From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YHurc-0002Df-Hr for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sun, 01 Feb 2015 13:47:00 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 74.125.82.52 as permitted sender) client-ip=74.125.82.52; envelope-from=mh.in.england@gmail.com; helo=mail-wg0-f52.google.com; Received: from mail-wg0-f52.google.com ([74.125.82.52]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1YHura-00063Y-On for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sun, 01 Feb 2015 13:47:00 +0000 Received: by mail-wg0-f52.google.com with SMTP id y19so34338942wgg.11 for ; Sun, 01 Feb 2015 05:46:52 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.37.77 with SMTP id w13mr14687537wij.66.1422798412621; Sun, 01 Feb 2015 05:46:52 -0800 (PST) Sender: mh.in.england@gmail.com Received: by 10.194.188.11 with HTTP; Sun, 1 Feb 2015 05:46:52 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: <27395C55-CF59-4E65-83CA-73F903272C5F@gmail.com> <1348028F-26F8-42CB-9859-C9CB751BF0C9@gmail.com> <88211D58-DE9D-4B4A-B3A5-2EEFDFC5E02B@gmail.com> Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2015 14:46:52 +0100 X-Google-Sender-Auth: 8gjYrmuFdgEaCut2Qq8sIrwJ4DU Message-ID: From: Mike Hearn To: =?UTF-8?Q?Martin_Habov=C5=A1tiak?= Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=e89a8f647021f8af3f050e07114b X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (mh.in.england[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1YHura-00063Y-On Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal to address Bitcoin malware X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 01 Feb 2015 13:47:00 -0000 --e89a8f647021f8af3f050e07114b Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable TREZOR does not support BIP70. I think they planned to work on it after multi-sig support, which is now done, so I'm hoping that it's next on their roadmap. The signing features of BIP70 have (fortunately!) been implemented by payment processors quite early, before we really have the client side fully figured out and implemented. Mobile wallets (Android, iOS) do implement it and they are reasonably secure, for desktops we need TREZOR and we need the Bitcoin Authenticator 2-factor wallet to support it. I think they do, but can't remember exactly. Either they do, or it's on their roadmap. On Sun, Feb 1, 2015 at 2:31 PM, Martin Habov=C5=A1tiak < martin.habovstiak@gmail.com> wrote: > BIP70 is quite safe agains MitB. If user copies URL belonging to other > merchant, he would see the fact after entering it into his wallet > application. The only problem is, attacker can buy from the same > merchant with user's money. (sending him different URL) This can be > mitigated by merchant setting "memo" to the description of the basket > and some user info (e.g. address to which goods are sent). > > But if whole computer is compromised, you're already screwed. Trezor > should help, but I'm not sure if it supports BIP70. > > 2015-02-01 14:49 GMT+02:00 Brian Erdelyi : > > > > In online banking, the banks generate account numbers. An attacker > cannot > > generate their own account number and the likelihood of an attacker > having > > the same account number that I am trying to transfer funds to is low an= d > > this is why OCRA is effective with online banking. > > > > With Bitcoin, the Bitcoin address is comparable to the recipient=E2=80= =99s bank > > account number. I now see how an an attacker can brute force the > bitcoin > > address with vanitygen. Is there any way to generate an 8 digit number > from > > the bitcoin address that can be used to verify transactions in such a w= ay > > (possibly with hashing?) that brute forcing a bitcoin address would tak= e > > longer than a reasonable period of time (say 60 seconds) so a system > could > > time out if a transaction was not completed in that time? > > > > I=E2=80=99ve also looked into BIP70 (Payment Protocol) that claims prot= ection > > against man-in-the-middle/man-in-the-browser (MitB) based attacks. A > common > > way to protect against this is with out-of-band transaction verificatio= n > > ( > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser#Out-of-band_transaction_v= erification > ). > > I see how BIP 70 verifies the payment request, however, is there any wa= y > to > > verify that the transaction signed by the wallet matches the request > before > > it is sent to the blockchain (and how can this support out of band > > verification)? Perhaps this is something that can only be supported wh= en > > sending money with web based wallets. > > > > Brian Erdelyi > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------= ----- > > Dive into the World of Parallel Programming. The Go Parallel Website, > > sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is > your > > hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought > > leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Tak= e > a > > look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net/ > > _______________________________________________ > > Bitcoin-development mailing list > > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------= ----- > Dive into the World of Parallel Programming. The Go Parallel Website, > sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is > your > hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought > leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take = a > look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net/ > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > --e89a8f647021f8af3f050e07114b Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
TREZOR does not support BIP70. I think they planned to wor= k on it after multi-sig support, which is now done, so I'm hoping that = it's next on their roadmap.=C2=A0

The signing featur= es of BIP70 have (fortunately!) been implemented by payment processors quit= e early, before we really have the client side fully figured out and implem= ented. Mobile wallets (Android, iOS) do implement it and they are reasonabl= y secure, for desktops we need TREZOR and we need the Bitcoin Authenticator= 2-factor wallet to support it. I think they do, but can't remember exa= ctly. Either they do, or it's on their roadmap.

On Sun, Feb 1, 2015 at 2:31= PM, Martin Habov=C5=A1tiak <martin.habovstiak@gmail.com>= wrote:
BIP70 is quite safe agains= MitB. If user copies URL belonging to other
merchant, he would see the fact after entering it into his wallet
application. The only problem is, attacker can buy from the same
merchant with user's money. (sending him different URL) This can be
mitigated by merchant setting "memo" to the description of the ba= sket
and some user info (e.g. address to which goods are sent).

But if whole computer is compromised, you're already screwed. Trezor should help, but I'm not sure if it supports BIP70.

2015-02-01 14:49 GMT+02:00 Brian Erdelyi <brian.erdelyi@gmail.com>:
>
> In online banking, the banks generate account numbers.=C2=A0 An attack= er cannot
> generate their own account number and the likelihood of an attacker ha= ving
> the same account number that I am trying to transfer funds to is low a= nd
> this is why OCRA is effective with online banking.
>
> With Bitcoin, the Bitcoin address is comparable to the recipient=E2=80= =99s bank
> account number.=C2=A0 =C2=A0I now see how an an attacker can brute for= ce the bitcoin
> address with vanitygen.=C2=A0 Is there any way to generate an 8 digit = number from
> the bitcoin address that can be used to verify transactions in such a = way
> (possibly with hashing?) that brute forcing a bitcoin address would ta= ke
> longer than a reasonable period of time (say 60 seconds) so a system c= ould
> time out if a transaction was not completed in that time?
>
> I=E2=80=99ve also looked into BIP70 (Payment Protocol) that claims pro= tection
> against man-in-the-middle/man-in-the-browser (MitB) based attacks.=C2= =A0 A common
> way to protect against this is with out-of-band transaction verificati= on
> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/= Man-in-the-browser#Out-of-band_transaction_verification).
> I see how BIP 70 verifies the payment request, however, is there any w= ay to
> verify that the transaction signed by the wallet matches the request b= efore
> it is sent to the blockchain (and how can this support out of band
> verification)?=C2=A0 Perhaps this is something that can only be suppor= ted when
> sending money with web based wallets.
>
> Brian Erdelyi
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------= --------------------
> Dive into the World of Parallel Programming. The Go Parallel Website,<= br> > sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, i= s your
> hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought<= br> > leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Ta= ke a
> look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net/
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-d= evelopment@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitco= in-development
>

---------------------------------------------------------------------------= ---
Dive into the World of Parallel Programming. The Go Parallel Website,
sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is you= r
hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought
leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a<= br> look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net/
_______________________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-develo= pment@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-de= velopment

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