From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Wcv1Y-0007sw-CX for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 23 Apr 2014 11:07:32 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.214.172 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.214.172; envelope-from=mh.in.england@gmail.com; helo=mail-ob0-f172.google.com; Received: from mail-ob0-f172.google.com ([209.85.214.172]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Wcv1W-00070p-DR for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 23 Apr 2014 11:07:31 +0000 Received: by mail-ob0-f172.google.com with SMTP id wo20so833350obc.31 for ; Wed, 23 Apr 2014 04:07:25 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.182.27.133 with SMTP id t5mr1264465obg.65.1398251245094; Wed, 23 Apr 2014 04:07:25 -0700 (PDT) Sender: mh.in.england@gmail.com Received: by 10.76.96.180 with HTTP; Wed, 23 Apr 2014 04:07:25 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <201404231057.54387.andyparkins@gmail.com> References: <201404231057.54387.andyparkins@gmail.com> Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 13:07:25 +0200 X-Google-Sender-Auth: 0jPXenrD123TIp3YXnHjyrtr5wQ Message-ID: From: Mike Hearn To: Andy Parkins Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113356c6c54eae04f7b3bc0d X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (mh.in.england[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Wcv1W-00070p-DR Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Coinbase reallocation to discourage Finney attacks X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 11:07:32 -0000 --001a113356c6c54eae04f7b3bc0d Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Just pedantry: 100% of credit card transactions _can_ be fradulantly > charged > back but arent. > If you do a chargeback the bank double checks this, investigates it and people who repeatedly try and do fraudulent chargebacks get their accounts terminated. It's not like your bank offers you a "reverse this payment" button in the UI that always works, right? > If N was 5%, then only 5% of bitcoin transactions _could_ be fraudulantly > "charged back"; so then why wouldn't only 2% of those bitcoin transactions > be fraudulant too, just as in the CC case? > If you attempt fraud against a bank, they know who you are and will come after you in one way or another. But it's safe to assume that users of a double spend service would be anonymous and the kind of merchants they go after are not hassling their customers with strong ID checks, so there would be no consequences for them. It's a game they can only win. --001a113356c6c54eae04f7b3bc0d Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Just pedantry: 100% of credit card transactions = _can_ be fradulantly charged
back but arent.

If you do a chargeback = the bank double checks this, investigates it and people who repeatedly try = and do fraudulent chargebacks get their accounts terminated. It's not l= ike your bank offers you a "reverse this payment" button in the U= I that always works, right?
=C2=A0
If N was 5%, then onl= y 5% of bitcoin transactions _could_ be fraudulantly
"charged back"; so then why wouldn't only 2% of those bitcoin= transactions
be fraudulant too, just as in the CC case?

<= div>If you attempt fraud against a bank, they know who you are and will com= e after you in one way or another. But it's safe to assume that users o= f a double spend service would be anonymous and the kind of merchants they = go after are not hassling their customers with strong ID checks, so there w= ould be no consequences for them. It's a game they can only win.

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