From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 58B3886 for ; Fri, 14 Aug 2015 00:47:38 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f178.google.com (mail-ig0-f178.google.com [209.85.213.178]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6D3D1141 for ; Fri, 14 Aug 2015 00:47:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: by igbjg10 with SMTP id jg10so2517311igb.0 for ; Thu, 13 Aug 2015 17:47:37 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc:content-type; bh=hogEvUGBcTedK7MW8kgh4bsh/hs4TMXBddPWj8cH3eA=; b=Hm9fwTEn9j7f7owa351xjf+30Dqp0UfbfyLGJbEew047/Qvs/4VxiYKr1Bghocw35a xMh9gZ546Hu20OWhAuOx4KPA8me3Z3uy5E+QW4CECk5V1a+baNpyVn/3VBMYOwLlPQ5O 6xeS07D6PEbNIwNSZoDe6Ee+qqiuZ28MdyZ+Or2tZCE1pt8XbbtjrNqloFrWgS/U0nWI 0ESg6EchMhCvXVscs3vg6FJijrGiWLfOg+qHLuKfANLh3kmSyPu5TqKWn1aoSLnrGNOm Cb5kryDV467kD3jdNOXhAUShI3v4+Q9SzMyu0QAjDiN8OOYR2CVebhBAeXSJP1V2WSjb VP7g== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQnVmMAdLpetMq0figyq2Nkmg9vJcVdrkItAcNqYknpJo+fNmzZeqSUpwDPakayBs2Bc6aIU X-Received: by 10.50.43.227 with SMTP id z3mr173151igl.22.1439513256876; Thu, 13 Aug 2015 17:47:36 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.107.138.14 with HTTP; Thu, 13 Aug 2015 17:47:17 -0700 (PDT) X-Originating-IP: [172.56.17.178] In-Reply-To: <20150813234213.GH2123@lightning.network> References: <20150813234213.GH2123@lightning.network> From: Mark Friedenbach Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2015 17:47:17 -0700 Message-ID: To: Joseph Poon Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0111c01653acc7051d3accb0 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [BIP-draft] CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY - An opcode for relative locktime X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2015 00:47:38 -0000 --089e0111c01653acc7051d3accb0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Thu, Aug 13, 2015 at 4:42 PM, Joseph Poon via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > I haven't tested the details of this, but is there another bit available > for use in the future for the relative blockheight? > > I strongly believe that Lightning needs mitigations for a systemic > supervillan attack which attemps to flood the network with transactions, > which can hypothetically be mitigated with something like a timestop > bit (as originally suggested by gmaxwell). > This proposal includes no such provision. Since we talked about it, I spent considerable time thinking about the supposed risk and proposed mitigations. I'm frankly not convinced that it is a risk of high enough credibility to worry about, or if it is that a protocol-level complication is worth doing. The scenario as I understand it is a hub turns evil and tries to cheat every single one of its users out of their bonds. Normally a lightning user is protected form such behavior because they have time to broadcast their own transactions spending part or all of the balance as fees. Therefore because of the threat of mutually assured destruction, the optimal outcome is to be an honest participant. But, the argument goes, the hub has many channels with many different people closing at the same time. So if the hub tries to cheat all of them at once by DoS'ing the network, it can do so and spend more in fees than any one participant stands to lose. My issue with this is that users don't act alone -- users can be assured that other users will react, and all of them together have enough coins to burn to make the attack unprofitable. The hub-cheats-many-users case really is the same as the hub-cheats-one-user case if the users act out their role in unison, which they don't have to coordinate to do. Other than that, even if you are still concerned about that scenario, I'm not sure timestop is the appropriate solution. A timestop is a protocol-level complication that is not trivial to implement, indeed I'm not even sure there is a way to implement it at all -- how do you differentiate in consensus code a DoS attack from regular old blocks filling up? And if you could, why add further complication to the consensus protocol? A simpler solution to me seems to be outsourcing the response to an attack to a third party, or otherwise engineering ways for users to respond-by-default even if their wallet is offline, or otherwise assuring sufficient coordination in the event of a bad hub. --089e0111c01653acc7051d3accb0 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Thu, Aug 13, 2015 at 4:42 PM, Joseph Poon via bitcoin-d= ev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
I haven't tested the details of this, but is the= re another bit available
for use in the future for the relative blockheight?

I strongly believe that Lightning needs mitigations for a systemic
supervillan attack which attemps to flood the network with transactions, which can hypothetically be mitigated with something like a timestop
bit (as originally suggested by gmaxwell).

<= div>This proposal includes no such provision.

Since we ta= lked about it, I spent considerable time thinking about the supposed risk a= nd proposed mitigations. I'm frankly not convinced that it is a risk of= high enough credibility to worry about, or if it is that a protocol-level = complication is worth doing.

The scenario as I understand= it is a hub turns evil and tries to cheat every single one of its users ou= t of their bonds. Normally a lightning user is protected form such behavior= because they have time to broadcast their own transactions spending part o= r all of the balance as fees. Therefore because of the threat of mutually a= ssured destruction, the optimal outcome is to be an honest participant.
=
But, the argument goes, the hub has many channels with many = different people closing at the same time. So if the hub tries to cheat all= of them at once by DoS'ing the network, it can do so and spend more in= fees than any one participant stands to lose. My issue with this is that u= sers don't act alone -- users can be assured that other users will reac= t, and all of them together have enough coins to burn to make the attack un= profitable. The hub-cheats-many-users case really is the same as the hub-ch= eats-one-user case if the users act out their role in unison, which they do= n't have to coordinate to do.

Other than that, even i= f you are still concerned about that=C2=A0 scenario, I'm not sure times= top is the appropriate solution. A timestop is a protocol-level complicatio= n that is not trivial to implement, indeed I'm not even sure there is a= way to implement it at all -- how do you differentiate in consensus code a= DoS attack from regular old blocks filling up? And if you could, why add f= urther complication to the consensus protocol?

A simpler = solution to me seems to be outsourcing the response to an attack to a third= party, or otherwise engineering ways for users to respond-by-default even = if their wallet is offline, or otherwise assuring sufficient coordination i= n the event of a bad hub.
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