From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YqfY5-0000eZ-Ph for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 08 May 2015 10:30:29 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.223.169 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.223.169; envelope-from=clem.ds@gmail.com; helo=mail-ie0-f169.google.com; Received: from mail-ie0-f169.google.com ([209.85.223.169]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1YqfY4-0003Q7-C6 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 08 May 2015 10:30:29 +0000 Received: by iepj10 with SMTP id j10so56847259iep.0 for ; Fri, 08 May 2015 03:30:23 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 10.42.187.65 with SMTP id cv1mr3339554icb.87.1431081023056; Fri, 08 May 2015 03:30:23 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <16096345.A1MpJQQkRW@crushinator> In-Reply-To: <16096345.A1MpJQQkRW@crushinator> From: =?UTF-8?Q?Cl=C3=A9ment_Elbaz?= Date: Fri, 08 May 2015 10:30:22 +0000 Message-ID: To: Matt Whitlock , bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=20cf303ea102062fb405158f84c7 X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (clem.ds[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1YqfY4-0003Q7-C6 Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposed alternatives to the 20MB step function X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 08 May 2015 10:30:29 -0000 --20cf303ea102062fb405158f84c7 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Matt : I think proposal #1 and #3 are a lot better than #2, and #1 is my favorite. I see two problems with proposal #2. The first problem with proposal #2 is that, as we see in democracies, there is often a mismatch between the people conscious vote and these same people behavior. Relying on an intentional vote made consciously by miners by choosing a configuration value can lead to twisted results if their actual behavior doesn't correlate with their vote (eg, they all vote for a small block size because it is the default configuration of their software, and then they fill it completely all the time and everything crashes). The second problem with proposal #2 is that if Gavin and Mike are right, there is simply no time to gather a meaningful amount of votes over the coinbases, after the fork but before the Bitcoin scalability crash. I like proposal #1 because the "vote" is made using already available data. Also there is no possible mismatch between behavior and vote. As a miner you vote by choosing to create a big (or small) block, and your actions reflect your vote. It is simple and straightforward. My feelings on proposal #3 is it is a little bit mixing apples and oranges, but I may not seeing all the implications. Le ven. 8 mai 2015 =C3=A0 09:21, Matt Whitlock a = =C3=A9crit : > Between all the flames on this list, several ideas were raised that did > not get much attention. I hereby resubmit these ideas for consideration a= nd > discussion. > > - Perhaps the hard block size limit should be a function of the actual > block sizes over some trailing sampling period. For example, take the > median block size among the most recent 2016 blocks and multiply it by 1.= 5. > This allows Bitcoin to scale up gradually and organically, rather than > having human beings guessing at what is an appropriate limit. > > - Perhaps the hard block size limit should be determined by a vote of the > miners. Each miner could embed a desired block size limit in the coinbase > transactions of the blocks it publishes. The effective hard block size > limit would be that size having the greatest number of votes within a > sliding window of most recent blocks. > > - Perhaps the hard block size limit should be a function of block-chain > length, so that it can scale up smoothly rather than jumping immediately = to > 20 MB. This function could be linear (anticipating a breakdown of Moore's > Law) or quadratic. > > I would be in support of any of the above, but I do not support Mike > Hearn's proposed jump to 20 MB. Hearn's proposal kicks the can down the > road without actually solving the problem, and it does so in a > controversial (step function) way. > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------= ----- > One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud > Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications > Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights > Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. > http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > --20cf303ea102062fb405158f84c7 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Matt : I think proposal #1 and #3 are a lot= better than #2, and #1 is my favorite.

I see two problem= s with proposal #2.
The first problem with proposal #2 is that, as= we see in democracies,=C2=A0 there is often a mismatch between the people = conscious vote and these same people behavior.

Relying on an=C2=A0 = intentional vote made consciously by miners by choosing a configuration val= ue can lead to twisted results if their actual behavior doesn't correla= te with their vote (eg, they all vote for a small block size because it is = the default configuration of their software, and then they fill it complete= ly all the time and everything crashes).

The second probl= em with proposal #2 is that if Gavin and Mike are right, there is simply no= time to gather a meaningful amount of votes over the coinbases, after the = fork but before the Bitcoin scalability crash.

I l= ike proposal #1 because the "vote" is made using already availabl= e data. Also there is no possible mismatch between behavior and vote. As a = miner you vote by choosing to create a big (or small) block, and your actio= ns reflect your vote. It is simple and straightforward.

My fee= lings on proposal #3 is it is a little bit mixing apples and oranges, but I= may not seeing all the implications.

Le=C2=A0ven. 8 mai 2015 =C3=A0=C2=A009:21, Matt Whitl= ock <bip@mattwhitlock.name&= gt; a =C3=A9crit=C2=A0:
Between all the f= lames on this list, several ideas were raised that did not get much attenti= on. I hereby resubmit these ideas for consideration and discussion.

- Perhaps the hard block size limit should be a function of the actual bloc= k sizes over some trailing sampling period. For example, take the median bl= ock size among the most recent 2016 blocks and multiply it by 1.5. This all= ows Bitcoin to scale up gradually and organically, rather than having human= beings guessing at what is an appropriate limit.

- Perhaps the hard block size limit should be determined by a vote of the m= iners. Each miner could embed a desired block size limit in the coinbase tr= ansactions of the blocks it publishes. The effective hard block size limit = would be that size having the greatest number of votes within a sliding win= dow of most recent blocks.

- Perhaps the hard block size limit should be a function of block-chain len= gth, so that it can scale up smoothly rather than jumping immediately to 20= MB. This function could be linear (anticipating a breakdown of Moore's= Law) or quadratic.

I would be in support of any of the above, but I do not support Mike Hearn&= #39;s proposed jump to 20 MB. Hearn's proposal kicks the can down the r= oad without actually solving the problem, and it does so in a controversial= (step function) way.

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