From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Z67Id-0005Rd-Kj for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 20 Jun 2015 01:10:23 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from mail-ie0-f174.google.com ([209.85.223.174]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Z67Ia-0005O3-M6 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 20 Jun 2015 01:10:23 +0000 Received: by iecrd14 with SMTP id rd14so84949457iec.3 for ; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 18:10:13 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc:content-type; bh=kCEbfACOFHIkrBZm1/m7v7wK0YIzA5un/lJm0cVeqws=; b=PIBpN0U0ol7IBsNqrFMQ9IZARqhiXpcqYqEXXMEp7GVzSUA9oOc19CVSqO9b98LzeB wAoAav6dAQzEj1Nj8ZOmpTZzaxcjL6zjtxl1kWW3ZphjMkMGm14DzpymbLX+GsVuNJh4 2q9H6nMIH6kfTCUMbVASzhe6DHV0TUbQm4O2oRMOfFIrb3Zwv3vTH7tJAKq2JAZryb3U PqyeGVwy1uN47NaGcmIEq8+7ZCmc36tSpYioP2T7UG1+uclGSbgLumzX3JrwkPtINDNx uVsbJNncewnsKZnRVOf2PIqaGlD9vKNvmGQ3+l0pgxqBmYe0+FVVoyvk4H8SH0G/Xeuy bADw== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQnB+06hmMw4zsF4DzoQ6W8RvC9fK1FGuu5ohpfWHk66Uq+6vGHw9N3s4MHCDAVmsGu7ExLQ X-Received: by 10.42.176.8 with SMTP id bc8mr14796094icb.22.1434762613273; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 18:10:13 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.107.149.20 with HTTP; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 18:09:53 -0700 (PDT) X-Originating-IP: [173.228.107.141] In-Reply-To: <5584B80A.7000403@petersson.at> References: <20150619103959.GA32315@savin.petertodd.org> <20150619154054.GA13498@savin.petertodd.org> <6716121.uS5ifrNBZv@crushinator> <5584B80A.7000403@petersson.at> From: Mark Friedenbach Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2015 18:09:53 -0700 Message-ID: To: Andreas Petersson Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=90e6ba6e8642e6d4680518e8b3b7 X-Spam-Score: 1.0 (+) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message X-Headers-End: 1Z67Ia-0005O3-M6 Cc: Bitcoin Development Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 20 Jun 2015 01:10:23 -0000 --90e6ba6e8642e6d4680518e8b3b7 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 What retail needs is escrowed microchannel hubs (what lightning provides, for example), which enable untrusted instant payments. Not reliance on single-signer zeroconf transactions that can never be made safe. On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:47 PM, Andreas Petersson wrote: > I have some experience here. If you are seriously suggesting these > measures, you might as well kill retail transactions altogether. > > In practice, if a retail place starts to accept bitcoin they have a > similar situation as with cash, only that the fraud potential is much > lower. (e.g. 100-dollar bill for a sandwich might turn out fake later) > and the fraud frequency is also much lower. > > 0-conf concerns were never a problem in practice. except for 2-way atms > i have never heard of a problem that was caused by double spends. > while adding these measures is generally positive, requiring them means > excluding 99.9% of the potential users. so you might as well not do it. > > RBF as implemented by F2Pool just flat out lowers Bitcoins utility > value. So it's a bad thing. > > for any online or automated system, waiting for a handful of > confirmations was always recommended practice. > > Am 19.06.2015 um 22:39 schrieb Matt Whitlock: > > Retail POS merchants probably should not be accepting vanilla Bitcoin > > payments, as Bitcoin alone does not (and cannot) guarantee the > > irreversibility of a transaction until it has been buried several > > blocks deep in the chain. Retail merchants should be requiring a > > co-signature from a mutually trusted co-signer that vows never to sign > > a double-spend. > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > --90e6ba6e8642e6d4680518e8b3b7 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
What retail needs is escrowed microchannel hubs (what ligh= tning provides, for example), which enable untrusted instant payments. Not = reliance on single-signer zeroconf transactions that can never be made safe= .

On Fri= , Jun 19, 2015 at 5:47 PM, Andreas Petersson <andreas@petersson.at= > wrote:
I have some experience= here. If you are seriously suggesting these
measures, you might as well kill retail transactions altogether.

In practice, if a retail place starts to accept bitcoin they have a
similar situation as with cash, only that the fraud potential is much
lower. (e.g. 100-dollar bill for a sandwich might turn out fake later)
and the fraud frequency is also much lower.

0-conf concerns were never a problem in practice. except for 2-way atms
i have never heard of a problem that was caused by double spends.
while adding these measures is generally positive, requiring them means
excluding 99.9% of the potential users. so you might as well not do it.

RBF as implemented by F2Pool just flat out lowers Bitcoins utility
value. So it's a bad thing.

for any online or automated system, waiting for a handful of
confirmations was always recommended practice.

Am 19.06.2015 um 22:39 schrieb Matt Whitlock:
> Retail POS merchants probably should not be accepting vanilla Bitcoin<= br> > payments, as Bitcoin alone does not (and cannot) guarantee the
> irreversibility of a transaction until it has been buried several
> blocks deep in the chain. Retail merchants should be requiring a
> co-signature from a mutually trusted co-signer that vows never to sign=
> a double-spend.


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