From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Wo356-0002mX-9z for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 24 May 2014 03:57:12 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.219.46 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.219.46; envelope-from=dscvlt@gmail.com; helo=mail-oa0-f46.google.com; Received: from mail-oa0-f46.google.com ([209.85.219.46]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Wo355-00052X-Cu for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 24 May 2014 03:57:12 +0000 Received: by mail-oa0-f46.google.com with SMTP id i4so6448529oah.5 for ; Fri, 23 May 2014 20:57:05 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.182.28.134 with SMTP id b6mr9525322obh.27.1400903825758; Fri, 23 May 2014 20:57:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.182.225.66 with HTTP; Fri, 23 May 2014 20:57:05 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sat, 24 May 2014 13:27:05 +0930 Message-ID: From: Ashley Holman To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c2903ce61e3e04fa1d56a5 X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (dscvlt[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Wo355-00052X-Cu Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Cut-through propagation of blocks X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 24 May 2014 03:57:12 -0000 --001a11c2903ce61e3e04fa1d56a5 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Hi, On this list there has been some discussion around techniques to speed up block propagation, with a particular focus on reducing the extra orphan risk carried by larger blocks. The current store-and-forward method means that larger blocks will propagate with higher latency. One proposed solution has been to broadcast two separate messages: a fast, fixed-size header message, and a 2nd, slower body message containing the full block. Whilst this allows larger blocks to compete equally with smaller blocks on the "which came first" rule, it creates a new area of uncertain delay between receiving the header, and receiving the body, where there may be perverse incentives to mine empty blocks on top of not-yet-valid headers. So I would like to propose another method which is hopefully a less significant change to the existing protocol rules, but should help reduce the latency gap between large and small blocks. * Skip the inv/getdata sequence for new blocks - just push them out directly to save 1 roundtrip per hop * When receiving a new block from a peer, as soon as we have the first 80 bytes (header) we can validate the PoW and, with only a low-level change to the networking code, begin streaming that block to our peers (in the style of cut-through switching). * No other rules need to change. Block primacy can still be determined as of the moment they are fully validated and accepted, but now the latency caused by larger blocks is only (1 * BlockSize * BottleneckHopSpeed), instead of (Sum[n=0 to NumHops](BlockSize * NodeBandwidth(n))). * As far as I can tell, this shouldn't change any game theory or incentives because nodes still receive blocks exactly as they do now, just sooner. The difference is, invalid blocks that meet the PoW will be broadcast to everyone, but this is nothing new since someone can peer with you and send you an invalid block already. Network DoS should not be a possibility since it is very expensive to make invalid blocks that meet network PoW. Thoughts? Thanks --001a11c2903ce61e3e04fa1d56a5 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi,

On this list there has been some di= scussion around techniques to speed up block propagation, with a particular= focus on reducing the extra orphan risk carried by larger blocks.

The current store-and-forward method means that larger block= s will propagate with higher latency. =C2=A0One proposed solution has been = to broadcast two separate messages: a fast, fixed-size header message, and = a 2nd, slower body message containing the full block. =C2=A0Whilst this all= ows larger blocks to compete equally with smaller blocks on the "which= came first" rule, it creates a new area of uncertain delay between re= ceiving the header, and receiving the body, where there may be perverse inc= entives to mine empty blocks on top of not-yet-valid headers.

So I would like to propose another method which is hope= fully a less significant change to the existing protocol rules, but should = help reduce the latency gap between large and small blocks.

* Skip the inv/getdata sequence for new blocks - just push them = out directly to save 1 roundtrip per hop
* =C2=A0When receiving a= new block from a peer, as soon as we have the first 80 bytes (header) we c= an validate the PoW and, with only a low-level change to the networking cod= e, begin streaming that block to our peers (in the style of cut-through swi= tching).
* No other rules need to change. =C2=A0Block primacy can still be dete= rmined as of the moment they are fully validated and accepted, but now the = latency caused by larger blocks is only (1 * BlockSize * BottleneckHopSpeed= ), instead of (Sum[n=3D0 to NumHops](BlockSize * NodeBandwidth(n))).
* As far as I can tell, this shouldn't change any game theory or i= ncentives because nodes still receive blocks exactly as they do now, just s= ooner. =C2=A0The difference is, invalid blocks that meet the PoW will be br= oadcast to everyone, but this is nothing new since someone can peer with yo= u and send you an invalid block already. =C2=A0Network DoS should not be a = possibility since it is very expensive to make invalid blocks that meet net= work PoW.

Thoughts?

Thanks
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