From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from hemlock.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [140.211.166.133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AA165C013A for ; Mon, 15 Feb 2021 14:19:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hemlock.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8565A87031 for ; Mon, 15 Feb 2021 14:19:29 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org Received: from hemlock.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id qFkxTMolPxK2 for ; Mon, 15 Feb 2021 14:19:27 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: delayed 05:34:55 by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-vk1-f180.google.com (mail-vk1-f180.google.com [209.85.221.180]) by hemlock.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0A9308702B for ; Mon, 15 Feb 2021 14:19:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-vk1-f180.google.com with SMTP id m145so1513286vke.7 for ; Mon, 15 Feb 2021 06:19:26 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=nunchuk-io.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=ncEnMX1Pql0WuFGTJxBtB7HxUSWS97Pgve8xsmZQTNs=; b=eNocWxvtMP7RwdfW0t419fY5x5ZTuE4H5o38MuOMNPp1wAm5GLEj/ICIB37PTzADWZ bj8u3ELjs3BsPaXHKuuLt3XJom/5Psa3tqIV2cAvOAdY2iCHjNhKvqchN/E4Ri/ZTsxm 7d2T1rr3XW2TGKc1yP40wZbWnEg8NuYcNwy2UVkx6nxyzdJSt74UBrmneN/l9DKmIJm4 eoDwXELMi0f32/K55vEwE8P1sNOheug10S8KJpeihPiJhsFVTBaaD0OhVQE9LKDyvPRW QzStPp1H36n9Isci9CcshLVl5HFeJa32NoxbnoUK0DPeSwR4Jw2s2KCEJjugq2kAaEbT OBQA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=ncEnMX1Pql0WuFGTJxBtB7HxUSWS97Pgve8xsmZQTNs=; b=RSGG6SJvJTY0UNaF0aTLKiAXrpKBIVSvZUUFEe/BBMpo2ghXAYV4Ckcg7L2sQvdz71 swi/jqNWiIP3t5jYgYsYYkyyFPbGiReg0BUFYoKipuDyhBGzDEFUM71U+EhLW01WCNcV mbnbT0qfX7/f174cUsVDqcz+Ger0TQz3HHxsPlUNKWTkVv2C8UBGZRNE1psL9IRpcJRf ii4eWrVgb4/WfBoTOr1jw2+4e5E+lyezHFYtF++c8xwbGZFkrAR+g6DrnpGc/YW1REZv 0pXRAJ6VhMWALQnNIXpHDJNk4fkyhfSVSQ6+i3riLFxz9YOM+rJTrH3y6wWN0rP3H5Xx Iupw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533pkuVftjLPuzCz5UUhimYQEqFJ+IoMf1ZbijT2Sa5M8EatOaZI NRmTL8cLkCjX4P681W4+9YavxACHrRss960H2dEkQQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxsyn+Rli2yGFQwui5bFRyFourD0tzlNr6DPPQ25YAtYIKbhyDV5Cqp8xHtwusHQWFt6CKkbXXF+3ineiheDPI= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6122:788:: with SMTP id k8mr7575847vkr.23.1613398765689; Mon, 15 Feb 2021 06:19:25 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Hugo Nguyen Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2021 06:19:14 -0800 Message-ID: To: Craig Raw Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000500c1805bb60aca6" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Mon, 15 Feb 2021 15:39:15 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal: Bitcoin Secure Multisig Setup X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2021 14:19:29 -0000 --000000000000500c1805bb60aca6 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi Craig, Thanks for the feedback! Sharing my comments inline. On Mon, Feb 15, 2021 at 5:53 AM Craig Raw wrote: > Hi all, > > Hugo and I have discussed off-list, and I have two concerns with this > proposal: > > 1. I believe adding the TOKEN and encryption to the exchange adds > complexity to already notoriously complex multisig, without adding much i= n > the way of security. > I disagree that this doesn't add security. This proposal was inspired by a real vulnerability we discovered in the wild while experimenting with HWWs, and during that process I noticed that there is little in the way of a an attacker to pull off a MITM attack, where he/she can intercept and tamper with the multisig configuration file, potentially swapping in their own XPUBs. This is especially important for remote multisig setups - which is not common now but I imagine will be a lot more common in the future. This is because the shared secret (TOKEN) must still be shared securely, > and if you have established an (off-protocol) secure channel to do this, > why not just share the actual multisig configuration data directly in tha= t > channel? Because multisig is inherently an interactive process. If we can create the multisig configuration in one shot for everybody, you're correct that this is not necessary! But the fact that multisig is by nature interactive and requires a few rounds of communication (since it needs each Signer to voluntarily share its XPUB before a wallet can be created) makes this necessary IMO. If you are able to do so, you retain the advantage of being able to inspect > the data directly. Note that some manual inspection is still part of the proposal. But instead of exclusively relying on manual inspection (which is error-prone, and also doesn't scale very well for a large number of signers), we strengthen this process by automating some of the checks and making it harder to tamper with. > > 2. Asking the user to enter the derivation into the Signer also adds (IMO > unnecessary) complexity to the multisig setup process. A different way of > doing it, which is specified in the UR crypto-account format linked to > previously, has the Signer provide as many common derivations (along with > their xpubs) as it can support for a given BIP44 account number. This has > the dual advantage of making things simpler for the user (they only have = to > provide an optional account number) and increasing the standardisation on > common derivation paths. On receiving these derivation/xpub pairs, the > Coordinator can simply pick the appropriate one. > Note that in the updated proposal, I added the option of the Signer automatically filling in the derivation paths on behalf of the user (and also should take care not to reuse XPUBs). Perhaps this can be made the default behavior. Best, Hugo > > These concerns noted, I agree it's a good idea to have Signers save the > multisig configuration as proposed, and it would be great to have > standardisation in hww import and export formats (not just for multisig). > On that note, I'd love to see greater adoption of the efficient UR2.0 > standard and associated formats for airgapped data transmission using QR > codes. > > Craig > > > On Mon, Feb 15, 2021 at 11:13 AM Hugo Nguyen via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> Hi all, >> I have updated the proposal based on further feedback. The new spec is >> included at the bottom. >> >> I have also created a public Github PR to make it easier to comment on >> the text of the spec itself: https://github.com/nunchuk-io/bips/pull/1 . >> >> Could someone please let me know what else needs to be done before a BIP >> number can be assigned? >> >> >> =3D=3D=3D Quick summary of changes from last update =3D=3D=3D >> >> 1. Define encryption modes >> >> # NO_ENCRYPTION: Encryption is disabled. >> # STANDARD : the TOKEN is a 64-bit nonce. >> # EXTENDED : the TOKEN is a 128-bit nonce. >> >> 2. Define signature algorithm >> >> Follow BIP-0322, legacy format allowed. >> >> 3. Multiple TOKENs (optional) >> >> Also add an option where the Coordinator can choose to use one common >> TOKEN for all Signers, or use one per Signer. >> >> =3D=3D=3D End of summary =3D=3D=3D >> >> >> Cheers, >> Hugo >> >> >> 
>>   BIP: To be determined
>>   Layer: Applications
>>   Title: Bitcoin Secure Multisig Setup (BSMS)
>>   Author: Hugo Nguyen , Peter Gray > coinkite.com>, Marko Bencun , Pavol Rusnak <
>> stick@satoshilabs.com>, Aaron Chen , Rodolfo
>> Novak 
>>   Comments-Summary: No comments yet.
>>   Comments-URI:
>>   Status: Proposed
>>   Type: Standards Track
>>   Created: 2020-11-10
>>   License: BSD-2-Clause
>>
>> >> =3D=3DIntroduction=3D=3D >> >> =3D=3D=3DAbstract=3D=3D=3D >> >> This document proposes a mechanism to set up multisig wallets securely. >> >> =3D=3D=3DCopyright=3D=3D=3D >> >> This BIP is licensed under the 2-clause BSD license. >> >> =3D=3D=3DMotivation=3D=3D=3D >> >> The Bitcoin multisig experience has been greatly streamlined under [ >> https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0174.mediawiki BIP-0174 >> (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction)]. However, what is still missing >> is a standardized process for setting up multisig wallets securely acros= s >> different vendors. >> >> There are a number of concerns when it comes to setting up a multisig >> wallet: >> >> # Whether the multisig configuration, such as Signer membership, script >> type, derivation paths and number of signatures required, is correct and >> not tampered with. >> # Whether Signer persists the multisig configuration in their respective >> storage, and under what format. >> # Whether Signer's storage is tamper-proof. >> # Whether Signer subsequently uses the multisig configuration to generat= e >> and verify receive and change addresses. >> >> An attacker who can modify the multisig configuration can steal or hold >> funds to ransom by duping the user into sending funds to the wrong addre= ss. >> >> This proposal seeks to address concerns #1 and #2: to mitigate the risk >> of tampering during the initial setup phase, and to define an interopera= ble >> multisig configuration format. >> >> Concerns #3 and #4 should be handled by Signers and is out of scope of >> this proposal. >> >> =3D=3DSpecification=3D=3D >> >> =3D=3D=3DPrerequisites=3D=3D=3D >> This proposal assumes the parties in the multisig support [ >> https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki >> BIP-0032], [ >> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/descriptors.md the >> descriptor language] and encryption. >> >> =3D=3D=3DRoles=3D=3D=3D >> =3D=3D=3D=3DCoordinator=3D=3D=3D=3D >> >> The Coordinator initiates the multisig setup. The Coordinator determines >> what type of multisig is used and the exact policy script. If encryption= is >> enabled, the Coordinator also distributes a shared secret or shared secr= ets >> to the parties involved for secure communication. The Coordinator gather= s >> information from the Signers to generate a descriptor record. The >> Coordinator distributes the descriptor record back to the Signers. >> >> =3D=3D=3D=3DSigner=3D=3D=3D=3D >> >> The Signer is a participating member in the multisig. Its >> responsibilities include providing its key record -- which contains an >> Extended Public Key (XPUB) -- to the Coordinator, verifying that its XPU= B >> is included in the descriptor record and persisting the descriptor recor= d >> in its storage. >> >> =3D=3D=3DSetup Process=3D=3D=3D >> >> =3D=3D=3D=3DRound 1=3D=3D=3D=3D >> >> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3DCoordinator=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D >> >> * The Coordinator creates a multisig wallet creation session. The >> Coordinator constructs the multisig script and its policy parameters, su= ch >> as the total number of signers and the required number of signatures >> (M and N). >> * The session should expire after some time period determined by the >> Coordinator, e.g., 24 hours. >> * If encryption is enabled, the Coordinator distributes a secret >> TOKEN to each Signer over a secure channel. The Signer can use = the >> TOKEN to derive an ENCRYPTION_KEY. Refer to the >> Encryption section below for details on the TOKEN, the key >> derivation function and the encryption scheme. Depending on the use case= , >> the Coordinator can decide whether to share one common TOKEN fo= r >> all Signers, or to have one per Signer. >> * If encryption is disabled, TOKEN is set to 0, and al= l >> the encryption/decryption steps below can be skipped. >> >> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3DSigner=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D >> >> * The Signer initiates a new secure multisig setup session by setting th= e >> TOKEN. The Signer derives an ENCRYPTION_KEY from the >> TOKEN. The Signer can keep the session open until a different >> value for the TOKEN is set. >> * The Signer generates a key record by prompting the user for a multisig >> derivation path and retrieves the XPUB at that derivation path. Optional= ly, >> the Signer can choose a path on behalf of the user. If the Signer choose= s >> the path, it should try to avoid reusing XPUBs for different wallets. >> * The first line in the record must be the TOKEN. The second >> line must be the KEY. The KEY is an XPUB plus its key >> origin information, written in the descriptor-defined format, i.e.: >> [{master key fingerprint}/{derivation path}]{XPUB}. The third l= ine >> must be a SIG, whereas SIG is the signature generated = by >> using the private key associated with the XPUB to sign the first two >> lines. The signature should follow [ >> https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0322.mediawiki >> BIP-0322], legacy format accepted. Finally, the Signer encrypts the enti= re >> record with ENCRYPTION_KEY. >> >> =3D=3D=3D=3DRound 2=3D=3D=3D=3D >> >> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3DCoordinator=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D >> >> * The Coordinator gathers key records from all participating Signers. >> Abort the setup if the wallet setup session has expired. >> * For each key record, the Coordinator decrypts it using >> ENCRYPTION_KEY. The Coordinator verifies that the included >> SIG is valid given the KEY. >> * If all key records look good, the Coordinator fills in all necessary >> information to generate a descriptor record, which is simply the descrip= tor >> string plus a CHECKSUM, all in one line. The CHECKSUM = has >> [ >> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/descriptors.md#checks= ums >> BECH32 encoding]. >> * The Coordinator encrypts this descriptor record with >> ENCRYPTION_KEY. >> * The Coordinator sends the encrypted descriptor record to all >> participating Signers. >> >> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3DSigner=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D >> >> * The Signer imports the descriptor record, decrypts it using the >> ENCRYPTION_KEY derived from the open session. >> * The Signer calculates and verifies the descriptor=E2=80=99s CHECKS= UM. >> Abort the setup if the CHECKSUM is incorrect. >> * The Signer checks whether one of the KEYs in the descriptor >> belongs to it, using path and fingerprint information included in the >> descriptor. The check must perform an exact match on the KEYs, = and >> not using shortcuts such as matching fingerprints (which is trivial to >> spoof). Abort the setup if it doesn=E2=80=99t detect its own KEY. >> * For confirmation, the Signer must display to the user the >> CHECKSUM, plus other configurations, such as M and >> N. The total number of Signers, N, is important to >> prevent a KEY insertion attack. All participating Signers shoul= d >> be able to display the same confirmation. >> * If all checks pass, the Signer persists the descriptor record in its >> storage. >> * The Signer can choose to further restrict post-XPUB derivation paths, >> such as to those defined in [ >> https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0044.mediawiki BIP-0044]= . >> * The Signer should subsequently use the descriptor to generate and >> verify receive and change addresses. >> >> This completes the setup. >> >> =3D=3D=3DEncryption=3D=3D=3D >> >> =3D=3D=3D=3DThe Token=3D=3D=3D=3D >> We define three modes of encryption. >> >> # NO_ENCRYPTION : the TOKEN is set to 0. >> Encryption is disabled. >> # STANDARD : the TOKEN is a 64-bit nonce. >> # EXTENDED : the TOKEN is a 128-bit nonce. >> >> The TOKEN can be converted to one of these formats: >> * A mnemonic phrase using [ >> https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039.mediawiki BIP-0039] >> word list (6 words in STANDARD mode, 12 words in EXTENDED >> mode) >> * A decimal number (20 digits in STANDARD mode, 40 digits in >> EXTENDED mode) >> * A QR code >> * Other formats >> >> The flexibility in the data format allows each Signer to customize the >> User Experience based on its respective capabilities. >> >> =3D=3D=3D=3DKey Derivation=3D=3D=3D=3D >> The key derivation function is [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2898 >> PBKDF2], with PRF =3D SHA512. Specifically: >> >> DK =3D PBKDF2(PRF, Password, Salt, c, dkLen) >> >> Whereas: >> >> * PRF =3D SHA512 >> * Password =3D "No SPOF" >> * Salt =3D TOKEN >> * c =3D 2048 >> * dkLen =3D 256 >> * DK =3D Derived ENCRYPTION_KEY >> >> =3D=3D=3D=3DEncryption Scheme=3D=3D=3D=3D >> The encryption scheme is [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3686 AES, CTR >> mode]. >> >> =3D=3DQR Codes=3D=3D >> For signers that use QR codes to transmit data, key and descriptor >> records can be converted to QR codes, following [ >> https://github.com/BlockchainCommons/Research/blob/master/papers/bcr-202= 0-005-ur.md >> the BCR standard]. >> >> Also refer to [ >> https://github.com/BlockchainCommons/Research/blob/master/papers/bcr-202= 0-015-account.md >> UR Type Definition for BIP44 Accounts] and [ >> https://github.com/BlockchainCommons/Research/blob/master/papers/bcr-202= 0-010-output-desc.md >> UR Type Definition for Bitcoin Output Descriptors] for more details. >> >> =3D=3DSecurity=3D=3D >> >> This proposal introduces two layers of protection. The first one is a >> temporary, secret token, used to encrypt the two rounds of communication >> between the Signer and the Coordinator. The second one is through the >> descriptor checksum and visual inspection of the descriptor itself. >> >> The token is only needed during the setup phase, and can be safely throw= n >> away afterwards. The token does not guarantee that the Signer membership >> set is not modified, since that depends on the overall security of all >> parties in the setup, but it can make it significantly harder for an >> attacker to do so. >> >> There are three ways an attacker can modify the membership set: by >> changing an existing member, by removing an existing member, or by addin= g a >> new member. >> >> For the first two methods, one of the Signers will be able to detect tha= t >> its membership has been changed or removed, and reject the final >> descriptor. Thus, it is vital that all participating Signers check that >> their membership is intact in the descriptor. Even one Signer failing to >> check for its membership means that the setup could be compromised. >> >> For the third type of attack, the descriptor checksum and visual >> inspection of the descriptor itself are the only way to guard against >> malicious members from being inserted into the set. >> >> =3D=3DAcknowledgement=3D=3D >> >> Special thanks to Dmitry Petukhov, Christopher Allen, Craig Raw and >> others for their feedback on the specification. >> >> =3D=3DReferences=3D=3D >> >> Original mailing list thread: >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-February/01= 8385.html >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> > --000000000000500c1805bb60aca6 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Craig,
Thanks for the feedback! Sharing my comm= ents inline.

On Mon, Feb 15, 2021 at 5:53 AM Craig Raw <craigraw@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi all,
<= div>
Hugo and I have discussed off-list, and I have two concerns w= ith this proposal:

1. I believe adding the TOKEN and enc= ryption to the exchange adds complexity to already notoriously complex mult= isig, without adding much in the way of security.
=

I disagree that this doesn't add security. This proposal was i= nspired by a real vulnerability we discovered in the wild while experimenti= ng with HWWs, and during that process I noticed that there is little in the= way of a an attacker to pull off a MITM attack, where he/she can intercept= and tamper with the multisig configuration file, potentially swapping in t= heir own XPUBs. This is especially important for remote multisig setups - w= hich is not common now but I imagine will be a lot more common in the futur= e.

This is because= the shared secret (TOKEN) must still be shared securely, and if you have e= stablished an (off-protocol) secure channel to do this, why not just share = the actual multisig configuration data directly in that channel?

Because multisig is inherently an interactive process. If= we can create the multisig configuration in one shot for everybody, you= 9;re correct that this is not necessary! But the fact that multisig is by n= ature interactive and requires a few rounds of communication (since it need= s each Signer to voluntarily share its=C2=A0XPUB before a wallet can be cre= ated) makes this necessary IMO.

If you are able to do so, you retain the advantage= of being able to inspect the data directly.

Note that some= manual inspection is still part of the proposal. But instead of exclusivel= y relying on manual inspection (which is error-prone, and also doesn't = scale very well for a large number of signers), we strengthen this process = by automating some of the checks and making it harder to tamper with.
=
=C2=A0

2. Asking the user to enter the derivation int= o the Signer also adds (IMO unnecessary) complexity to the multisig setup p= rocess. A different way of doing it, which is specified in the UR crypto-ac= count format linked to previously, has the Signer provide as many common de= rivations (along with their xpubs) as it can support for a given BIP44 acco= unt number. This has the dual advantage of making things simpler for the us= er (they only have to provide an optional account number) and increasing th= e standardisation on common derivation paths. On receiving these derivation= /xpub pairs, the Coordinator can simply pick the appropriate one.

Note that in the updated proposal, I added the opti= on of the Signer automatically filling in the derivation paths on behalf of= the user (and also should take care not to reuse XPUBs). Perhaps this can = be made the default behavior.

Best,
Hugo
=C2=A0

These concerns noted, I agree it's a good idea to have Signers save = the multisig configuration as proposed, and it would be great to have stand= ardisation in hww import and export formats (not just for multisig). On tha= t note, I'd love to see greater adoption of the efficient UR2.0 standar= d and associated formats for airgapped data transmission using QR codes.

Craig


On Mon, Feb 15, 2021 at 11= :13 AM Hugo Nguyen via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.or= g> wrote:
Hi all,
I have updated the proposal based on furt= her feedback. The new spec is included at the bottom.

<= div>I have also created a public Github PR to make it easier to comment on = the text of the spec itself:=C2=A0https://github.com/nunchuk-io/bips/pull/1 .

Could someone please let me know what else needs to be done befo= re a BIP number can be assigned?


=3D=3D=3D Quick summary of chan= ges from last update =3D=3D=3D

1. Define encryption modes

# N= O_ENCRYPTION: Encryption is disabled.
# STANDARD : the TOKEN is a 64-bit= nonce.
# EXTENDED : the TOKEN is a 128-bit nonce.

2. Define sign= ature algorithm

Follow BIP-0322, legacy format allowed.

3. Mu= ltiple TOKENs (optional)

Also add an option where the Coordinator ca= n choose to use one common TOKEN for all Signers, or use one per Signer.
=3D=3D=3D End of summary =3D=3D=3D



<pre>
=C2= =A0 BIP: To be determined
=C2=A0 Layer: Applications
=C2=A0 Title: Bi= tcoin Secure Multisig Setup (BSMS)
=C2=A0 Author: Hugo Nguyen <hugo a= t nunchuk.io>, Peter= Gray <peter at coinki= te.com>, Marko Bencun <marko at shiftcrypto.ch>, Pavol Rusnak <stick@satoshilabs.com>, = Aaron Chen <aarondongchen at gmail.com>, Rodolfo Novak <rodolfo at coinkite.com>
=C2=A0 Comments-Summary:= No comments yet.
=C2=A0 Comments-URI:
=C2=A0 Status: Proposed
=C2= =A0 Type: Standards Track
=C2=A0 Created: 2020-11-10
=C2=A0 License: = BSD-2-Clause
</pre>

=3D=3DIntroduction=3D=3D

=3D=3D= =3DAbstract=3D=3D=3D

This document proposes a mechanism to set up mu= ltisig wallets securely.

=3D=3D=3DCopyright=3D=3D=3D

This BIP= is licensed under the 2-clause BSD license.

=3D=3D=3DMotivation=3D= =3D=3D

The Bitcoin multisig experience has been greatly streamlined = under [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-01= 74.mediawiki BIP-0174
(Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction)]. Howev= er, what is still missing is a standardized process for setting up multisig= wallets securely across different vendors.

There are a number of co= ncerns when it comes to setting up a multisig wallet:

# Whether the = multisig configuration, such as Signer membership, script type, derivation = paths and number of signatures required, is correct and not tampered with.<= br># Whether Signer persists the multisig configuration in their respective= storage, and under what format.
# Whether Signer's storage is tampe= r-proof.
# Whether Signer subsequently uses the multisig configuration t= o generate and verify receive and change addresses.

An attacker who = can modify the multisig configuration can steal or hold funds to ransom by = duping the user into sending funds to the wrong address.

This propos= al seeks to address concerns #1 and #2: to mitigate the risk of tampering d= uring the initial setup phase, and to define an interoperable multisig conf= iguration format.

Concerns #3 and #4 should be handled by Signers an= d is out of scope of this proposal.

=3D=3DSpecification=3D=3D
=3D=3D=3DPrerequisites=3D=3D=3D
This proposal assumes the parties in th= e multisig support [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/= master/bip-0032.mediawiki BIP-0032], [https://gith= ub.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/descriptors.md the descriptor la= nguage] and encryption.

=3D=3D=3DRoles=3D=3D=3D
=3D=3D=3D=3DCoord= inator=3D=3D=3D=3D

The Coordinator initiates the multisig setup. The= Coordinator determines what type of multisig is used and the exact policy = script. If encryption is enabled, the Coordinator also distributes a shared= secret or shared secrets to the parties involved for secure communication.= The Coordinator gathers information from the Signers to generate a descrip= tor record. The Coordinator distributes the descriptor record back to the S= igners.

=3D=3D=3D=3DSigner=3D=3D=3D=3D

The Signer is a partic= ipating member in the multisig. Its responsibilities include providing its = key record -- which contains an Extended Public Key (XPUB) -- to the Coordi= nator, verifying that its XPUB is included in the descriptor record and per= sisting the descriptor record in its storage.

=3D=3D=3DSetup Process= =3D=3D=3D

=3D=3D=3D=3DRound 1=3D=3D=3D=3D

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3DCoor= dinator=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D

* The Coordinator creates a multisig wallet c= reation session. The Coordinator constructs the multisig script and its pol= icy parameters, such as the total number of signers and the required number= of signatures (<tt>M</tt> and <tt>N</tt>).
* Th= e session should expire after some time period determined by the Coordinato= r, e.g., 24 hours.
* If encryption is enabled, the Coordinator distribut= es a secret <tt>TOKEN</tt> to each Signer over a secure channel= . The Signer can use the <tt>TOKEN</tt> to derive an <tt>= ENCRYPTION_KEY</tt>. Refer to the Encryption section below for detail= s on the <tt>TOKEN</tt>, the key derivation function and the en= cryption scheme. Depending on the use case, the Coordinator can decide whet= her to share one common <tt>TOKEN</tt> for all Signers, or to h= ave one per Signer.
* If encryption is disabled, <tt>TOKEN</tt&= gt; is set to <tt>0</tt>, and all the encryption/decryption ste= ps below can be skipped.

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3DSigner=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
* The Signer initiates a new secure multisig setup session by setting the = <tt>TOKEN</tt>. The Signer derives an <tt>ENCRYPTION_KEY&= lt;/tt> from the <tt>TOKEN</tt>. The Signer can keep the ses= sion open until a different value for the <tt>TOKEN</tt> is set= .
* The Signer generates a key record by prompting the user for a multis= ig derivation path and retrieves the XPUB at that derivation path. Optional= ly, the Signer can choose a path on behalf of the user. If the Signer choos= es the path, it should try to avoid reusing XPUBs for different wallets.* The first line in the record must be the <tt>TOKEN</tt>. The= second line must be the <tt>KEY</tt>. The <tt>KEY</tt= > is an XPUB plus its key origin information, written in the descriptor-= defined format, i.e.: <tt>[{master key fingerprint}/{derivation path}= ]{XPUB}</tt>. The third line must be a <tt>SIG</tt>, wher= eas <tt>SIG</tt> is the signature generated by using the privat= e key associated with the XPUB to sign the first two lines.=C2=A0 The signa= ture should follow [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/= master/bip-0322.mediawiki BIP-0322], legacy format accepted. Finally, t= he Signer encrypts the entire record with <tt>ENCRYPTION_KEY</tt&g= t;.

=3D=3D=3D=3DRound 2=3D=3D=3D=3D

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3DCoordinato= r=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D

* The Coordinator gathers key records from all part= icipating Signers. Abort the setup if the wallet setup session has expired.=
* For each key record, the Coordinator decrypts it using <tt>ENCR= YPTION_KEY</tt>. The Coordinator verifies that the included <tt>= ;SIG</tt> is valid given the <tt>KEY</tt>.
* If all ke= y records look good, the Coordinator fills in all necessary information to = generate a descriptor record, which is simply the descriptor string plus a = <tt>CHECKSUM</tt>, all in one line. The <tt>CHECKSUM</= tt> has [https://github.com/bitcoin/bitco= in/blob/master/doc/descriptors.md#checksums BECH32 encoding].
* The = Coordinator encrypts this descriptor record with <tt>ENCRYPTION_KEY&l= t;/tt>.
* The Coordinator sends the encrypted descriptor record to al= l participating Signers.

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3DSigner=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
* The Signer imports the descriptor record, decrypts it using the <tt&g= t;ENCRYPTION_KEY</tt> derived from the open session.
* The Signer = calculates and verifies the descriptor=E2=80=99s <tt>CHECKSUM</tt&= gt;. Abort the setup if the <tt>CHECKSUM</tt> is incorrect.
= * The Signer checks whether one of the <tt>KEY</tt>s in the des= criptor belongs to it, using path and fingerprint information included in t= he descriptor. The check must perform an exact match on the <tt>KEY&l= t;/tt>s, and not using shortcuts such as matching fingerprints (which is= trivial to spoof). Abort the setup if it doesn=E2=80=99t detect its own &l= t;tt>KEY</tt>.
* For confirmation, the Signer must display to t= he user the <tt>CHECKSUM</tt>, plus other configurations, such = as <tt>M</tt> and <tt>N</tt>. The total number of S= igners, <tt>N</tt>, is important to prevent a <tt>KEY<= /tt> insertion attack. All participating Signers should be able to displ= ay the same confirmation.
* If all checks pass, the Signer persists the = descriptor record in its storage.
* The Signer can choose to further res= trict post-XPUB derivation paths, such as to those defined in [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0044.mediawiki BI= P-0044].
* The Signer should subsequently use the descriptor to generate= and verify receive and change addresses.

This completes the setup.<= br>
=3D=3D=3DEncryption=3D=3D=3D

=3D=3D=3D=3DThe Token=3D=3D=3D= =3D
We define three modes of encryption.

# <tt>NO_ENCRYPTIO= N</tt> : the <tt>TOKEN</tt> is set to <tt>0</tt&= gt;. Encryption is disabled.
# <tt>STANDARD</tt> : the <t= t>TOKEN</tt> is a 64-bit nonce.
# <tt>EXTENDED</tt>= : the <tt>TOKEN</tt> is a 128-bit nonce.

The <tt>= TOKEN</tt> can be converted to one of these formats:
* A mnemonic = phrase using [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master= /bip-0039.mediawiki BIP-0039] word list (6 words in <tt>STANDARD&= lt;/tt> mode, 12 words in <tt>EXTENDED</tt> mode)
* A dec= imal number (20 digits in <tt>STANDARD</tt> mode, 40 digits in = <tt>EXTENDED</tt> mode)
* A QR code
* Other formats
The flexibility in the data format allows each Signer to customize the Us= er Experience based on its respective capabilities.

=3D=3D=3D=3DKey = Derivation=3D=3D=3D=3D
The key derivation function is [https://tools.ietf.org/htm= l/rfc2898 PBKDF2], with PRF =3D SHA512. Specifically:

<tt>= DK =3D PBKDF2(PRF, Password, Salt, c, dkLen)</tt>

Whereas:
=
* PRF =3D <tt>SHA512</tt>
* Password =3D <tt>"= ;No SPOF"</tt>
* Salt =3D <tt>TOKEN</tt>
* c = =3D <tt>2048</tt>
* dkLen =3D <tt>256</tt>
* = DK =3D Derived <tt>ENCRYPTION_KEY</tt>

=3D=3D=3D=3DEncry= ption Scheme=3D=3D=3D=3D
The encryption scheme is [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rf= c3686 AES, CTR mode].

=3D=3DQR Codes=3D=3D
For signers that u= se QR codes to transmit data, key and descriptor records can be converted t= o QR codes, following [https://githu= b.com/BlockchainCommons/Research/blob/master/papers/bcr-2020-005-ur.md = the BCR standard].

Also refer to [https://github.com/BlockchainCommons/Research/blob/master/paper= s/bcr-2020-015-account.md UR Type Definition for BIP44 Accounts] and [<= a href=3D"https://github.com/BlockchainCommons/Research/blob/master/papers/= bcr-2020-010-output-desc.md" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/Blockchai= nCommons/Research/blob/master/papers/bcr-2020-010-output-desc.md UR Typ= e Definition for Bitcoin Output Descriptors] for more details.

=3D= =3DSecurity=3D=3D

This proposal introduces two layers of protection.= The first one is a temporary, secret token, used to encrypt the two rounds= of communication between the Signer and the Coordinator. The second one is= through the descriptor checksum and visual inspection of the descriptor it= self.

The token is only needed during the setup phase, and can be sa= fely thrown away afterwards. The token does not guarantee that the Signer m= embership set is not modified, since that depends on the overall security o= f all parties in the setup, but it can make it significantly harder for an = attacker to do so.

There are three ways an attacker can modify the m= embership set: by changing an existing member, by removing an existing memb= er, or by adding a new member.

For the first two methods, one of the= Signers will be able to detect that its membership has been changed or rem= oved, and reject the final descriptor. Thus, it is vital that all participa= ting Signers check that their membership is intact in the descriptor. Even = one Signer failing to check for its membership means that the setup could b= e compromised.

For the third type of attack, the descriptor checksum= and visual inspection of the descriptor itself are the only way to guard a= gainst malicious members from being inserted into the set.

=3D=3DAck= nowledgement=3D=3D

Special thanks to Dmitry Petukhov, Christopher Al= len, Craig Raw and others for their feedback on the specification.

= =3D=3DReferences=3D=3D

Original mailing list thread: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-d= ev/2021-February/018385.html

=C2=A0
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
--000000000000500c1805bb60aca6--