From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1VAKM7-000484-OX for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 16 Aug 2013 13:46:19 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.214.170 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.214.170; envelope-from=mh.in.england@gmail.com; helo=mail-ob0-f170.google.com; Received: from mail-ob0-f170.google.com ([209.85.214.170]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1VAKM6-0002M9-DR for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 16 Aug 2013 13:46:19 +0000 Received: by mail-ob0-f170.google.com with SMTP id eh20so2102343obb.1 for ; Fri, 16 Aug 2013 06:46:13 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.182.250.232 with SMTP id zf8mr11655obc.75.1376660772881; Fri, 16 Aug 2013 06:46:12 -0700 (PDT) Sender: mh.in.england@gmail.com Received: by 10.76.80.165 with HTTP; Fri, 16 Aug 2013 06:46:12 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 15:46:12 +0200 X-Google-Sender-Auth: RDPlZ_a8ldSCHPqGUIBtFgf3OUk Message-ID: From: Mike Hearn To: "Warren Togami Jr." Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0160c454580dc804e410d003 X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (mh.in.england[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1VAKM6-0002M9-DR Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Gavin's post-0.9 TODO list... X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 13:46:19 -0000 --089e0160c454580dc804e410d003 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 A ban-subnet RPC would be a reasonable addition, but obviously DoS attackers that are IP or bandwidth constrained are really just script kiddies. Also anything that involves every node operator doing manual intervention rather works against decentralisation and having a big network. That's why I keep pushing for automated heuristic driven prioritisation. On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 3:41 PM, Warren Togami Jr. wrote: > > https://togami.com/~warren/archive/2013/example-bitcoind-dos-mitigation-via-iptables.txt > *Anti-DoS Low Hanging Fruit: source IP or subnet connection limits* > If you disallow the same IP and/or subnet from establishing too many TCP > connections with your node, it becomes more expensive for attackers to use > a single host exhaust a target node's resources. This iptables firewall > based example has almost zero drawbacks, but it is too complicated for most > people to deploy. Yes, there is a small chance that you will block > legitimate connections, but there are plenty of other nodes for random > connections to choose from. Configurable per source IP and source subnet > limits with sane defaults enforced by bitcoind itself would be a big > improvement over the current situation where one host address can consume > limited resources of many target nodes. > > This doesn't remove the risk of a network-wide connection exhaustion > attack by a determined attacker, but it at least makes multiple types of > attacks a lot more expensive. This also doesn't do much against the io > vulnerability, which would require major redesigns to prevent in Bitcoin. > > > https://github.com/litecoin-project/litecoin/commit/db4d8e21d99551bef4c807aa1534a074e4b7964d > *Want to safely delay the block size limit increase for another year or > two?* This patch alone enables that. > > > > On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 2:24 AM, Mike Hearn wrote: > >> The only other thing I'd like to see there is the start of a new anti-DoS >> framework. I think once the outline is in place other people will be able >> to fill it in appropriately. But the current framework has to be left >> behind. >> >> If I had to choose one thing to evict to make time for that, it'd be the >> whitepapers. At the moment we still have plenty of headroom in block sizes, >> even post April. It can probably be safely delayed for a while. >> >> >> On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 2:11 PM, Mike Hearn wrote: >> >>> Cool. Maybe it's time for another development update on the foundation >>> blog? >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 3:00 AM, Gavin Andresen >> > wrote: >>> >>>> Mike asked what non-0.9 code I'm working on; the three things on the >>>> top of my list are: >>>> >>>> 1) Smarter fee handling on the client side, instead of hard-coded fees. >>>> I was busy today generating scatter-plots and histograms of transaction >>>> fees versus priorities to get some insight into what miner policies look >>>> like right now. >>>> >>>> 2) "First double-spend" relaying and alerting, to better support >>>> low-value in-person transactions. Related: >>>> *Have *a *Snack*, Pay with *Bitcoins* >>>> >>>> >>>> 3) Work on 2-3 whitepapers on why we need to increase or remove the 1MB >>>> block size limit, how we can do it safely, and go through all of the >>>> arguments that have been made against it and explain why they're wrong. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> -- >>>> Gavin Andresen >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> Get 100% visibility into Java/.NET code with AppDynamics Lite! >> It's a free troubleshooting tool designed for production. >> Get down to code-level detail for bottlenecks, with <2% overhead. >> Download for free and get started troubleshooting in minutes. >> >> http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=48897031&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk >> _______________________________________________ >> Bitcoin-development mailing list >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >> >> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Get 100% visibility into Java/.NET code with AppDynamics Lite! > It's a free troubleshooting tool designed for production. > Get down to code-level detail for bottlenecks, with <2% overhead. > Download for free and get started troubleshooting in minutes. > http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=48897031&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > --089e0160c454580dc804e410d003 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
A ban-subnet RPC would be a reasonable addition, but obvio= usly DoS attackers that are IP or bandwidth constrained are really just scr= ipt kiddies. Also anything that involves every node operator doing manual i= ntervention rather works against decentralisation and having a big network.= That's why I keep pushing for automated heuristic driven prioritisatio= n.


On Fri, Aug 1= 6, 2013 at 3:41 PM, Warren Togami Jr. <wtogami@gmail.com> wr= ote:
Anti-DoS Low Hanging Fruit: source IP or subnet connection limits<= /b>
If you disallow the same IP and/or subnet from establishing too many T= CP connections with your node, it becomes more expensive for attackers to u= se a single host exhaust a target node's resources. =C2=A0This iptables= firewall based example has almost zero drawbacks, but it is too complicate= d for most people to deploy. =C2=A0Yes, there is a small chance that you wi= ll block legitimate connections, but there are plenty of other nodes for ra= ndom connections to choose from. =C2=A0Configurable per source IP and sourc= e subnet limits with sane defaults enforced by bitcoind itself would be a b= ig improvement over the current situation where one host address can consum= e limited resources of many target nodes.

This doesn't remove the risk of a network-wide conn= ection exhaustion attack by a determined attacker, but it at least makes mu= ltiple types of attacks a lot more expensive. =C2=A0This also doesn't d= o much against the io vulnerability, which would require major redesigns to= prevent in Bitcoin.

Want to safely delay the block size limit increase for anothe= r year or two? =C2=A0This patch alone enables that.



=
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 2:24 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.n= et> wrote:
The only other thing I'd like to see there is the start of a n= ew anti-DoS framework. I think once the outline is in place other people wi= ll be able to fill it in appropriately. But the current framework has to be= left behind.

If I had to choose one thing to evict to make time for that,= it'd be the whitepapers. At the moment we still have plenty of headroo= m in block sizes, even post April. It can probably be safely delayed for a = while.


On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 2:11 PM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
Cool. Maybe it's time for another development update o= n the foundation blog?


On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 3:00 AM, Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen@gmail.com> wrote:
Mike asked what non-0.9 cod= e I'm working on; the three things on the top of my list are:

<= /div>
1) Smarter fee handling on the client side, instead of hard-coded fees= . I was busy today generating scatter-plots and histograms of transaction f= ees versus priorities to get some insight into what miner policies look lik= e right now.

2) "First double-spend" relaying and alerting= , to better support low-value in-person transactions. =C2=A0Related:=C2=A0<= /div>

Have=C2=A0a=C2=A0Snack, Pay with=C2=A0Bitcoins=C2=A0


3) Work on 2-3 whitepapers on why we need to increase o= r remove the 1MB block size limit, how we can do it safely, and go through = all of the arguments that have been made against it and explain why they= 9;re wrong.

--
--
Gavin Andresen




-----------------------------= -------------------------------------------------
Get 100% visibility into Java/.NET code with AppDynamics Lite!
It's a free troubleshooting tool designed for production.
Get down to code-level detail for bottlenecks, with <2% overhead.
Download for free and get started troubleshooting in minutes.
http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gam= pad/clk?id=3D48897031&iu=3D/4140/ostg.clktrk
___________________= ____________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-de= velopment



-----------------------------------------------------------------------= -------
Get 100% visibility into Java/.NET code with AppDynamics Lite!
It's a free troubleshooting tool designed for production.
Get down to code-level detail for bottlenecks, with <2% overhead.
Download for free and get started troubleshooting in minutes.
http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gam= pad/clk?id=3D48897031&iu=3D/4140/ostg.clktrk
___________________= ____________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-develo= pment@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-de= velopment


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