From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1W3cfA-0002EQ-R4 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 16 Jan 2014 02:26:32 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of midnightdesign.ws designates 50.87.144.70 as permitted sender) client-ip=50.87.144.70; envelope-from=boydb@midnightdesign.ws; helo=gator3054.hostgator.com; Received: from gator3054.hostgator.com ([50.87.144.70]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.76) id 1W3cfA-0008Qb-1j for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 16 Jan 2014 02:26:32 +0000 Received: from [74.125.82.43] (port=33574 helo=mail-wg0-f43.google.com) by gator3054.hostgator.com with esmtpsa (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1W3cf3-000566-TC for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 15 Jan 2014 20:26:26 -0600 Received: by mail-wg0-f43.google.com with SMTP id y10so2593650wgg.22 for ; Wed, 15 Jan 2014 18:26:23 -0800 (PST) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:content-type; bh=Os5TPIe/JVV2nocN+ljgkRSqlUmnOS+KaKPMbXIgDtc=; b=P3Orwb5yYrHInxi77+vGXVFZJ1mhP5Xwoqwu5t9YykAJdV7jVoV4CNXBNvD3HLPWyJ G7uod3pXf9axoBnN2mFcovaDzplRCtHL7T7V4NPJHQgcpDpL3O6tDcHIkpF2nsfahX2d OsVNEzbvdQsOuOMuZyyknPmiqG8IfcJ/ik1MD8d5EBjPrrOEPPZ/HQ+4FQC/mP3m04Ch wRI8ZhO4kDSWfx87pMc+g1YrbOBUGEt+bDJKqQ0BV840lYf55dJoQDNijbH1SVsa+ss4 uwsdqXDUSR3BvL9E5h1X6CzFiKdTDRdKkVdjrTlsesQVWbvnhXSWX+7jB2CaXTKvuhMC oCQw== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQk6MhNi29DCBdwiq79PfM09/f4sMC4viyqWc+Z1D3llt5eS13qhF1zkF6cOSnmH+sS3LA6/ MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.81.38 with SMTP id w6mr5325214wix.27.1389839183856; Wed, 15 Jan 2014 18:26:23 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.227.12.193 with HTTP; Wed, 15 Jan 2014 18:26:23 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: <5747D5DF-879B-4A60-8BD6-18251E7D5F47@plan99.net> Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 20:26:23 -0600 Message-ID: From: Brooks Boyd To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d044288c0d95cd504f00d2605 X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - gator3054.hostgator.com X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - lists.sourceforge.net X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12] X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - midnightdesign.ws X-BWhitelist: no X-Source-IP: 74.125.82.43 X-Source: X-Source-Args: X-Source-Dir: X-Source-Sender: (mail-wg0-f43.google.com) [74.125.82.43]:33574 X-Source-Auth: midnight X-Email-Count: 1 X-Source-Cap: bWlkbmlnaHQ7bWlkbmlnaHQ7Z2F0b3IzMDU0Lmhvc3RnYXRvci5jb20= X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 SPF_HELO_PASS SPF: HELO matches SPF record -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message X-Headers-End: 1W3cfA-0008Qb-1j Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Tor / SPV X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 02:26:33 -0000 --f46d044288c0d95cd504f00d2605 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 > > My goal here is not necessarily to hide P2P nodes - we still need lots of > clearnet P2P nodes for the forseeable future no matter what. Rather we're > just using hidden services as a way to get authentication and encryption. > Actually the 6-hop hidden service circuits are overkill for this > application, a 3-hop circuit would work just as well for most nodes that > aren't Tor-exclusive. > Ah, I see, so you're intending to use the Tor hidden services not for their original purpose (hiding), but rather as as "authentication" (someone may spoof my clearnet IP, but only I have the private key that makes this Tor hidden service connect to me, so you can trust when you connect to it it's really me). So if you trust the clearnet IP to be a friendly node, that makes a more secure connection, but if you're already talking to a bad node, moving the communication to Tor doesn't change that. I agree the six-hop circuits would be overkill for that; I wonder if the network slowdown you get on Tor will be worth the increased security? Yes, you'll be more protected from MITM, but if this is widely adopted, would the overall transactions/second the Bitcoin network could handle go down? Brooks --f46d044288c0d95cd504f00d2605 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
My goal here is not necessarily to hide P2P nodes - we still need lots= of clearnet P2P nodes for the forseeable future no matter what. Rather we&= #39;re just using hidden services as a way to get authentication and encryp= tion. Actually the 6-hop hidden service circuits are overkill for this appl= ication, a 3-hop circuit would work just as well for most nodes that aren&#= 39;t Tor-exclusive.=A0

Ah, I see, so you&#= 39;re intending to use the Tor hidden services not for their original purpo= se (hiding), but rather as as "authentication" (someone may spoof= my clearnet IP, but only I have the private key that makes this Tor hidden= service connect to me, so you can trust when you connect to it it's re= ally me). So if you trust the clearnet IP to be a friendly node, that makes= a more secure connection, but if you're already talking to a bad node,= moving the communication to Tor doesn't change that. I agree the six-h= op circuits would be overkill for that; I wonder if the network slowdown yo= u get on Tor will be worth the increased security? Yes, you'll be more = protected from MITM, but if this is widely adopted, would the overall trans= actions/second the Bitcoin network could handle go down?

Brooks

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