From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org (smtp3.osuosl.org [140.211.166.136]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 47CDEC002D for ; Thu, 7 Jul 2022 16:24:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 13B9B6128A for ; Thu, 7 Jul 2022 16:24:31 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp3.osuosl.org 13B9B6128A Authentication-Results: smtp3.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=voskuil-org.20210112.gappssmtp.com header.i=@voskuil-org.20210112.gappssmtp.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20210112 header.b=hwZRGrv+ X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.897 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.897 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, MIME_QP_LONG_LINE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp3.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id I_nqSUdZZBGO for ; Thu, 7 Jul 2022 16:24:29 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp3.osuosl.org BEA4061289 Received: from mail-pf1-x429.google.com (mail-pf1-x429.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::429]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BEA4061289 for ; Thu, 7 Jul 2022 16:24:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-pf1-x429.google.com with SMTP id y141so20396915pfb.7 for ; Thu, 07 Jul 2022 09:24:29 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=voskuil-org.20210112.gappssmtp.com; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:from:mime-version:subject:date:message-id :references:cc:in-reply-to:to; bh=EGA/Rmz4Ec7bMlQjPmjQf/Wet14me/rrnQy5ixN5p6M=; b=hwZRGrv+4h7TZpFmGepwTq60zhTvHyBWLHMVrI+4mWlkjdMcthiNs4K0f9dMcUVTrI vnW+IuU+orimZYQrqmLxAhm0CGspkLPuFqca2UW76PPAtYLIPNVFAZ51j/xgrqaspczM o++iFtAeUqd8yuFfYe/8g86fuRtVUXUoRmtdgHsJxTJUKvHfBPzZ0qfLmw/eQTqAXU/w tJFJZ53F2TxS7F8JKW9UqPBCKJcj84NKg4YUAqja2e2r7440cbrPC3jHPslgW3x+My6b aEXCLm7wmSZLC2KyoUezcWnPrbm6loQ228+WyHbkVLHUhrQY0zJadgTMUjlnPkWCY1Ho jk7g== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:content-transfer-encoding:from:mime-version :subject:date:message-id:references:cc:in-reply-to:to; bh=EGA/Rmz4Ec7bMlQjPmjQf/Wet14me/rrnQy5ixN5p6M=; b=Pfl0WOQV2aO6fJ0Dhe1rrMZXCBCEkrwyzCOGWV8Urb5ssvCsH12KuRFI+bOwxA4DHU o58vWsnSjIVoy3xkYXuH1aJoVYROyUL0VkxZeLzt/MO5MxmWPq90gJt8nk16/y6krhAz 4sMN84ei1dWRK87E68KRM3KmKaov8PwPyYp/CS0wpxxDCw+0sY8VJBO0LM0jwMjZPsaS FAGZ/N3NFdIjWxBVV/GdpA7DGwNXxy0VAYzFvCUUiPvBY4Dfk9u1e4SJXIHWFhVgNTK1 RRj72j0ehLSzCxJhZNxZfnL1O+tEdfp4ITR7yLnHvXEXyFVRB8HKZ2/ldER5UKK7f4s9 adlQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AJIora8nDH1O7TbfZwT+OnMR6DLZHdTxTXTjjewkeixrPlHh+w4NK+8E 2em7jBZ6ytSJkQS2lx6CJ8UWXQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1uzhoyLlZEfwBQu6Vz6JBBIWyAs5bVaBKs3rqYOsaJ1sLkYXsXd4iD1lkdpfZ+RUpiXm2gv9w== X-Received: by 2002:a17:90b:4d8a:b0:1ef:da53:e126 with SMTP id oj10-20020a17090b4d8a00b001efda53e126mr3191095pjb.116.1657211068965; Thu, 07 Jul 2022 09:24:28 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtpclient.apple ([2600:380:801f:6202:f47e:c7ca:fad6:7d1]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id bk21-20020aa78315000000b005254e44b748sm26896236pfb.84.2022.07.07.09.24.27 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 07 Jul 2022 09:24:27 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=Apple-Mail-76221C1E-812B-468B-B34D-D0497FB044ED Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: Eric Voskuil Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 09:24:26 -0700 Message-Id: References: In-Reply-To: To: Peter Todd , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (19F77) Cc: John Carvalho Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Bitcoin covenants are inevitable X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 07 Jul 2022 16:24:31 -0000 --Apple-Mail-76221C1E-812B-468B-B34D-D0497FB044ED Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > On Jul 7, 2022, at 07:13, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev wrote: >=20 > =EF=BB=BFOn Thu, Jul 07, 2022 at 02:24:39PM +0100, John Carvalho via bitco= in-dev wrote: >> Billy, >>=20 >> Proof of work and the difficulty adjustment function solve literally >> everything you are talking about already. >=20 > Unfortunately you are quite wrong: the difficulty adjustment function mere= ly > adjusts for changes in the amount of observable, non-51%-attacking, hashin= g > power. In the event of a chain split, the difficulty adjustment function d= oes > nothing; against a 51% attacker, the difficulty adjustment does nothing; > against a censor, the difficulty adjustment does nothing. Consider falling hash rate due to a perpetual 51% attack. Difficulty falls, p= ossibly to min difficulty if all non-censors stop mining and with all censor= s collaborating (one miner). Yet as difficulty falls, so does the cost of co= untering the censor. At min difficulty everyone can CPU mine again. Given the presumption that fees rise on unconfirmed transactions, there is i= nherent economic incentive to countering at any level of difficulty. Consequ= ently the censor is compelled to subsidize the loss resulting from forgoing h= igher fee transactions that are incentivizing its competition. With falling difficulty this incentive is compounded. Comparisons of security in different scenarios presume a consistent level of= demand. If that demand is insufficient to offset the censor=E2=80=99s subsi= dy, there is no security in any scenario. Given that the block subsidy (inflation) is paid equally to censoring and no= n-censoring miners, it offers no security against censorship whatsoever. Tra= ding fee-based block reward for inflation-based is simply trading censorship= resistance for the presumption of double-spend security. But of course, a c= ensor can double spend profitably in any scenario where the double spend val= ue (to the censor) exceeds that of blocks orphaned (as the censor earns 100%= of all block rewards). Banks and state monies offer reasonable double spend security. Not sure that= =E2=80=99s a trade worth making. It=E2=80=99s not clear to me that Satoshi understood this relation. I=E2=80=99= ve seen no indication of it. However the decision to phase out subsidy, once= a sufficient number of units (to assure divisibility) had been issued, is w= hat transitions Bitcoin from a censorable to a censorship resistant money. I= f one does not believe there is sufficient demand for such a money, there is= no way to reconcile that belief with a model of censorship resistance. > We should not imbue real technology with magical qualities. Precisely. It is economic forces (people), not technology, that provide secu= rity. e >> Bitcoin does not need active economic governanance by devs or meddlers. >=20 > Yes, active governance would definitely be an exploitable mechanism. On th= e > other hand, the status quo of the block reward eventually going away entir= ely > is obviously a risky state change too. >=20 >>>> There is also zero agreement on how much security would constitute such= >>> an optimum. >>>=20 >>> This is really step 1. We need to generate consensus on this long before= >>> the block subsidy becomes too small. Probably in the next 10-15 years. I= >>> wrote a paper >=20 > The fact of the matter is that the present amount of security is about 1.7= % of > the total coin supply/year, and Bitcoin seems to be working fine. 1.7% is a= lso > already an amount low enough that it's much smaller than economic volatili= ty. >=20 > Obviously 0% is too small. >=20 > There's zero reason to stress about finding an "optimal" amount. An amount= low > enough to be easily affordable, but non-zero, is fine. 1% would be fine; 0= .5% > would probably be fine; 0.1% would probably be fine. >=20 > Over a lifetime - 75 years - 0.5% yearly inflation works out to be a 31% t= ax on > savings; 0.1% works out to be 7.2% >=20 > These are all amounts that are likely to be dwarfed by economic shifts. >=20 > --=20 > https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev --Apple-Mail-76221C1E-812B-468B-B34D-D0497FB044ED Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name=signature.asc; x-apple-part-url=A962793E-D2B4-4B43-AFE5-A0C2EB768DD8 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=signature.asc Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE0RcYcKRzsEwFZ3N5Lly11TVRLzcFAmLG6dcACgkQLly11TVR LzfHRQ//dCSdHeUKwvpEN4kUI5n8riCjOzFbzf7DtGjZ8mr5JKk99Y5dvNSt43E0 x5B+fp0jt6NPoQkQ9d/gMChdloyeCpIzI0q5t6upVWWIejE/lE109OhaZJxW2/Fm 8iDZjPbx0agvzxktmsEYoOQ7UHzEz1J78GrhlE3uuR80QY/8YwNvL6348Ycxgzi9 0XdZX5yf9grl1gAJldx5icTHIo0hNEpWQZye2SnLda9NrLPSKgE5UcDSIEIBJBfv F5HELWV5Gf0F/ruxC70kXUMx+qlIk/Nao6bvEy31YkYStA3GlWo5ZmnuyvdnQ4yr JuZwQJw/R2RiiOYsK8TMbB7kXwYD3Gzt6QW+bhXpty3K0sKT/70FT2VE+NdMXFNT EqxJK9AYuUK3WTLZSOda9Ny/eBK3RDMkWbXdxMXAPOsW86BC3j5+KzzSSmIVpU0j URaqcE0XfXWBvCz+LFH8Mvkxi7xS9kro/XXXzLVO6ZSrpw8z5MmMPy6HdruWZbp2 VpLcaANBFxGUrFbh/zvMJB03vAU8peRtfwWodn9ynWymb38DlZsBZyg2uejnKjYv ghPGxPdAEXbm/zSWmnVU9jhN/0+7DA7+r0pk8+l6t4iOdqu46l/K8CRxkwKlIOSA bcTYYeZthY7iTEABS+RNAx/vzP54bxywpPg9HGy/zKmKCT/sDpE= =I1Dy -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --Apple-Mail-76221C1E-812B-468B-B34D-D0497FB044ED--