From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1XJn4Y-0003Sy-DD for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 19 Aug 2014 17:19:50 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.213.179 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.213.179; envelope-from=christophe.biocca@gmail.com; helo=mail-ig0-f179.google.com; Received: from mail-ig0-f179.google.com ([209.85.213.179]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1XJn4X-0007bw-Dz for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 19 Aug 2014 17:19:50 +0000 Received: by mail-ig0-f179.google.com with SMTP id h18so9972390igc.6 for ; Tue, 19 Aug 2014 10:19:44 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.42.247.137 with SMTP id mc9mr42109798icb.13.1408468784115; Tue, 19 Aug 2014 10:19:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.64.78.161 with HTTP; Tue, 19 Aug 2014 10:19:44 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <0C0EF7F9-DBBA-4872-897D-63CFA3853726@ricmoo.com> <33D4B2E3-DBF0-444E-B76A-765C4C17E964@ricmoo.com> <53F37635.5070807@riseup.net> Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 13:19:44 -0400 Message-ID: From: Christophe Biocca To: Bitcoin Development Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Spam-Score: -1.6 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (christophe.biocca[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1XJn4X-0007bw-Dz Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal: Encrypt bitcoin messages X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 17:19:50 -0000 If your threat model is passive listeners, it seems to me that simply establishing a symmetric key for each connection at handshake time using diffie-hellman is all you need. No public private crypto needed at all. The whole thing seems like a bit of security theater unfortunately. The kind of attacker that can pull off widespread passive listening is probably able and willing to do active MITM. It's not a huge incremental cost. Instead, those users that do have a need for security should probably connect to the network using Tor or I2P, which can give much better security guarantees than anything being discussed here. On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 12:58 PM, Angel Leon wrote: > " > I suggest that Bitcoin Core should generate a public/private key pair and > share the public one with peers." > > I've not read the p2p protocol of Bitcoin core, but I suppose the initial > handshake between 2 peers would be the ideal place to exchange a public > keys. > > would it make sense to generate a new random pair of keys per each peer you > connect to? > then each subsequent message to every peer gets encrypted differently, > keeping each conversation isolated from each other encryption-speaking. > > These keys would have nothing to do with your wallet, they're just to > encrypt any further communication between peers post-handshake. Would that > be of any use to "This could provide privacy and integrity but not > autentication."? > > http://twitter.com/gubatron > > > On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Gregory Maxwell > wrote: >> >> On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Justus Ranvier >> wrote: >> > If that's not acceptable, even using TLS with self-signed certificates >> > would be an improvement. >> >> TLS is a huge complex attack surface, any use of it requires an >> additional dependency with a large amount of difficult to audit code. >> TLS is trivially DOS attacked and every major/widely used TLS >> implementation has had multiple memory disclosure or remote execution >> vulnerabilities even in just the last several years. >> >> We've dodged several emergency scale vulnerabilities by not having TLS. >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> _______________________________________________ >> Bitcoin-development mailing list >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >