From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Z42Cw-0006bA-Bk for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sun, 14 Jun 2015 07:19:54 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.214.177 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.214.177; envelope-from=dscvlt@gmail.com; helo=mail-ob0-f177.google.com; Received: from mail-ob0-f177.google.com ([209.85.214.177]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Z42Cv-0004ry-5x for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sun, 14 Jun 2015 07:19:54 +0000 Received: by obcej4 with SMTP id ej4so46226639obc.0 for ; Sun, 14 Jun 2015 00:19:47 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.182.153.197 with SMTP id vi5mr15498747obb.28.1434266387726; Sun, 14 Jun 2015 00:19:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.183.3.38 with HTTP; Sun, 14 Jun 2015 00:19:47 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <20150612181153.GB19199@muck> References: <20150612181153.GB19199@muck> Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2015 17:19:47 +1000 Message-ID: From: Ashley Holman To: Peter Todd Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e014953208dc86e0518752ada X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (dscvlt[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Z42Cv-0004ry-5x Cc: Bitcoin Development Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] User vote in blocksize through fees X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2015 07:19:54 -0000 --089e014953208dc86e0518752ada Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Economic policy sounds like a dirty word in the context of Bitcoin, but as Jeff Garzik said, choosing a block size cap is unfortunately an economic policy that has to be chosen somehow. Enabling users to incentivise the voting process is an interesting tool to have in the toolbox, but I think it would be sensible to first observe how the miner-only voting system behaves on its own. If, for example, the hashing majority tended to favour a move towards centralization (big blocks), user preferences could potentially hasten this move by further punishing marginal miners through reduced fees. On the other hand, if user preferences tended to oppose the preferences of miners, then such a system might function well in keeping a balance between usability and security (although it's not clear how this balance might change over time as the block subsidy drops). In short, I think it's wise to keep it simple and implement one mechanism at a time. On Sat, Jun 13, 2015 at 4:11 AM, Peter Todd wrote: > Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize limit be removed > entirely, with a "soft" limit being enforced via miner vote, recorded by > hashing power. > > This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over > the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions > themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included > in a block casting a specific vote. > > We can simplify Garzik's vote to say that one of the nVersion bits > either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some > fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a > nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or > decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an > indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via > fees to vote according to user wishes. > > Of course, to cast a "don't care" vote we can either define an > additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we > can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a > mechanism such as replace-by-fee. > > > See also John Dillon's proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting: > > > https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html > > -- > 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org > 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778 > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > --089e014953208dc86e0518752ada Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Economic policy sounds like a dirty word in the context of= Bitcoin, but as Jeff Garzik said, choosing a block size cap is unfortunate= ly an economic policy that has to be chosen somehow.=C2=A0 Enabling users t= o incentivise the voting process is an interesting tool to have in the tool= box, but I think it would be sensible to first observe how the miner-only v= oting system behaves on its own.

If, for example, the ha= shing majority tended to favour a move towards centralization (big blocks),= user preferences could potentially hasten this move by further punishing m= arginal miners through reduced fees.=C2=A0 On the other hand, if user prefe= rences tended to oppose the preferences of miners, then such a system might= function well in keeping a balance between usability and security (althoug= h it's not clear how this balance might change over time as the block s= ubsidy drops).

In short, I think it's wise to = keep it simple and implement one mechanism at a time.

On Sat, Jun 13, 2015 at 4:1= 1 AM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize = limit be removed
entirely, with a "soft" limit being enforced via miner vote, reco= rded by
hashing power.

This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over
the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included in a block casting a specific vote.

We can simplify Garzik's vote to say that one of the nVersion bits
either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some
fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a
nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or
decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an
indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via
fees to vote according to user wishes.

Of course, to cast a "don't care" vote we can either define a= n
additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we
can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a
mechanism such as replace-by-fee.


See also John Dillon's proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting:
https://www.mail= -archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html
--
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778

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