From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YsIN5-00007r-Ji for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 12 May 2015 22:09:51 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.220.41 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.220.41; envelope-from=gappleto97@gmail.com; helo=mail-pa0-f41.google.com; Received: from mail-pa0-f41.google.com ([209.85.220.41]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1YsIN4-0005TU-65 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 12 May 2015 22:09:51 +0000 Received: by pabsx10 with SMTP id sx10so27891714pab.3 for ; Tue, 12 May 2015 15:09:44 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.68.106.226 with SMTP id gx2mr4748332pbb.78.1431468584461; Tue, 12 May 2015 15:09:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.66.0.163 with HTTP; Tue, 12 May 2015 15:09:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.66.0.163 with HTTP; Tue, 12 May 2015 15:09:44 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <20150512171640.GA32606@savin.petertodd.org> Date: Tue, 12 May 2015 18:09:44 -0400 Message-ID: From: gabe appleton To: Tier Nolan Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7b6da9f07bed800515e9c085 X-Spam-Score: -0.3 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (gappleto97[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 0.2 FREEMAIL_ENVFROM_END_DIGIT Envelope-from freemail username ends in digit (gappleto97[at]gmail.com) 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message 0.0 AC_DIV_BONANZA RAW: Too many divs in a row... spammy template -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature -0.0 AWL AWL: Adjusted score from AWL reputation of From: address X-Headers-End: 1YsIN4-0005TU-65 Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposed additional options for pruned nodes X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 12 May 2015 22:09:51 -0000 --047d7b6da9f07bed800515e9c085 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 This is exactly the sort of solution I was hoping for. It seems this is the minimal modification to make it work, and, if someone was willing to work with me, I would love to help implement this. My only concern would be if the - - max-size flag is not included than this delivers significantly less benefit to the end user. Still a good chunk, but possibly not enough. On May 12, 2015 6:03 PM, "Tier Nolan" wrote: > > > On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 8:03 PM, Gregory Maxwell > wrote: > >> >> (0) Block coverage should have locality; historical blocks are >> (almost) always needed in contiguous ranges. Having random peers >> with totally random blocks would be horrific for performance; as you'd >> have to hunt down a working peer and make a connection for each block >> with high probability. >> >> (1) Block storage on nodes with a fraction of the history should not >> depend on believing random peers; because listening to peers can >> easily create attacks (e.g. someone could break the network; by >> convincing nodes to become unbalanced) and not useful-- it's not like >> the blockchain is substantially different for anyone; if you're to the >> point of needing to know coverage to fill then something is wrong. >> Gaps would be handled by archive nodes, so there is no reason to >> increase vulnerability by doing anything but behaving uniformly. >> >> (2) The decision to contact a node should need O(1) communications, >> not just because of the delay of chasing around just to find who has >> someone; but because that chasing process usually makes the process >> _highly_ sybil vulnerable. >> >> (3) The expression of what blocks a node has should be compact (e.g. >> not a dense list of blocks) so it can be rumored efficiently. >> >> (4) Figuring out what block (ranges) a peer has given should be >> computationally efficient. >> >> (5) The communication about what blocks a node has should be compact. >> >> (6) The coverage created by the network should be uniform, and should >> remain uniform as the blockchain grows; ideally it you shouldn't need >> to update your state to know what blocks a peer will store in the >> future, assuming that it doesn't change the amount of data its >> planning to use. (What Tier Nolan proposes sounds like it fails this >> point) >> >> (7) Growth of the blockchain shouldn't cause much (or any) need to >> refetch old blocks. >> > > M = 1,000,000 > N = number of "starts" > > S(0) = hash(seed) mod M > ... > S(n) = hash(S(n-1)) mod M > > This generates a sequence of start points. If the start point is less > than the block height, then it counts as a hit. > > The node stores the 50MB of data starting at the block at height S(n). > > As the blockchain increases in size, new starts will be less than the > block height. This means some other runs would be deleted. > > A weakness is that it is random with regards to block heights. Tiny > blocks have the same priority as larger blocks. > > 0) Blocks are local, in 50MB runs > 1) Agreed, nodes should download headers-first (or some other compact way > of finding the highest POW chain) > 2) M could be fixed, N and the seed are all that is required. The seed > doesn't have to be that large. If 1% of the blockchain is stored, then 16 > bits should be sufficient so that every block is covered by seeds. > 3) N is likely to be less than 2 bytes and the seed can be 2 bytes > 4) A 1% cover of 50GB of blockchain would have 10 starts @ 50MB per run. > That is 10 hashes. They don't even necessarily need to be crypt hashes > 5) Isn't this the same as 3? > 6) Every block has the same odds of being included. There inherently > needs to be an update when a node deletes some info due to exceeding its > cap. N can be dropped one run at a time. > 7) When new starts drop below the tip height, N can be decremented and > that one run is deleted. > > There would need to be a special rule to ensure the low height blocks are > covered. Nodes should keep the first 50MB of blocks with some probability > (10%?) > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud > Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications > Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights > Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. > http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > --047d7b6da9f07bed800515e9c085 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

This is exactly the sort of solution I was hoping for. It se= ems this is the minimal modification to make it work, and, if someone was w= illing to work with me, I would love to help implement this.

My only concern would be if the - - max-size flag is not inc= luded than this delivers significantly less benefit to the end user. Still = a good chunk, but possibly not enough.

On May 12, 2015 6:03 PM, "Tier Nolan" = <tier.nolan@gmail.com> wr= ote:


On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 8:= 03 PM, Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@gmail.com> wrote:

(0) Block coverage should have locality; historical blocks are
(almost) always needed in contiguous ranges.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Having random peer= s
with totally random blocks would be horrific for performance; as you'd<= br> have to hunt down a working peer and make a connection for each block
with high probability.

(1) Block storage on nodes with a fraction of the history should not
depend on believing random peers; because listening to peers can
easily create attacks (e.g. someone could break the network; by
convincing nodes to become unbalanced) and not useful-- it's not like the blockchain is substantially different for anyone; if you're to the<= br> point of needing to know coverage to fill then something is wrong.
Gaps would be handled by archive nodes, so there is no reason to
increase vulnerability by doing anything but behaving uniformly.

(2) The decision to contact a node should need O(1) communications,
not just because of the delay of chasing around just to find who has
someone; but because that chasing process usually makes the process
_highly_ sybil vulnerable.

(3) The expression of what blocks a node has should be compact (e.g.
not a dense list of blocks) so it can be rumored efficiently.

(4) Figuring out what block (ranges) a peer has given should be
computationally efficient.

(5) The communication about what blocks a node has should be compact.

(6) The coverage created by the network should be uniform, and should
remain uniform as the blockchain grows; ideally it you shouldn't need to update your state to know what blocks a peer will store in the
future, assuming that it doesn't change the amount of data its
planning to use. (What Tier Nolan proposes sounds like it fails this
point)

(7) Growth of the blockchain shouldn't cause much (or any) need to
refetch old blocks.

M = =3D 1,000,000
N =3D number of "sta= rts"

S(0) =3D hash(seed) mod M
...S(n) =3D hash(S(n-1)) mod M

This generates a sequence of start points.=C2= =A0 If the start point is less than the block height, then it counts as a h= it.

The node stores the 50MB of dat= a starting at the block at height S(n).

As the blockchain increases in size, new starts will be less than the=20 block height.=C2=A0 This means some other runs would be deleted.

A weakness is that it is random with regards to block heights.=C2=A0 Tin= y blocks have the same priority as larger blocks.

0) Bloc= ks are local, in 50MB runs
1) Agreed, nodes should download h= eaders-first (or some other compact way of finding the highest POW chain)
2) M could be fixed, N and the seed are all that is required.= =C2=A0 The seed doesn't have to be that large.=C2=A0 If 1% of the block= chain is stored, then 16 bits should be sufficient so that every block is c= overed by seeds.
3) N is likely to be less than 2 bytes and t= he seed can be 2 bytes
4) A 1% cover of 50GB of blockchain wo= uld have 10 starts @ 50MB per run.=C2=A0 That is 10 hashes.=C2=A0 They don&= #39;t even necessarily need to be crypt hashes
5) Isn't t= his the same as 3?
6) Every block has the same odds of being = included.=C2=A0 There inherently needs to be an update when a node deletes = some info due to exceeding its cap.=C2=A0 N can be dropped one run at a tim= e.=C2=A0
7) When new starts drop below the tip height, N can= be decremented and that one run is deleted.

There would = need to be a special rule to ensure the low height blocks are covered.=C2= =A0 Nodes should keep the first 50MB of blocks with some probability (10%?)=

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Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight.
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