Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP 158 Flexibility and Filter Size

[Olaoluwa Osuntokun <laolu32@gmail.com>]

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> Doesn't the current BIP157 protocol have each filter commit to the filter
> for the previous block?

Yep!

> If that's the case, shouldn't validating the commitment at the tip of the
> chain (or buried back whatever number of blocks that the SPV client
trusts)
> obliviate the need to validate the commitments for any preceeding blocks
in
> the SPV trust model?

Yeah, just that there'll be a gap between the p2p version, and when it's
ultimately committed.

> It seems like you're claiming better security here without providing any
> evidence for it.

What I mean is that one allows you to fully verify the filter, while the
other allows you to only validate a portion of the filter and requires other
added heuristics.

> In the case of prevout+output filters, when a client receives
advertisements
> for different filters from different peers, it:

Alternatively, they can decompress the filter and at least verify that
proper _output scripts_ have been included. Maybe this is "good enough"
until its committed. If a command is added to fetch all the prev outs along
w/ a block (which would let you do another things like verify fees), then
they'd be able to fully validate the filter as well.

-- Laolu


On Sat, Jun 9, 2018 at 3:35 AM David A. Harding <dave@dtrt.org> wrote:

> On Fri, Jun 08, 2018 at 04:35:29PM -0700, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via
> bitcoin-dev wrote:
> >   2. Since the coinbase transaction is the first in a block, it has the
> >      longest merkle proof path. As a result, it may be several hundred
> bytes
> >      (and grows with future capacity increases) to present a proof to the
> >      client.
>
> I'm not sure why commitment proof size is a significant issue.  Doesn't
> the current BIP157 protocol have each filter commit to the filter for
> the previous block?  If that's the case, shouldn't validating the
> commitment at the tip of the chain (or buried back whatever number of
> blocks that the SPV client trusts) obliviate the need to validate the
> commitments for any preceeding blocks in the SPV trust model?
>
> > Depending on the composition of blocks, this may outweigh the gains
> > had from taking advantage of the additional compression the prev outs
> > allow.
>
> I think those are unrelated points.  The gain from using a more
> efficient filter is saved bytes.  The gain from using block commitments
> is SPV-level security---that attacks have a definite cost in terms of
> generating proof of work instead of the variable cost of network
> compromise (which is effectively free in many situations).
>
> Comparing the extra bytes used by block commitments to the reduced bytes
> saved by prevout+output filters is like comparing the extra bytes used
> to download all blocks for full validation to the reduced bytes saved by
> only checking headers and merkle inclusion proofs in simplified
> validation.  Yes, one uses more bytes than the other, but they're
> completely different security models and so there's no normative way for
> one to "outweigh the gains" from the other.
>
> > So should we optimize for the ability to validate in a particular
> > model (better security), or lower bandwidth in this case?
>
> It seems like you're claiming better security here without providing any
> evidence for it.  The security model is "at least one of my peers is
> honest."  In the case of outpoint+output filters, when a client receives
> advertisements for different filters from different peers, it:
>
>     1. Downloads the corresponding block
>     2. Locally generates the filter for that block
>     3. Kicks any peers that advertised a different filter than what it
>        generated locally
>
> This ensures that as long as the client has at least one honest peer, it
> will see every transaction affecting its wallet.  In the case of
> prevout+output filters, when a client receives advertisements for
> different filters from different peers, it:
>
>     1. Downloads the corresponding block and checks it for wallet
>        transactions as if there had been a filter match
>
> This also ensures that as long as the client has at least one honest
> peer, it will see every transaction affecting its wallet.  This is
> equivilant security.
>
> In the second case, it's possible for the client to eventually
> probabalistically determine which peer(s) are dishonest and kick them.
> The most space efficient of these protocols may disclose some bits of
> evidence for what output scripts the client is looking for, but a
> slightly less space-efficient protocol simply uses randomly-selected
> outputs saved from previous blocks to make the probabalistic
> determination (rather than the client's own outputs) and so I think
> should be quite private.  Neither protocol seems significantly more
> complicated than keeping an associative array recording the number of
> false positive matches for each peer's filters.
>
> -Dave
>

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