I would not modify my node if the change introduced a perpetual 100 BTC subsidy per block, even if 99% of miners went along with it.
A hardfork is safe when 100% of (economically relevant) users upgrade. If miners don't upgrade at that point, they just lose money.
This is why a hashrate-triggered hardfork does not make sense. Either you believe everyone will upgrade anyway, and the hashrate doesn't matter. Or you are not certain, and the fork is risky, independent of what hashrate upgrades.
And the march 2013 fork showed that miners upgrade at a different schedule than the rest of the network.
> On the other hand, if 99.99% of the miners updated and only 75% of
> merchants and 75% of users updated, then that would be a serioud split of
> the network.
But is that a plausible scenario? Certainly *if* the concensus rules
required a 99% supermajority of miners for the hard fork to go ahead,
then there would be absoltely no rational reason for merchants and
users to refuse to upgrade, even if they don't support the changes
introduces by the hard fork. Their only choice, if the fork succeeds,
is between the active chain and the one that is effectively stalled -
and, of course, they can make that choice ahead of time.
roy
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