From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F34E3C04E for ; Fri, 8 Mar 2019 15:57:26 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-it1-f178.google.com (mail-it1-f178.google.com [209.85.166.178]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5100912E for ; Fri, 8 Mar 2019 15:57:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-it1-f178.google.com with SMTP id f186so6762011ita.0 for ; Fri, 08 Mar 2019 07:57:26 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=blockstream.io; s=google; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=wSLoXijqwqH8r63FEh2kAaSdd8rO/4szIsXz5UDLk18=; b=nbPWpWr2hrJdMEOh5a1cMzIU2RM27QTuFI5ixnignkN4iXSKj3lqXe1QymFGG+RWxc LN3SjnSC5salvfiGSWB/T9vVDuT1PAsbUCaEJu7OQPAcXjPPKWG6YUS+up7LZFpvc9fe LNQpEXv+WsoyVelh199oefH2Ff6ODyD+368JI= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=wSLoXijqwqH8r63FEh2kAaSdd8rO/4szIsXz5UDLk18=; b=Fj21qxw3Pm9nqSHoEYj0BP5mAU8jaOeJA3fvyYWSIrrr+HmqqTJ3X7WNn5FuUZxVaQ dD68I5o+yjOtWkoPUPPQ/YycgwroSd0YDrO1H/EbpZ3XVB0Q8GlvX+BHTDynhJMvcQAt v5ApBApKOf7a5NNXd7UtQEl6JUNwnTJkBv+SchBeBxB4OXoIvC5VSwQm4o4eDkoRux7P LkCDlcDVngurep27PmcpENnG3N4/57yU05jxqYIcUBM1exoep0DTP8lszxwgQjL/oxiV 3I8cS4N111BoW+oPZ3RfZvFp6/4znSKemQLLYwvZNSvcmpz8rmwV/DbPtzw1QvOnB5jt ZbSw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAXmgXALsDx59WoKmzoJhYC9+EGzvf8bLLVD6D8AMYMbaul7Xvmc qR4w9gOgTuTzXcwq3ZslfjbjjafAwPJka2gY2uIorExh X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzpv+jWfJk6XNxsUQj6N8SUUPR5ZkEhouvwz6kQdJddwilo7wLccvv0RgU9Jxf3tKUI6xO4g/fakz6riFzb7SM= X-Received: by 2002:a24:36c8:: with SMTP id l191mr10285905itl.101.1552060645366; Fri, 08 Mar 2019 07:57:25 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: "Russell O'Connor" Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2019 10:57:14 -0500 Message-ID: To: Matt Corallo Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000006ff6e205839747c6" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 08 Mar 2019 18:58:01 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Sighash Type Byte; Re: BIP Proposal: The Great Consensus Cleanup X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 08 Mar 2019 15:57:27 -0000 --0000000000006ff6e205839747c6 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 2:57 PM Matt Corallo wrote: > I can't say I'm particularly married to this idea (hence the alternate > proposal in the original email), but at the same time the lack of > existing transactions using these bits (and the redundancy thereof - > they don't *do* anything special) seems to be pretty strong indication > that they are not in use. One could argue a similarity between these > bits and OP_NOPs - no one is going to create transactions that require > OP_NOP execution to be valid as they are precisely the kind of thing > that may get soft-forked to have a new meaning. While the sighash bits > are somewhat less candidates for soft-forking, I don't think "somewhat less candidates for soft-forking" is a fair description. These bits essentially unsuitable for soft-forking within legacy Script. I don't think "someone > may have shoved random bits into parts of their > locked-for-more-than-a-year transactions" is sufficient reason to not > soft-fork something out. I disagree. It is sufficient. When was the last time Bitcoin soft-forked out working transactions that sent funds from securely held UTXOs to securely held UTXOs (aside from those secured by Scripts using the reserved OP_NOP1-OP_NOP10)? AFAIK it has never occurred since the time of Satoshi, even for the most hypothetical of transactions. It is my understanding is that Bitcoin Core would never do such a thing unless the security of Bitcoin protocol itself was under existential threat (see OP_CODESEPARATOR) and even then Bitcoin Core would only soft-fork out the minimal amount necessary to safely diffuse such a threat. Since the above soft-fork isn't addressing addressing any such threat (that I'm aware of), and could hypothetically destroy other people money, it crosses a line I thought we were never supposed to cross. > > Obviously, actually *seeing* it used in > practice or trying to fork them out in a fast manner would be > unacceptable, but neither is being proposed here. > Perhaps you don't see them in used in the blockchain because the users trying to use them are caught up by the fact they they are not being relayed by default (violating SCRIPT_VERIFY_STRICTENC) and are having difficulty redeeming them. You cannot first make transactions non-standard and then use the fact that you don't see them being used to justify a soft-fork. I know of users who have their funds tied up due to other changes in Bitcoin Core's default relay policy. I believe they waiting for their funds to become valuable enough to go through the trouble of having them directly mined. Shall we now permanently destroy their funds too, before they have a chance to get their transactions mined? --0000000000006ff6e205839747c6 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 2:57 PM Mat= t Corallo <lf-lists@mattcorallo.com> wrote:
I can't say I'm particularly married to th= is idea (hence the alternate
proposal in the original email), but at the same time the lack of
existing transactions using these bits (and the redundancy thereof -
they don't *do* anything special) seems to be pretty strong indication =
that they are not in use. One could argue a similarity between these
bits and OP_NOPs - no one is going to create transactions that require
OP_NOP execution to be valid as they are precisely the kind of thing
that may get soft-forked to have a new meaning. While the sighash bits
are somewhat less candidates for soft-forking,

=
I don't think "somewhat less candidates for soft-forking"= ; is a fair=20 description.=C2=A0 These bits essentially unsuitable for soft-forking withi= n legacy Script.

I don't think "someone
may have shoved random bits into parts of their
locked-for-more-than-a-year transactions" is sufficient reason to not =
soft-fork something out.

I disagree. It is = sufficient.

When was the last time Bitcoin soft-fo= rked out working transactions that sent funds from securely held UTXOs to s= ecurely held UTXOs (aside from those secured by Scripts using the reserved = OP_NOP1-OP_NOP10)?=C2=A0 AFAIK it has never occurred since the time of Sato= shi, even for the most hypothetical of transactions.=C2=A0 It is my underst= anding is that Bitcoin Core would never do such a thing unless the security= of Bitcoin protocol itself was under existential threat (see OP_CODESEPARA= TOR) and even then Bitcoin Core would only soft-fork out the minimal amount= necessary to safely diffuse such a threat.

Since = the above soft-fork isn't addressing addressing any such threat (that I= 'm aware of), and could hypothetically destroy other people money, it c= rosses a line I thought we were never supposed to cross.
=C2=A0 Obviously, actually *seeing* it= used in
practice or trying to fork them out in a fast manner would be
unacceptable, but neither is being proposed here.

Perhaps you don't see them in used in = the blockchain=20 because the users trying to use them are caught up by the fact they they are not being relayed by default (violating SCRIPT_VERIFY_STRICTENC) and a= re having difficulty redeeming them.
You cannot first make transa= ctions non-standard and then use the fact that you don't see them being= used to justify a soft-fork.

I know of users who = have their funds tied up due to other changes in Bitcoin Core's default= relay policy.=C2=A0 I believe they waiting for their funds to become valua= ble enough to go through the trouble of having them directly mined.=C2=A0 S= hall we now permanently destroy their funds too, before they have a chance = to get their transactions mined?

=
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