=C2=A0 It happens regularly.

Not many wallets let you spend unconfirmed outputs t= hat you didn't create.

The problem = is with institutional wallets sweeping incoming payments.=C2=A0 It seems th= at in practice they are happy to sweep unconfirmed outputs.

Setting all of the above aside for a moment.=C2=A0 We need to understand= that rational miners are going to prefer to transactions with higher packa= ge fee rates regardless of whatever your personal preferred RBF policy is.= =C2=A0 If we do not bring the RBF policy to alignment with what is economic= ally rational, then miners are going to change their own policies anyways, = probably all in slightly different ways.=C2=A0 It behooves everyone to deve= lop a reasonable standard RBF policy, that is still robust against possible= DoS vectors, and aligns with miner incentives, so that all participants kn= ow what behaviour they can reasonably expect.=C2=A0 It is simply a bonus th= at this change in RBF policy also partially mitigates the problem of pinned= transactions.
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