From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2ED8C10DA for ; Tue, 23 Jan 2018 05:47:40 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wr0-f195.google.com (mail-wr0-f195.google.com [209.85.128.195]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 15E4E1B4 for ; Tue, 23 Jan 2018 05:47:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-wr0-f195.google.com with SMTP id w50so11115281wrc.11 for ; Mon, 22 Jan 2018 21:47:39 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=XdbJiQsqO/t/+n5jmrtpMGD72EDKQHpeVagKNhkMCNE=; b=q5/RWsswFvJiwpYeyEkcKpQ+FCivri1IK/4S+bDuGq98NzrFRa4ALelqw3nErpIvE2 yImSgydnc8Om4/veYlRYEKRfAy02ZIAqIQ6WVXdrE0EV82wrN6W5ZpPoFQCM+bev5hcl yHuMF6TzBLA6ZsDjO+tQAvl00Kp0q7jQOvdtvmWEXgEvERXgeWg5g14qdM1aYld/WHLe qYjzE3K9kr5wFSQGTtgo+yz2Di3/qA39PTqnP9gS3e1LcNDuZa2BwHLY39I4WABxEGXH HiaxbF1ZShlABcbTm+ezF5D5juFEc9WxMxUc/lYgdZtH17fnqYMTUAiWnE8TFFvbZSCO 2BvQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=XdbJiQsqO/t/+n5jmrtpMGD72EDKQHpeVagKNhkMCNE=; b=Pmw0i3AH0Rpv+IXmmzckYsXxBstneK39w3VdACNIc8f701rFTwj3SlTHNgLCNFhwGx 0Bn1/vK2Y1xBdUoYmM7eqe/wLhD6gh1w+3U2UUKE8poOFjZwy+DGvcweysAocBdw0mDG ByeqK/6y6XjthqBpVkQwaO7QAhPiXe1IcgaKRLAcVG33hvXfrClKrNtjccglhy6UYDe9 4NEfHjdDPLud7FhVqNCmq4mdLNtCSldOY1r+rJFWDFyKJqTTqZoo4QIO/CmSeLpawmLS u77fec0CADfmUPFT1ZuTD+wYAxFk1jKvR3XfwqWd2kXWXufyIFkdJncXaH9b3NZ6oIRR dzPQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AKwxyte5rggpuwyn8uwIlr2hqyJQKhzgMmVAttSPvM3LpAb8IaYQ2oiH fTNUdnMTYfIiN2wU9wl5IE/kWP2rGCW5SbvbkQ6AkA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AH8x225F28TC8Rb8pXapyHwRhyvfdpTNrXQvy/xauxWWMsgI28JTJCx5Rog14a0QCFLKdIHywZrEslD9CR+gJL/vIaI= X-Received: by 10.223.185.21 with SMTP id k21mr1102204wrf.37.1516686457808; Mon, 22 Jan 2018 21:47:37 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <16b2ea77-3ff5-81b1-d3d7-a7107f4b37fc@voskuil.org> In-Reply-To: <16b2ea77-3ff5-81b1-d3d7-a7107f4b37fc@voskuil.org> From: Chaofan Li Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 05:47:27 +0000 Message-ID: To: Eric Voskuil Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="f403045f58128dab3c05636b1563" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_ENVFROM_END_DIGIT,FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 05:55:25 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Blockchain Voluntary Fork (Split) Proposal (Chaofan Li) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 05:47:40 -0000 --f403045f58128dab3c05636b1563 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable The human perception of difference will be eliminated. Will your bank tell you whether your balance means coins or paper money? If wallets and exchanges only show the total amount of btc rather than btc.0 and btc.1, there is no human perception difference. Also note that one valid address is automatically valid on the other chain, which means you can send money through any one chain. As long as one has the private key, he/she can get the money anyway. So there is no difference between number of merchants. The merchant =E2=80=98s address is valid on bo= th chains. The exchange cost would be trivial. People don=E2=80=99t need to exchange t= wo same thing. Chaofan On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 10:57 PM Eric Voskuil wrote: > On 01/22/2018 04:38 PM, Chaofan Li via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > Miners are most likely to be equally distributed between the two almos= t > > same chains. > > This is irrelevant as miners don't determine the utility of a money, > they anticipate it. However you don't have to accept this to recognize > the error of the argument below... > > > If one chain is faster, according to the difficulty adjustment scheme, > > it will become more difficult to mine. > > Mining difficulty controls the block period, not miner return on capital. > > > The two chain should have similar chain generation rates with similar > > difficulty and similar length. > > This is the consequence of the presumed common regulation of the block > period. It matters not how useful are either of the monies. > > > or the miners will be attracted to the chain easier to mine, > > and more miners will make the chain generation rate increase and then, > > after difficulty adjustment, harder to mine. > > You are conflating difficulty with profitability. These are not the same > thing. A chain can be more difficult and less profitable and the > reverse. Profitability is controlled by competition, as it is in all > markets. Competition is controlled by the cost of capital, which is in > turn controlled by time preference. Mining seeks the same level of > profitability for any coin, regardless of how difficultly. This applies > to all industry - difficulty does not regulate profit, it's just a cost. > > > Equilibrium will be achieved.> All the above are based on one > assumption: the two chains have the same > > value initially or miners believe they will have the same value > finally. > > Actually the opposite is the case. Even if we could start at a point of > perfect equality, the smallest change in the number of merchants or > human perception of the money (as examples), would lead one to be > slightly better. All things being equal that alone would lead to > elimination of one money in favor of the other. > > One money is inherently better than two, as there is an exchange cost > between them. In the absence of exchange controls the better money gets > used, and in this case that can simply be the result of a slightly > larger network (or perception of it). > > e > > --f403045f58128dab3c05636b1563 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
The human perception of difference will be eliminate= d.
Will your bank tell you whether your balance mean= s coins or paper money?
If wallets and exchanges onl= y show the total amount of btc rather than btc.0 and btc.1, there is no hum= an perception difference.=C2=A0

Also note that one valid address is automatically valid on the ot= her chain, which means you can send money through any one chain. As long as= one has the private key, he/she can get the money anyway. So there is no d= ifference between number of merchants. The merchant =E2=80=98s address is v= alid on both chains.

The= exchange cost would be trivial. People don=E2=80=99t need to exchange two = same thing.=C2=A0

Chaofa= n=C2=A0



On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 10:57 PM Eric Voskuil= <eric@voskuil.org> wrote:
On 01/22/2018 04:38 PM, Chaofan Li vi= a bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Miners are most likely to be=C2=A0 equally distributed between the two= almost
> same chains.

This is irrelevant as miners don't determine the utility of a money, they anticipate it. However you don't have to accept this to recognize<= br> the error of the argument below...

> If one chain is faster, according to the difficulty adjustment scheme,=
> it will become more difficult to mine.

Mining difficulty controls the block period, not miner return on capital.
> The two chain should have similar chain generation rates with similar<= br> > difficulty and similar length.

This is the consequence of the presumed common regulation of the block
period. It matters not how useful are either of the monies.

> or the miners will be attracted to the chain easier to mine,=C2=A0
> and more miners will make the chain generation rate increase and then,=
> after difficulty adjustment, harder to mine.

You are conflating difficulty with profitability. These are not the same thing. A chain can be more difficult and less profitable and the
reverse. Profitability is controlled by competition, as it is in all
markets. Competition is controlled by the cost of capital, which is in
turn controlled by time preference. Mining seeks the same level of
profitability for any coin, regardless of how difficultly. This applies
to all industry - difficulty does not regulate profit, it's just a cost= .

> Equilibrium will be achieved.> All the above are based on one assum= ption: the two chains have the same
> value initially or miners believe they will=C2=A0 have=C2=A0 the same = value finally.

Actually the opposite is the case. Even if we could start at a point of
perfect equality, the smallest change in the number of merchants or
human perception of the money (as examples), would lead one to be
slightly better. All things being equal that alone would lead to
elimination of one money in favor of the other.

One money is inherently better than two, as there is an exchange cost
between them. In the absence of exchange controls the better money gets
used, and in this case that can simply be the result of a slightly
larger network (or perception of it).

e

--f403045f58128dab3c05636b1563--