From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4ED49C24 for ; Wed, 14 Jun 2017 19:04:29 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-pf0-f195.google.com (mail-pf0-f195.google.com [209.85.192.195]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 82948201 for ; Wed, 14 Jun 2017 19:04:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-pf0-f195.google.com with SMTP id w12so1183732pfk.0 for ; Wed, 14 Jun 2017 12:04:25 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc:message-id:references :to; bh=Fg7siHAPKFIpTZbq0UXPxkGq/Ly9TGGmbfS1pKe54jI=; b=i/2ecU4EEe+UOu/k6bR4NElia5R4xckPOrtZp3WCQCmEDn/bRxCzUgMEeCuwp5m0tC C62LGeB/FQJ4dx/maCUo5LDyeW6SXc7+/CfO0LydDV+oUAv4xN4oI2EZ35NdruIHWg7l LvB0orJHiwADggbGFgv1sDcI9YZ4LeeVBLv313zAbFiyBgGy9QZQ7o4kJxVjLCLffGXR CiwjBfdMDP/sV7p0XF12zp5YNO/HO1C0a8aUW5dnAlknJNHA+x7jIQnLfFJXf9ixxCZr SMy1hhy+2hvKYTvlCVekIctEJ4BG9X5K3mMyOGIlC2bKXMK43rk0m0oijjlLGGdqyZwY H2Hg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :message-id:references:to; bh=Fg7siHAPKFIpTZbq0UXPxkGq/Ly9TGGmbfS1pKe54jI=; b=YZ3hy0e+dbUyqjj00cJ9ezdLFZ1FbTSZL8ADorJmntNZlFk7Ej+T0S1l9hMCZLxRyQ EhMc/1lxQ/OWGzHS8Y9bNRJkhq2ZqkZsh5nQbhxuOf/I4sK5kaWWKb9AuiXsYbZs8NRE vXdIkP77hb/X/0IeEmiet7mpID9kdgRWXmN484R0JOQpJzW1M9b/rki3WuewxUGUVjAR aMCHo1F4bnMuhP+hMcM288COUccMeWF6RLlEMZd88UbFXpx1cwD8N9ei2hk7CBNIlo2x 4nGQ/7ZONoK9gy6ky08LqHTh36TACcEVujwMZcZ8T3QWcbvVfYM0dJZRZt9nxC1+rmHD 9wvw== X-Gm-Message-State: AKS2vOyzlFlz27PZy64k/JnvOumm7AP9EsyoJMShB2Cpb/RZ58kBmcHD B0OGrdYr9TdVVQ== X-Received: by 10.98.153.135 with SMTP id t7mr1446591pfk.160.1497467065062; Wed, 14 Jun 2017 12:04:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.249.10] ([180.166.55.198]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id y29sm1290072pff.50.2017.06.14.12.04.23 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 14 Jun 2017 12:04:24 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_E8674C1B-2684-4711-8781-D566241AD8C8" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 11.0 \(3431\)) From: Zheming Lin In-Reply-To: Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 03:04:21 +0800 Message-Id: References: <31040BE1-64ED-4D05-BCBE-E80BC7B9A182@gmail.com> To: Jameson Lopp X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3431) X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,FREEMAIL_REPLY,HTML_MESSAGE, MIME_QP_LONG_LINE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 14 Jun 2017 19:24:06 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal: Demonstration of Phase in Full Network Upgrade Activated by Miners X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2017 19:04:29 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_E8674C1B-2684-4711-8781-D566241AD8C8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=gb2312 Hi Jameson: > =D4=DA 2017=C4=EA6=D4=C215=C8=D5=A3=AC02:55=A3=ACJameson Lopp = =D0=B4=B5=C0=A3=BA >=20 >=20 >=20 > On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 11:29 AM, Zheming Lin > wrote: > Hi Jameson: >=20 >> =D4=DA 2017=C4=EA6=D4=C215=C8=D5=A3=AC01:20=A3=ACJameson Lopp = > =D0=B4=B5=C0=A3=BA= >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev = > wrote: >>=20 >>=20 >> > =D4=DA 2017=C4=EA6=D4=C214=C8=D5=A3=AC02:11=A3=ACGregory Maxwell = > =D0=B4=B5=C0=A3=BA >> > >> > On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev >> > > wrote: >>=20 >> > The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not = just >> > miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8, >> > paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence). This is >> > critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current >> > degree of centralization in pools. Without it, Bitcoin's security >> > would look a lot more like the Ripple system. >> > >>=20 >> =CA=C7=B5=C4=A3=AC=D3=C3=BB=A7=D3=C0=D4=B6=B6=BC=D3=D0=D1=A1=D4=F1=A3=AC= =B2=A2=BF=C9=D2=D4=C5=D7=C6=FA=C4=C7=D0=A9=BD=DA=B5=E3=A1=A3=D5=E2=B8=F6 = BIP = =B2=A2=C3=BB=D3=D0=B7=B4=B6=D4=D5=E2=D0=A9=D3=C3=BB=A7=D5=E2=C3=B4=D7=F6=A1= =A3=D6=BB=D3=D0=C4=C7=D0=A9=B1=BB=B6=AF=B5=C4=C7=AE=B0=FC=D3=C3=BB=A7=A3=AC= =CB=FB=C3=C7=D0=E8=D2=AA=D6=AA=B5=C0=B1=D8=D0=EB=D7=F6=B3=F6=D2=BB=B8=F6=D1= =A1=D4=F1=A1=A3=A3=A8=B6=F8=B2=BB=CA=C7=B1=BB=B6=AF=B5=C4=B8=FA=CB=E6=C4=AC= =C8=CF=B5=C4=B2=DF=C2=D4=A3=A9 >> Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This = BIP does=A1=AFt go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) = that=A1=AFs passive, they need to know there=A1=AFs a choice and pick = one. >>=20 >> =D5=E2=B8=F6 BIP = =BF=C9=D2=D4=B1=BB=D3=A6=D3=C3=D3=DA=BC=B8=BA=F5=C8=CE=BA=CE=B5=C4=C9=FD=BC= =B6=C9=CF=A3=AC=B0=FC=C0=A8=B8=F4=C0=EB=BC=FB=D6=A4=A3=AC=C1=BD=D5=D7=B5=C4= =B8=F4=C0=EB=BC=FB=D6=A4=A3=AC=C1=BD=D5=D7=C0=A9=C8=DD=A3=AC=D3=BF=CF=D6=B9= =B2=CA=B6=A3=AC=B0=CB=D5=D7=C0=A9=C8=DD=B5=C8=A1=A3=B5=AB=D5=E2=D0=A9=C9=FD= =BC=B6=B2=A2=B2=BB=CA=C7=D6=D8=B5=E3=A1=A3 >> This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit, = Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m=A1=AD but the upgrade is not the key point. >>=20 >> =B5=BD=B5=D7=CE=D2=C3=C7=B5=C4=D3=C3=BB=A7=CA=C7=B7=F1=D5=E6=B5=C4=D3=B5= =D3=D0=D1=A1=D4=F1=A3=BF >> Did the users have any real choice? >>=20 >> = =CE=D2=B2=A2=B2=BB=C4=DC=C0=ED=BD=E2=CB=FB=C3=C7=CF=E0=D0=C5=B4=F3=B2=BF=B7= =D6=BF=F3=B9=A4=A3=A8=BE=CD=CF=F1=B5=B1=C7=B0=D2=BB=D1=F9=A3=A9=A3=AC=B5=AB= =BE=DC=BE=F8=D5=E2=D0=A9=B6=E0=CA=FD=BF=F3=B9=A4=B6=D4=D0=AD=D2=E9=B8=C4=B1= =E4=B5=C4=CD=B6=C6=B1=BD=E1=B9=FB=A1=A3 >> I don=A1=AFt see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they do = today) but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade. >>=20 >> To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using = the term "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. = Once a feature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may = signal that they are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason = miners are too "passive or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the = new rules, users may choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to = accept blocks that do not show readiness for enforcing the new rules. >=20 > How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. = But what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or = the fork? >=20 > I agree with you that the =A1=B0vote=A1=B1 is not accurate. Could you = kindly suggest an other word for that? >=20 > I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you = agree with this or not? >=20 > Regarding consensus changes, users can voice their opinion on any = number of communication platforms. Though if you're looking for a way = for users to signal their intentions at the protocol level, every = proposal for doing that to date has been arguably flawed. Measuring = meatspace consensus is pretty tricky if not completely impossible, = especially given the fact that the vast majority of Bitcoin users do not = voice any opinions on the matter of consensus rules. >=20 =A1=B0Sybil attack=A1=B1. The genuine node will leave the chain if it = doesn=A1=AFt like the change. That=A1=AFs what restrain the majority = miners acting foolishly. If the users like the idea, they follow. If they don=A1=AFt the fork = away(and not afraid of replay attack). I think it=A1=AFs a way to move = forward together.=20 Would you support the idea that we put the choice to the users to = decide? > Most attempts at measuring user consensus would probably be best = described as signaling rather than voting given that the act of doing so = has no actual power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a fully = validating node is free to enforce the rules with which the agree = regardless of what rules other entities are enforcing.=20 >> =20 >>=20 >> = =B6=D4=C7=AE=B0=FC=D3=C3=BB=A7=B5=C4=D1=A1=D4=F1=A3=AC=CA=C7=CB=FB=C3=C7=CA= =C7=B7=F1=CF=E0=D0=C5=B6=E0=CA=FD=BF=F3=B9=A4=A1=A3=C8=E7=B9=FB=CB=FB=C3=C7= =B2=BB=CF=E0=D0=C5=A3=AC=BF=C9=D2=D4=CD=A8=B9=FD=B7=D6=B2=E6=C0=B4=CF=FB=B3= =FD=B5=F4=BF=F3=B9=A4=A1=A3 >> This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51% = majority miners. If they don=A1=AFt, they can have their fork that get = rid of miners. >>=20 >> =C8=E7=B9=FB=CB=FB=C3=C7=C8=D4=BE=C9=CF=E0=D0=C5=BF=F3=B9=A4=A3=AC=C4=C7= =C3=B4=BF=C9=D2=D4=C1=F4=CF=C2=C0=B4=B2=A2=B8=FA=CB=E6=BF=F3=B9=A4=BD=AB=C0= =B4=B5=C4=D0=AD=D2=E9=B8=C4=B1=E4=A1=A3 >> If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote = for upcoming protocol upgrade. >>=20 >> = =CB=F9=D2=D4=CE=CA=CC=E2=D4=DA=D3=DA=A3=BA=B1=C8=CC=D8=B1=D2=B5=C4=BF=AA=B7= =A2=D5=DF=A1=A2=D3=C3=BB=A7=A1=A2=D3=B5=D3=D0=D5=DF=A1=A2=B7=FE=CE=F1=CC=E1= =B9=A9=D5=DF=A1=A2=C9=F5=D6=C1=BF=F3=B9=A4=A3=AC=CA=C7=B7=F1=A3=A8=C8=D4=C8= =BB=A3=A9=C8=E7=B0=D7=C6=A4=CA=E9=D6=D0=C3=E8=CA=F6=B5=C4=B6=D4=B4=F3=B6=E0= =CA=FD=BF=F3=B9=A4=D3=B5=D3=D0=D0=C5=C8=CE=A1=A3 >> So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, = service provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of = miners as designed in the white paper? >>=20 >> =20 >> There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - the white = paper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to = determining the correct chain within the context of many possible = /valid/ chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine = the correct chain amongst an infinitely variable number of currently = invalid chain forks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not have = faith in miners (or any other entity) when it comes to choosing the = consensus rules they wish to enforce. >>=20 >=20 > Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1 = temporarily. That=A1=AFs a =A1=B0soft fork=A1=B1 right? If they dislike = the idea, they can leave as always. >=20 > =46rom my understanding, if the only change miners make is to stop = confirming transactions that have a version less than X then it should = be a soft fork, yes.=20 And if we add a version 2 valid, does that still be a =A1=B0soft fork=A1=B1= ? Regards, LIN Zheming= --Apple-Mail=_E8674C1B-2684-4711-8781-D566241AD8C8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=gb2312 Hi = Jameson:

=D4=DA 2017=C4=EA6=D4=C215=C8=D5=A3=AC02:55=A3=AC= Jameson Lopp <jameson.lopp@gmail.com> =D0=B4=B5=C0=A3=BA



On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 11:29 AM, = Zheming Lin <heater@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi Jameson:

=D4=DA 2017=C4=EA6=D4=C215=C8=D5=A3=AC01:20=A3=AC= Jameson Lopp <jameson.lopp@gmail.com> = =D0=B4=B5=C0=A3=BA



On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at = 9:39 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:


> =D4=DA 2017=C4=EA6=D4=C214=C8=D5=A3=AC02:11=A3=ACGregory = Maxwell <greg@xiph.org> =D0=B4=B5=C0=A3=BA
>
> On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via = bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> = wrote:

> The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, = and not just
> miners, is specifically described in the = white paper (section 8,
> paragraph 2, it especially = clear in the last sentence).  This is
> critical = for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current
>= degree of centralization in pools.  Without it, Bitcoin's = security
> would look a lot more like the Ripple = system.
>

=CA=C7=B5=C4=A3=AC=D3=C3=BB=A7=D3=C0=D4=B6=B6=BC=D3=D0=D1= =A1=D4=F1=A3=AC=B2=A2=BF=C9=D2=D4=C5=D7=C6=FA=C4=C7=D0=A9=BD=DA=B5=E3=A1=A3= =D5=E2=B8=F6 BIP = =B2=A2=C3=BB=D3=D0=B7=B4=B6=D4=D5=E2=D0=A9=D3=C3=BB=A7=D5=E2=C3=B4=D7=F6=A1= =A3=D6=BB=D3=D0=C4=C7=D0=A9=B1=BB=B6=AF=B5=C4=C7=AE=B0=FC=D3=C3=BB=A7=A3=AC= =CB=FB=C3=C7=D0=E8=D2=AA=D6=AA=B5=C0=B1=D8=D0=EB=D7=F6=B3=F6=D2=BB=B8=F6=D1=A1=D4=F1=A1=A3=A3= =A8=B6=F8=B2=BB=CA=C7=B1=BB=B6=AF=B5=C4=B8=FA=CB=E6=C4=AC=C8=CF=B5=C4=B2=DF= =C2=D4=A3=A9
Yes, users always have choice that they can = abandon the nodes. This BIP does=A1=AFt go against them. I mean only the = one(especially wallets) that=A1=AFs passive, they need to know there=A1=AF= s a choice and pick one.

=D5=E2=B8=F6 BIP = =BF=C9=D2=D4=B1=BB=D3=A6=D3=C3=D3=DA=BC=B8=BA=F5=C8=CE=BA=CE=B5=C4=C9=FD=BC= =B6=C9=CF=A3=AC=B0=FC=C0=A8=B8=F4=C0=EB=BC=FB=D6=A4=A3=AC=C1=BD=D5=D7=B5=C4= =B8=F4=C0=EB=BC=FB=D6=A4=A3=AC=C1=BD=D5=D7=C0=A9=C8=DD=A3=AC=D3=BF=CF=D6=B9=B2=CA=B6=A3=AC=B0= =CB=D5=D7=C0=A9=C8=DD=B5=C8=A1=A3=B5=AB=D5=E2=D0=A9=C9=FD=BC=B6=B2=A2=B2=BB= =CA=C7=D6=D8=B5=E3=A1=A3
This BIP can be applied to almost = any upgrade, including Segwit, Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m=A1=AD but the = upgrade is not the key point.

=B5=BD=B5=D7=CE=D2=C3=C7=B5=C4=D3=C3=BB=A7=CA=C7=B7=F1=D5=E6=B5= =C4=D3=B5=D3=D0=D1=A1=D4=F1=A3=BF
Did the users have any = real choice?

=CE=D2=B2=A2=B2=BB=C4=DC=C0=ED=BD=E2=CB=FB=C3=C7=CF=E0=D0=C5=B4= =F3=B2=BF=B7=D6=BF=F3=B9=A4=A3=A8=BE=CD=CF=F1=B5=B1=C7=B0=D2=BB=D1=F9=A3=A9= =A3=AC=B5=AB=BE=DC=BE=F8=D5=E2=D0=A9=B6=E0=CA=FD=BF=F3=B9=A4=B6=D4=D0=AD=D2=E9=B8=C4=B1=E4=B5=C4=CD=B6=C6= =B1=BD=E1=B9=FB=A1=A3
I don=A1=AFt see the reason they = trust the majority miners(as they do today) but refuse the vote for = upcoming protocol upgrade.

To be = clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using the term = "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once a = feature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that = they are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too = "passive or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, = users may choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks = that do not show readiness for enforcing the new = rules.

How does the users show their opinion? = They can fork away and leave. But what remains will be united. Are you = afraid of the united users or the fork?

I agree with you that the =A1=B0vote=A1=B1= is not accurate. Could you kindly suggest an other word for = that?

I think = users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you agree with = this or not?

Regarding= consensus changes, users can voice their opinion on any number of = communication platforms. Though if you're looking for a way for users to = signal their intentions at the protocol level, every proposal for doing = that to date has been arguably flawed. Measuring meatspace consensus is = pretty tricky if not completely impossible, especially given the fact = that the vast majority of Bitcoin users do not voice any opinions on the = matter of consensus rules.


=A1=B0Sybil attack=A1=B1. The genuine node will = leave the chain if it doesn=A1=AFt like the change. That=A1=AFs what = restrain the majority miners acting foolishly.

If the users like the idea, they follow. If they = don=A1=AFt the fork away(and not afraid of replay attack). I think it=A1=AF= s a way to move forward together. 

Would you support the idea that we put the choice = to the users to decide?

Most attempts at measuring user consensus would probably be = best described as signaling rather than voting given that the act of = doing so has no actual power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a = fully validating node is free to enforce the rules with which the agree = regardless of what rules other entities are = enforcing. 
 

=B6=D4=C7=AE=B0=FC=D3=C3=BB=A7=B5=C4=D1=A1=D4=F1=A3=AC=CA=C7=CB= =FB=C3=C7=CA=C7=B7=F1=CF=E0=D0=C5=B6=E0=CA=FD=BF=F3=B9=A4=A1=A3=C8=E7=B9=FB= =CB=FB=C3=C7=B2=BB=CF=E0=D0=C5=A3=AC=BF=C9=D2=D4=CD=A8=B9=FD=B7=D6=B2=E6=C0=B4=CF=FB=B3=FD=B5=F4=BF=F3=B9= =A4=A1=A3
This choice for wallet users right now, is = wether to follow the 51% majority miners. If they don=A1=AFt, they can = have their fork that get rid of miners.

=C8=E7=B9=FB=CB=FB=C3=C7=C8=D4=BE=C9=CF=E0=D0=C5=BF=F3=B9=A4=A3= =AC=C4=C7=C3=B4=BF=C9=D2=D4=C1=F4=CF=C2=C0=B4=B2=A2=B8=FA=CB=E6=BF=F3=B9=A4= =BD=AB=C0=B4=B5=C4=D0=AD=D2=E9=B8=C4=B1=E4=A1=A3
If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow = the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.

=CB=F9=D2=D4=CE=CA=CC=E2=D4=DA=D3=DA=A3=BA=B1=C8=CC=D8=B1=D2=B5= =C4=BF=AA=B7=A2=D5=DF=A1=A2=D3=C3=BB=A7=A1=A2=D3=B5=D3=D0=D5=DF=A1=A2=B7=FE= =CE=F1=CC=E1=B9=A9=D5=DF=A1=A2=C9=F5=D6=C1=BF=F3=B9=A4=A3=AC=CA=C7=B7=F1=A3=A8=C8=D4=C8=BB=A3=A9=C8=E7=B0= =D7=C6=A4=CA=E9=D6=D0=C3=E8=CA=F6=B5=C4=B6=D4=B4=F3=B6=E0=CA=FD=BF=F3=B9=A4= =D3=B5=D3=D0=D0=C5=C8=CE=A1=A3
So the questions is: Do the = bitcoin developers, users, holders, service provides, even miners, = (still) have faith in the majority of miners as designed in the white = paper?

 
There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - = the white paper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with = regard to determining the correct chain within the context of many = possible /valid/ chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to = determine the correct chain amongst an infinitely variable number of = currently invalid chain forks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not = have faith in miners (or any other entity) when it comes to choosing the = consensus rules they wish to enforce.


Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the = miners just invalids tx version 1 temporarily. That=A1=AFs a =A1=B0soft = fork=A1=B1 right? If they dislike the idea, they can leave as = always.

=46rom = my understanding, if the only change miners make is to stop confirming = transactions that have a version less than X then it should be a soft = fork, yes. 

And if we add a version 2 valid, does that still = be a =A1=B0soft fork=A1=B1?


Regards,

LIN Zheming
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