Re: [bitcoin-dev] Anti-transaction replay in a hardfork

[Johnson Lau <jl2012@xbt.hk>]

I don’t think this is how the blockchain consensus works. If there is a split, it becomes 2 incompatible ledgers. Bitcoin is not a trademark, and you don’t need a permission to hardfork it. And what you suggest is also technically infeasible, as the miners on the new chain may not have a consensus only what’s happening in the old chain.

> On 26 Jan 2017, at 15:03, Chris Priest <cp368202@ohiou.edu> wrote:
> 
> I don't think the solution should be to "fix the replay attack", but
> rather to "force the replay effect". The fact that transactions can be
> relayed should be seen as a good thing, and not something that should
> be fixed, or even called an "attack".
> 
> The solution should be to create a "bridge" that replays all
> transactions from one network over to the other, and vice-versa. A
> fork should be transparent to the end-user. Forcing the user to choose
> which network to use is bad, because 99% of people that use bitcoin
> don't care about developer drama, and will only be confused by the
> choice. When a user moves coins mined before the fork date, both
> blockchains should record that transaction. Also a rule should be
> introduced that prevents users "tainting" their prefork-mined coins
> with coins mined after the fork. All pre-fork mined coins should
> "belong" to the network with hashpower majority. No other networks
> should be able to claim pre-forked coins as being part of their
> issuance (and therefore part of market cap). Market cap may be
> bullshit, but it is used a lot in the cryptosphere to compare coins to
> each other.
> 
> The advantage of pre-fork coins being recorded on both forks is that
> if one fork goes extinct, no one loses any money. This setup
> encourages the minority chain to die,and unity returned. If pre-fork
> coins change hands on either fork (and not on the other), then holders
> have an incentive to not let their chain die, and the networks will be
> irreversibly split forever. The goal should be unity not permanent
> division.
> 
> On 1/25/17, Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> "A. For users on both existing and new fork, anti-replay is an option,
>> not mandatory"
>> 
>> To maximize fork divergence, it might make sense to require this. Any
>> sensible proposal for a hard fork would include a change to the sighash
>> anyway, so might as well make it required, no?
>> 
>> Matt
>> 
>> On 01/24/17 14:33, Johnson Lau via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>>> This is a pre-BIP. Just need some formatting to make it a formal BIP
>>> 
>>> Motivation:
>>> 
>>> In general, hardforks are consensus rule changes that make currently
>>> invalid transactions / blocks valid. It requires a very high degree of
>>> consensus and all economic active users migrate to the new rules at the
>>> same time. If a significant amount of users refuse to follow, a
>>> permanent ledger split may happen, as demonstrated by Ethereum (“DAO
>>> hardfork"). In the design of DAO hardfork, a permanent split was not
>>> anticipated and no precaution has been taken to protect against
>>> transaction replay attack, which led to significant financial loss for
>>> some users.
>>> 
>>> A replay attack is an attempt to replay a transaction of one network on
>>> another network. It is normally impossible, for example between Bitcoin
>>> and Litecoin, as different networks have completely different ledgers.
>>> The txid as SHA256 hash guarantees that replay across network is
>>> impossible. In a blockchain split, however, since both forks share the
>>> same historical ledger, replay attack would be possible, unless some
>>> precautions are taken.
>>> 
>>> Unfortunately, fixing problems in bitcoin is like repairing a flying
>>> plane. Preventing replay attack is constrained by the requirement of
>>> backward compatibility. This proposal has the following objectives:
>>> 
>>> A. For users on both existing and new fork, anti-replay is an option,
>>> not mandatory.
>>> 
>>> B. For transactions created before this proposal is made, they are not
>>> protected from anti-replay. The new fork has to accept these
>>> transactions, as there is no guarantee that the existing fork would
>>> survive nor maintain any value. People made time-locked transactions in
>>> anticipation that they would be accepted later. In order to maximise the
>>> value of such transactions, the only way is to make them accepted by any
>>> potential hardforks.
>>> 
>>> C. It doesn’t require any consensus changes in the existing network to
>>> avoid unnecessary debate.
>>> 
>>> D. As a beneficial side effect, the O(n^2) signature checking bug could
>>> be fixed for non-segregated witness inputs, optionally.
>>> 
>>> Definitions:
>>> 
>>> “Network characteristic byte” is the most significant byte of the
>>> nVersion field of a transaction. It is interpreted as a bit vector, and
>>> denotes up to 8 networks sharing a common history.
>>> 
>>> “Masked version” is the transaction nVersion with the network
>>> characteristic byte masked.
>>> 
>>> “Existing network” is the Bitcoin network with existing rules, before a
>>> hardfork. “New network” is the Bitcoin network with hardfork rules. (In
>>> the case of DAO hardfork, Ethereum Classic is the existing network, and
>>> the now called Ethereum is the new network)
>>> 
>>> “Existing network characteristic bit” is the lowest bit of network
>>> characteristic byte
>>> 
>>> “New network characteristic bit” is the second lowest bit of network
>>> characteristic byte
>>> 
>>> Rules in new network:
>>> 
>>> 1. If the network characteristic byte is non-zero, and the new network
>>> characteristic bit is not set, this transaction is invalid in the new
>>> network. (softfork)
>>> 
>>> 2. If the network characteristic byte is zero, go to 4
>>> 
>>> 3. If the network characteristic byte is non-zero, and the new network
>>> characteristic bit is set, go to 4, regardless of the status of the
>>> other bits.
>>> 
>>> 4. If the masked version is 2 or below, the new network must verify the
>>> transaction with the existing script rules. (no change)
>>> 
>>> 5. If the masked version is 3 or above, the new network must verify the
>>> signatures with a new SignatureHash algorithm (hardfork). Segwit and
>>> non-segwit txs will use the same algorithm. It is same as BIP143, except
>>> that 0x2000000 is added to the nHashType before the hash is calculated.
>>> 
>>> Rules in the existing network:
>>> 
>>> 6. No consensus rule changes is made in the existing network.
>>> 
>>> 7. If the network characteristic byte is non-zero, and the existing
>>> network characteristic bit is not set, this transaction is not relayed
>>> nor mined by default (no change)
>>> 
>>> 8. If the network characteristic byte is zero, no change
>>> 
>>> 9. If the network characteristic byte is non-zero, and the existing
>>> network characteristic bit is set, the masked version is used to
>>> determine whether a transaction should be mined or relayed (policy
>>> change)
>>> 
>>> 10. Wallet may provide an option for setting the existing network
>>> characteristic bit.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Rationales (by rule number):
>>> 
>>> 1. This makes sure transactions with only existing network
>>> characteristic bit set is invalid in the new network (opt-in anti-replay
>>> for existing network transactions on the new network, objective A)
>>> 
>>> 2+4. This makes sure time-locked transactions made before this proposals
>>> are valid in the new network (objective B)
>>> 
>>> 2+5. This makes sure transactions made specifically for the new network
>>> are invalid in the existing network (anti-replay for new network
>>> transactions on the old network); also fixing the O(n^2) bug (objectives
>>> A and D)
>>> 
>>> 3. This is to prepare for the next hardfork from the new network
>>> (objective A)
>>> 
>>> 6, 7, 8. These minimise the change to the existing network (objective C)
>>> 
>>> 9, 10. These are not strictly needed until a hardfork is really
>>> anticipated. Without a significant portion of the network and miners
>>> implement this policy, however, no one should create such transactions.
>>> (objective A)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Limitations:
>>> 
>>> * It is not possible to protect transactions made before the proposal.
>>> To avoid a replay of such transactions, users should first spend at
>>> least a relevant UTXO on the new network so the replay transaction would
>>> be invalidated.
>>> 
>>> * It is up to the designer of a hardfork to decide whether this proposal
>>> is respected. As the DAO hardfork has shown how harmful replay attack
>>> could be, all hardfork proposals (except trivial and totally
>>> uncontroversial ones) should take this into account
>>> 
>>> * The size of network characteristic byte is limited to 8 bits. However,
>>> if we are sure that some of the networks are completely abandoned, the
>>> bits might be reused.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Reference implementation:
>>> 
>>> A demo is available in my forcenet2
>>> branch:
>>> https://github.com/jl2012/bitcoin/commit/7c2593946c4f3e210683110782d82f55473c682a
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-January/013472.html
>>> 
>>> 
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>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>> 
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