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From: Olaoluwa Osuntokun <laolu32@gmail.com>
To: Tomas <tomas@tomasvdw.nl>, bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Compact Client Side Filtering for Light Clients
Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2017 03:50:37 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAO3Pvs_0r1xOL9JMSXf7taG-vFcOanPEh7d4nuQKEPSNLZ6kXQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1496915408.1583369.1002689000.641E8EAB@webmail.messagingengine.com>

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Tomas wrote:
> A rough estimate would indicate this to be about 2-2.5x as big per block
> as your proposal, but comes with rather different security
> characteristics, and would not require download since genesis.

Our proposal _doesnt_ require downloading from genesis, if by
"downloading" you mean downloading all the blocks. Clients only need to
sync the block+filter headers, then (if they don't care about historical
blocks), will download filters from their "birthday" onwards.

> The client could verify the TXIDs against the merkle root with a much
> stronger (PoW) guarantee compared to the guarantee based on the assumption
> of peers being distinct, which your proposal seems to make

Our proposal only makes a "one honest peer" assumption, which is the same
as any other operating mode. Also as client still download all the
headers, they're able to verify PoW conformance/work as normal.

> I don't completely understand the benefit of making the outpoints and
> pubkey hashes (weakly) verifiable. These only serve as notifications and
> therefore do not seem to introduce an attack vector.

Not sure what you mean by this. Care to elaborate?

> I think client-side filtering is definitely an important route to take,
> but is it worth compressing away the information to verify the merkle
> root?

That's not the case with our proposal. Clients get the _entire_ block (if
they need it), so they can verify the merkle root as normal. Unless one of
us is misinterpreting the other here.

-- Laolu


On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 6:34 AM Tomas via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On Thu, Jun 1, 2017, at 21:01, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>
> Hi y'all,
>
> Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for
> consideration:
>    *
> https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki
>
>
>
> Very interesting.
>
> I would like to consider how this compares to another light client type
> with rather different security characteristics where each client would
> receive for each transaction in each block,
>
> * The TXID (uncompressed)
> * The spent outpoints (with TXIDs compressed)
> * The pubkey hash (compressed to reasonable amount of false positives)
>
> A rough estimate would indicate this to be about 2-2.5x as big per block
> as your proposal, but comes with rather different security characteristics,
> and would not require download since genesis.
>
> The client could verify the TXIDs against the merkle root with a much
> stronger (PoW) guarantee compared to the guarantee based on the assumption
> of peers being distinct, which your proposal seems to make. Like your
> proposal this removes the privacy and processing  issues from server-side
> filtering, but unlike your proposal retrieval of all txids in each block
> can also serve for a basis of fraud proofs and (disprovable) fraud hints,
> without resorting to full block downloads.
>
> I don't completely understand the benefit of making the outpoints and
> pubkey hashes (weakly) verifiable. These only serve as notifications and
> therefore do not seem to introduce an attack vector. Omitting data is
> always possible, so receiving data is a prerequisite for verification, not
> an assumption that can be made.  How could an attacker benefit from "hiding
> notifications"?
>
> I think client-side filtering is definitely an important route to take,
> but is it worth compressing away the information to verify the merkle root?
>
> Regards,
> Tomas van der Wansem
> bitcrust
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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  reply	other threads:[~2017-06-09  3:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-01 19:01 [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Compact Client Side Filtering for Light Clients Olaoluwa Osuntokun
2017-06-01 21:00 ` Eric Lombrozo
2017-06-01 21:33 ` Matt Corallo
2017-06-01 22:10   ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
2017-06-02  2:15     ` Chris
2017-06-02  2:28       ` Gregory Maxwell
2017-06-02  3:35         ` Alex Akselrod
2017-06-02 16:07         ` Chris Pacia
2017-06-02  4:49 ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
2017-06-09  3:59   ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
2017-11-09 23:44     ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
2017-06-02  6:00 ` Karl Johan Alm
     [not found]   ` <CAE0pnx+RRAP269VeWAcxKbrcS9qX4LS8_6nY_js8X5NtQ22t_A@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]     ` <CAE0pnxLKYnwHnktTqW949s1AA9uK=6WnVYWmRoau8B1SszzYEg@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]       ` <CAE0pnxJxHYQ4+2pt3tt=1WZ0-K0vDxGB4KBXY+R=WfktMmATwA@mail.gmail.com>
2017-06-02 17:55         ` Alex Akselrod
2017-06-05  2:06           ` Karl Johan Alm
2017-06-09  3:03             ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
2017-06-07 21:41 ` Gregory Maxwell
2017-06-09  3:42   ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
2017-06-09  4:47     ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun
2017-06-08  9:50 ` Tomas
2017-06-09  3:50   ` Olaoluwa Osuntokun [this message]
2017-06-09  8:26     ` Tomas
2017-06-19 11:58 ` Andreas Schildbach
2017-06-19 12:26   ` bfd
2017-06-19 15:15     ` Tom Zander
2017-06-19 15:49       ` Jonas Schnelli
2017-06-19 15:59         ` Andreas Schildbach
2017-06-19 16:22           ` Jonas Schnelli
2017-06-19 16:36             ` adiabat
2017-06-19 20:49               ` Andreas Schildbach
2017-06-20  7:03             ` Eric Voskuil
2017-06-19 16:07         ` Tom Zander
2017-06-19 16:30           ` Jonas Schnelli
2017-06-19 16:38             ` Tom Zander
2017-06-19 15:43     ` Andreas Schildbach
2017-06-19 16:10       ` Jonas Schnelli
2017-06-19 22:41     ` Gregory Maxwell
2017-06-20  9:52       ` Tom Zander
2017-06-20 13:08         ` bfd
2017-06-20 17:20           ` Adam Back

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