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[166.176.185.182]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 185sm34814736pfg.13.2017.03.05.10.48.35 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 05 Mar 2017 10:48:35 -0800 (PST) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-75F0AD18-DBB3-4B00-95E2-62A5E0D8C222 Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) From: Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org> X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (14D27) In-Reply-To: <CAFVRnyomgeXu2pRO=+B7bwB-bZdEL2DcpJNPMz=tAhht6eZXAQ@mail.gmail.com> Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2017 10:48:33 -0800 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <CF179411-8790-4CD9-A785-D7DA7C9AB865@voskuil.org> References: <0ba5bf9c-5578-98ce-07ae-036d0d71046b@riseup.net> <CAFVRnyomgeXu2pRO=+B7bwB-bZdEL2DcpJNPMz=tAhht6eZXAQ@mail.gmail.com> To: David Vorick <david.vorick@gmail.com>, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, HTML_MESSAGE, MIME_QP_LONG_LINE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Moving towards user activated soft fork activation X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev.lists.linuxfoundation.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/options/bitcoin-dev>, <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/> List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>, <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=subscribe> X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 05 Mar 2017 18:48:37 -0000 --Apple-Mail-75F0AD18-DBB3-4B00-95E2-62A5E0D8C222 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable There are two aspects of system security in Bitcoin, mining (hash power) and= payment validation (economy). The security of each is a function of its lev= el of decentralization. Another way to think of it is that a system with les= s decentralization has a smaller community (consensus). A large consensus is= more secure in that it is more resistant to change (forks) than a system wi= th a small consensus. The fact that mining is highly centralized makes it relatively easy to enfor= ce a fork via miner collaboration, and hard to do so without it. So clearly the other option, as being discussed here, is to enforce a fork v= ia the economy. Given the highly centralized nature of the economy, describe= d below as "economic hubs", it is also relatively easy as well. Independent of one's opinion on the merits of one fork or another, the state= of centralization in Bitcoin is an area of great concern. If "we" can sit d= own with 75% of the economy and/or 90% of the hash power (which of course ha= s been done) and negotiate a change to any rule, Bitcoin is a purely politic= al money. If "we" can do this, so can "they". e > On Mar 5, 2017, at 10:10 AM, David Vorick via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lis= ts.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >=20 > I also think that the UASF is a good idea. Hashrate follows coin price. If= the UASF has the higher coin price, the other chain will be annihilated. If= the UASF has a lower coin price, the user activated chain can still exist (= though their coins can be trivially stolen on the majority chain). >=20 > The success of the UASF depends entirely on the price. And actually, the p= rice is easy to manipulate. If you, as an economically active full node, ref= use to acknowledge the old chain and demand that incoming coins arrive over t= he UASF chain. In doing so, you drive down the utility of the old chain and d= rive up the utility of the new chain. This ultimately impacts the price. >=20 > I think it would be pretty easy to get high confidence of the success of a= UASF. Basically you need all the major economic hubs to agree to upgrade an= d then exclusively accept UASF coins. I don't have a comprehensive list, but= if we could sign on 75% of the major exchanges and payment processors, and g= et 75% of the wallets to upgrade, then the UASF would be very likely to succ= essfully obliterate the old rules, as miners would be unable to sell their c= oins or pay their bills by stubbornly sticking to the old chain. It's less r= isky than a hard fork by far, because there is zero risk of coin split if th= e UASF has majority hashrate, which will follow majority economic value. >=20 > A serious proposal I think would get all the code ready and merged, but wi= thout setting a flag day. Then we would get signatures from the major instit= utions promising to use the software and saying that they are ready for a fl= ag day. After that, you release a patch with a flag day 12 months in the fut= ure. People can upgrade immediately, and have a full year to transition. >=20 > That gives tons of time for people to upgrade, and tons of confidence that= the UASF will end up as the majority chain. >=20 > If we cannot get enough major exchanges, payment processors, and other eco= nomic hubs to upgrade, the flag day should remain upset, as the risk of coi= n split will be non-zero. >=20 > I would suggest that a carefully executed UASF is much riskier than a soft= fork, but far, far less risky than a hard fork. >=20 >=20 > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev --Apple-Mail-75F0AD18-DBB3-4B00-95E2-62A5E0D8C222 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D= utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><div></div><div>There are two aspects of sy= stem security in Bitcoin, mining (hash power) and payment validation (econom= y). The security of each is a function of its level of decentralization. Ano= ther way to think of it is that a system with less decentralization has a sm= aller community (consensus). A large consensus is more secure in that it is m= ore resistant to change (forks) than a system with a small consensus.</div><= div><br></div><div>The fact that mining is highly centralized makes it relat= ively easy to enforce a fork via miner collaboration, and hard to do so with= out it.</div><div><br></div><div>So clearly the other option, as being discu= ssed here, is to enforce a fork via the economy. Given the highly centralize= d nature of the economy, described below as "economic hubs", it is also rela= tively easy as well.</div><div><br></div><div>Independent of one's opinion o= n the merits of one fork or another, the state of centralization in Bitcoin i= s an area of great concern. If "we" can sit down with 75% of the economy and= /or 90% of the hash power (which of course has been done) and negotiate a ch= ange to any rule, Bitcoin is a purely political money.</div><div><br></div><= div>If "we" can do this, so can "they".</div><div><br></div><div>e</div><div= ><br>On Mar 5, 2017, at 10:10 AM, David Vorick via bitcoin-dev <<a href=3D= "mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfounda= tion.org</a>> wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div dir= =3D"auto"><div class=3D"gmail_extra" dir=3D"auto"><div style=3D"font-family:= sans-serif;font-size:13.696px" dir=3D"auto">I also think that the UASF is a g= ood idea. Hashrate follows coin price. If the UASF has the higher coin price= , the other chain will be annihilated. If the UASF has a lower coin price, t= he user activated chain can still exist (though their coins can be trivially= stolen on the majority chain).</div><div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;fo= nt-size:13.696px" dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:sans-seri= f;font-size:13.696px" dir=3D"auto">The success of the UASF depends entirely o= n the price. And actually, the price is easy to manipulate. If you, as an ec= onomically active full node, refuse to acknowledge the old chain and demand t= hat incoming coins arrive over the UASF chain. In doing so, you drive down t= he utility of the old chain and drive up the utility of the new chain. This u= ltimately impacts the price.</div><div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-= size:13.696px" dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;f= ont-size:13.696px" dir=3D"auto">I think it would be pretty easy to get high c= onfidence of the success of a UASF. Basically you need all the major economi= c hubs to agree to upgrade and then exclusively accept UASF coins. I don't h= ave a comprehensive list, but if we could sign on 75% of the major exchanges= and payment processors, and get 75% of the wallets to upgrade, then the UAS= F would be very likely to successfully obliterate the old rules, as miners w= ould be unable to sell their coins or pay their bills by stubbornly sticking= to the old chain. It's less risky than a hard fork by far, because there is= zero risk of coin split if the UASF has majority hashrate, which will follo= w majority economic value.</div><div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-si= ze:13.696px" dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;fon= t-size:13.696px" dir=3D"auto">A serious proposal I think would get all the c= ode ready and merged, but without setting a flag day. Then we would get sign= atures from the major institutions promising to use the software and saying t= hat they are ready for a flag day. After that, you release a patch with a fl= ag day 12 months in the future. People can upgrade immediately, and have a f= ull year to transition.</div><div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:= 13.696px" dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-s= ize:13.696px" dir=3D"auto">That gives tons of time for people to upgrade, an= d tons of confidence that the UASF will end up as the majority chain.</div><= div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:13.696px" dir=3D"auto"><br></d= iv><div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:13.696px" dir=3D"auto">If w= e cannot get enough major exchanges, payment processors, and other economic h= ubs to upgrade, the flag day should remain upset, as the risk of coin s= plit will be non-zero.</div><div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:1= 3.696px" dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-si= ze:13.696px" dir=3D"auto">I would suggest that a carefully executed UASF is m= uch riskier than a soft fork, but far, far less risky than a hard fork.</div= ><div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:13.696px" dir=3D"auto"><br><= /div><div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:13.696px" dir=3D"auto"><= br></div></div></div> </div></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><span>____________________= ___________________________</span><br><span>bitcoin-dev mailing list</span><= br><span><a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-de= v@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a></span><br><span><a href=3D"https://lists.lin= uxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev">https://lists.linuxfoundation= .org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a></span><br></div></blockquote></body></= html>= --Apple-Mail-75F0AD18-DBB3-4B00-95E2-62A5E0D8C222--