From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org (smtp1.osuosl.org [140.211.166.138]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 48736C002D for ; Tue, 3 May 2022 14:36:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3126A8140F for ; Tue, 3 May 2022 14:36:55 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.899 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.899 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp1.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Ie8Eabk0AbUZ for ; Tue, 3 May 2022 14:36:53 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from mail-vs1-f42.google.com (mail-vs1-f42.google.com [209.85.217.42]) by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B24C0813A2 for ; Tue, 3 May 2022 14:36:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-vs1-f42.google.com with SMTP id w124so16595747vsb.8 for ; Tue, 03 May 2022 07:36:53 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=S6nboAGFTBNvDkYAiyuoZ1TvetYICXya/QuvAhh55Jc=; b=uUbmlSgKgk1XmVKbznWhCfH0r/zCXolim9Kb6hkVyfPjryLfG7ulR6X0Eq7rvyqiHJ kcwGmnSHskywGv5jOdLid8xF9MiKIkRGbr675OIKOuk1dAm2cXBiXyMz4mwm4gWVHwop 7BovFEwNf/yBfzdDo8tkTNOdKMbojl5QDTWC2cX/6yL7oeR1acfKhBVFHey4Cg7R2viH JF0OgaMz8rl+li4/fIBuqCrBXd0jNEl5iNWF11NruF/l+R/FNg0TeYLg5LcFNz222Q8x wMQNoTkicV0Sypi4KzoXM/lY4QXHr9xwL7FtzHoQFlyQsjA/8Sqg4TWz/v/idXBSgtg7 SxaA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530hRbE+zxZn8shk3TfgFq4SsAiHF9zLw/HwZvBvuDa3jGQ4tqJ7 2WAQHkFvdWyFC4rIHLQo6/ONeYkCtYrAgTXkd3NX/ZWMU6mww+V/ X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzBNu4XZHebTRZ0eA3pWXGAL7hdP4a7g9RCBauxkVwmXSC6NJhomaoNjG9D9mdYC5DYI1AdK6HaVfg2Azq/gPs= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6102:2333:b0:32c:e27c:b60b with SMTP id b19-20020a056102233300b0032ce27cb60bmr5101462vsa.79.1651588611768; Tue, 03 May 2022 07:36:51 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Ryan Grant Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 14:36:15 +0000 Message-ID: To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] What to do when contentious soft fork activations are attempted X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 03 May 2022 14:36:55 -0000 On Sun, May 1, 2022 at 8:49 PM Jorge Tim=C3=B3n via bitcoin-dev wrote: > On Sun, May 1, 2022, 09:22 alicexbt via bitcoin-dev wrote: >> [...] Andreas is clueless about BIP 119 and other covenant >> proposals. He is spreading misinformation and [...] > Clueless and spreading disinformation, you say? What > misinformation, could you explain? First, OP_CTV covenants cannot restrict any address that the sender does not control. OP_CTV just delivers auditable presigned transactions. That's it! OP_CTV's primary design constraint is to NOT empower new ways to do blacklists (which are already possible using unwanted-multisig). That's not a statement about what Bitcoin should ultimately become, but rather what Bitcoin is likely ready for. Much like Bitcoin's design, the simplest possible covenant solution was chosen, so that it would be "dirt simple" to audit that the code does only what it should, and no more. Andreas used a few words of indecision to make excuses for not code-reviewing BIP119 or the pull request, while using a lot of words talking about: how dangerous any change is; conservative consensus process; and GovCoin blacklists. This gave the strong impression that the change was dangerous and could easily lead to the creation of blacklists enforced by L1 consensus itself (rather than enforced by other signers in a sidechain or unwanted-multisig). Andreas also didn't look into the reason that the proposed client was safe and would not cause a chain split. Speedy Trials by themselves don't risk chain splits, they poll. There was no UASF in the planned executable. Some devs hate ST because it puts the initiative in miner's hands to gauge **user support and readiness** - which those devs feel the miners have no reason to be good at - but that expires speedily. If everyone loved the change and the trial was about to pass, except ornery users - who we love when UASF is needed, of course - were going to cause a chain split of their own to block it, then ST offers miners the capability to - very quickly, faster than a release can be pushed out - change their signaling to again prevent a chain split. Russell O'Connor wrote the definitive explanation for how ST arose in the consensus process and how it was designed to make everyone unhappy. It's a great explanation of what we went through last year. https://r6.ca/blog/20210615T191422Z.html "On Building Consensus and Speedy Trial" on | 2021-06-15T19:14:22Z by | Russell O'Connor Andreas also didn't look for a non-attack reason for a separate binary release. (Here I feel like I should be naming a lot of devs as well, hmm.) Let's go back to O'Connor, who reminds us of a faction from the last consensus change: > The "devs-do-not-decide" faction's concern is regarding the > appearance of Bitcoin developers deciding the rules of Bitcoin. > [...] This faction would be fine with users building their own > alternative client for forced activation, or a configuration flag > for enabling some kind of forced activation that is not enabled by > default. Maintainers of the repository and "Big Name" devs have very personal reasons to take this stance. Meanwhile, devs who want to form an opinion on some given matter but who do not want to do their own code reviews typically look to Big Name code reviewers for guidance, in a "Consensus Beauty Contest" [note_kbc]. Contrast this with everyone who restricts their opinion-formation to their own review of the code; they are "Doing Consensus Right", rather than being stuck in the Beauty Contest. Now, if a "devs-do-not-decide" dev wrote some code, they implicitly reviewed their own code, right? But! If they did not write that code, then they **must avoid it** ...in proportion to how much it affects consensus. According to this theory of Bitcoin's consensus, we would **expect** Big Names to be partly missing from the OP_CTV code reviews. This confuses people who are used to playing the Consensus Beauty Contest. [note_kbc:] for another game about what everybody else thinks, see Keynesian beauty contest: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keynesian_beauty_contest (The connection is funny to me because we all have to individually play this game when deciding what money is, and in so doing pay a last homage to Keynes, during our multi-generational exit from his eponymous economics of manipulated interest rates.) Jimmy Song, in a video best fitting the advocacy referred to by Michael (who did not give any specific link), claims that the OP_CTV review process is "routing around" some Big Names. Jimmy is seemingly unaware that some Big Names are explicitly not participating in guiding what Bitcoin's consensus should be, and that some are even using strategic ambiguity to do so. With the context above, we have a much less nefarious interpretation of motive for releasing a binary - one that is part of the consensus process. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Di5VNiiCYnIg "Bitcoin Brief - BIP119, Mexico CBDC & Bitcoin's Role in Russia vs Ukraine!" on | Apr 25, 2022 (mark 1:13:52.0) Jimmy Song (mark 1:18:00.0) "routing around" An alternative client must, by necessity, offer both its consensus feature and its activation. Releasing an alternative client is not a decision made from impatience and disrespect. It=E2=80=99s the result of asking everyone, getting literal non-responses, and intuiting that the landscape has changed, so something on this path must be different from last time. While the alternative client route surprised me when I heard about it, I cannot say that I personally knew of any other way to advance what has clearly been a blocked discussion, and so I did not disassociate myself from the effort. People do not understand how blocked up consensus is, and no dev has verbalized a better solution for maintainers than strategic ambiguity, which is most confusing when it is delivering only silence. The typical alternative offered by other devs is, "Wait." Well, this "Wait" has almost always meant "Never." Take a look at CSFS and APO. They've been waiting, but for what? What's the bug that BIP authors can't fix? Where's the concrete pull request? Who is going to anoint them as done? OP_CTV has made its rite of passage and transcended these questions. Its only competition is whether something better can be imagined, but those arguments need to explain why learning from a good opcode in the meantime is worth waiting years to work through new safety concerns. If any of this matters, then timing matters, too. OP_CTV is sitting at the front of the bus. Personally, I suspect that the "something better" crowd wants recursive covenants, yet recognizes the argument is difficult and would have put it off in a sense of misplaced priorities, but we'll find out soon. If there were some kind of assurance that could be offered, something that would result in a less contentious soft fork, instead of stonewalling resistance that makes all soft forks more contentious, then a later "epsilon" upgrade to covenants would be easier instead of harder. This is because everyone who believes that recursive covenants are not a new threat to Bitcoin could argue towards a common purpose and resolve that in a binding consensus agreement. One such binding mechanism could be parties committing matched coins locked under a future opcode, although this would be an extreme departure from typical development and incur massive risk to the parties if for other reasons phase two of the initiative fails. It's too bad the game theory isn't simpler. Finally, Andreas summarized the conservatism in his position as basically, "If you want scripting and contracts, go buy ETH." Which is offensive to everyone trying to make bitcoins more protective of individual freedom and thus more valuable; whether you're working on scaling and privacy, the Lightning Network, Discreet Log Contracts, CoinPool covenants, self-custody vault covenants, building out Taproot capabilities, or working on other infrastructure. What a clueless shitcoiner! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DvAE5fOZ2Luw "BIP119, EU regulatory attack, El Salvador, and much more in Q&A with aantonop (April 2022)" on | Apr 24, 2022 by | aantonop (mark 30:34.0) "if you want to do smart contracts..." The path to redemption in the Bitcoin community is to unequivocally help Bitcoin. Jeremy wasn't always Bitcoin-only, but his efforts have been sincere and he works in the concrete realm where anyone can judge how pure his contributions are. Even if OP_CTV is never activated, or if no covenant opcode is ever activated, Bitcoin is much more secure due to the critical bug fixes that Jeremy has already seen merged just planning ahead for a mempool that could handle dependent transactions. Bitcoin was never under attack or at risk of harm from Jeremy's actions to advance the covenants discussion. Andreas is welcome to research technical merits better before communicating, and to discover how a vision of powerful contract covenants - in the most decentralized money that exists - can affect people's freedom. In so doing, join us.