From: Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net>
To: Daniel Lidstrom <lidstrom83@gmail.com>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Identity protocol observation
Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2013 17:22:26 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CANEZrP1Eb2DS7LOg_wp-H9y-WaSWKj1x7f4gE7mK7RyusaamyA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CADjHg8G8v_oN=CWCVy8agvjP6cAMkACav74SaYRrTGf+c0nVeA@mail.gmail.com>
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1) Generate sacrifice proof file using an app
2) Load file into browser
3) Surf
Where are the names in that design? I'm not sure where NameCoin comes into
this. The point of a sacrifice is it's an anonymous identity, there's no
point attaching a name to it.
BTW I keep phone numbers in an address book ;)
On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 5:16 PM, Daniel Lidstrom <lidstrom83@gmail.com>wrote:
> Fair enough, though people still manage okay with phone numbers. And a
> decentralized naming system seems to come at great cost - with namecoin you
> need the whole blockchain to resolve names without trust. Strip out a bell
> and whistle - meaningfulness and transferability of names - and you get a
> simple, rudimentary (spam killing!) system that scales on any device. I'll
> only argue that it seems to be Good Enough *for the types of people who
> might care about decentralized names*. Probably a very small set :)
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 8:00 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
>
>> Interesting observation, thanks.
>>
>> I'd think any competent implementation of such an identity scheme would
>> not involve end users directly handling randomized nonsense words, however.
>> I always imagined a sacrifice as being a file that you make with a GUI tool
>> and load into a browser extension.
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 3:35 PM, Daniel Lidstrom <lidstrom83@gmail.com>wrote:
>>
>>> A couple more thoughts on this:
>>>
>>> 1) Both c and k can be kept if c is pronounced 'ch', giving ~10.9 bits
>>> per phoneme.
>>> 2) An extra phoneme (4 encode 43 bits total) gives room to put extra
>>> information into the name, e.g. the first 5 bits could be input as the key
>>> to a PRP that permutes the last 38 back to a standard encoding of a tx
>>> location. This would give the user 32 random names per sacrifice to choose
>>> from, and 38 bits to encode its location in the blockchain, which is enough
>>> for pretty large blocks.
>>>
>>> Sample 4 phoneme names:
>>> ~milmoz-vyrnyx
>>> ~mypnoz-fojzas
>>> ~sawfex-bovlec
>>> ~fidhut-guvgis
>>> ~bobfej-jessuk
>>> ~furcos-diwhuw
>>> ~wokryx-wilrox
>>> ~bygbyl-caggos
>>> ~vewcyv-jyjsal
>>> ~daxsaf-cywkul
>>>
>>> They're not that bad IMHO, especially if you get to pick a decent one
>>> from a bunch.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 3:35 AM, Daniel Lidstrom <lidstrom83@gmail.com>wrote:
>>>
>>>> The location of a tx in the blockchain can be encoded in
>>>> n=log2(h)+log2(t) bits, where h is the block height, and t is the number of
>>>> transactions in the block. Currently h~250,000 and t~500, so n~27. A CVC
>>>> phoneme encodes ~10.7 bits *, so a transaction today can be located in the
>>>> blockchain with 3 of these, e.g. reb-mizvig. This is reasonably short,
>>>> readable and memorable.
>>>>
>>>> The identity protocol Jeff Garzik is working on will link a public key
>>>> fingerprint to a miner sacrifice transaction. This tx could in turn be
>>>> uniquely described with a short name as above. Associating this name with
>>>> the public key becomes secure once the tx is sufficiently buried in the
>>>> blockchain. In the identity protocol, lightweight clients check the
>>>> validity of a sacrifice tx by checking that its merkle path is valid. But
>>>> this path encodes, via the ordering of the hashes at each level, the
>>>> location of the transaction in the block, so the lightweight client can
>>>> verify the sacrifice tx's short name using only the information he already
>>>> has.
>>>>
>>>> Some more random names:
>>>> vec-halhic
>>>> wom-vizpyd
>>>> guv-zussof
>>>> jog-copwug
>>>> seg-rizges
>>>> jyg-somgod
>>>> pax-synjem
>>>> zyg-zuxdyj
>>>> gid-mutdyj
>>>> rel-hyrdaj
>>>>
>>>> Sources of inspiration:
>>>> urbit.org
>>>> https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Identity_protocol_v1
>>>>
>>>> * This is somewhat restricted: I disallowed q for obvious reasons and k
>>>> because it conflicts with c, and c looks much softer and less like
>>>> Klingon. H is allowed for the first consonant, but not the second, and x
>>>> is allowed for the last one, but not the first one. Y is a vowel, but not
>>>> a consonant. Maybe these weren't quite the right choices. Paint away!
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-10-03 15:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-10-03 9:35 [Bitcoin-development] Identity protocol observation Daniel Lidstrom
2013-10-03 13:35 ` Daniel Lidstrom
2013-10-03 14:00 ` Mike Hearn
2013-10-03 15:16 ` Daniel Lidstrom
2013-10-03 15:22 ` Mike Hearn [this message]
2013-10-03 16:16 ` Daniel Lidstrom
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