From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D7694100B for ; Thu, 17 Dec 2015 21:18:46 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-pa0-f51.google.com (mail-pa0-f51.google.com [209.85.220.51]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3CD67125 for ; Thu, 17 Dec 2015 21:18:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-pa0-f51.google.com with SMTP id jx14so19557958pad.2 for ; Thu, 17 Dec 2015 13:18:46 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=user-agent:in-reply-to:references:mime-version:content-type :content-transfer-encoding:subject:from:date:to:cc:message-id; bh=7AkBuXYzXTPkIz2lcWGesQgpR6KqEl+aUmoWvHlVS7c=; b=ra+01dLUNnLcpV3tD3b0f71jcDEsuJHCRBfwtB2EgeFmJJwzYuA+8McBesRQ8Ypy8J CwqmXZFyJln1upxzB3hlPUhT26xhARLmArD2corcbu3rziIJvlugSllETs7fa+GAY9OK SyrJM9LJoa66yrhce5HrUz3eFOy8TrUvLICsPy3SfWhpWjExsrqQARyPnpkn71Tc6HZc SWcTMAiVK+dWkroOcOOF+KaFMPYp51PIJzon2MHJx6fUpDYIZIkbd8FoQr0dSgu2frwt hdILE/INjbp5nbym2NUHJtXbLoWMeymbUbmUSni9MSb4KCId3gECdy5CcoI6bk3h+NpG kV+Q== X-Received: by 10.66.251.3 with SMTP id zg3mr15824648pac.145.1450387125985; Thu, 17 Dec 2015 13:18:45 -0800 (PST) Received: from [192.168.1.104] (cpe-76-167-237-202.san.res.rr.com. [76.167.237.202]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id x22sm638390pfa.82.2015.12.17.13.18.44 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Thu, 17 Dec 2015 13:18:45 -0800 (PST) User-Agent: K-9 Mail for Android In-Reply-To: References: <2402050984d0076bf0a4556e10962722@xbt.hk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----R90QQLIP9K81UAPP9CI0ZO9WKPVSV7" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Eric Lombrozo Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 13:18:57 -0800 To: Jeff Garzik , Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev , jl2012 Message-ID: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin development mailing list Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Segregated Witness in the context of Scaling Bitcoin X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 21:18:46 -0000 ------R90QQLIP9K81UAPP9CI0ZO9WKPVSV7 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Doesn't a good soft fork signaling mechanism along with an activation warning system for non-upgraded nodes (i.e. BIP9, or even block version ISM for that matter) essentially fix this? I don't quite get why this should be an issue. On December 17, 2015 10:52:39 AM PST, Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev wrote: >On Thu, Dec 17, 2015 at 1:46 PM, jl2012 wrote: > >> This is not correct. >> >> As only about 1/3 of nodes support BIP65 now, would you consider CLTV >tx >> are less secure than others? I don't think so. Since one invalid CLTV >tx >> will make the whole block invalid. Having more nodes to fully >validate >> non-CLTV txs won't make them any safer. The same logic also applies >to SW >> softfork. >> > > >Yes - the logic applies to all soft forks. Each soft fork degrades the >security of non-upgraded nodes. > >The core design of bitcoin is that trustless nodes validate the work of >miners, not trust them. > >Soft forks move in the opposite direction. Each new soft-forked >feature >leans very heavily on miner trust rather than P2P network validation. > > >------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >_______________________________________________ >bitcoin-dev mailing list >bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev ------R90QQLIP9K81UAPP9CI0ZO9WKPVSV7 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Doesn't a good soft fork signaling mechanism along with an activation warning system for non-upgraded nodes (i.e. BIP9, or even block version ISM for that matter) essentially fix this? I don't quite get why this should be an issue.

On December 17, 2015 10:52:39 AM PST, Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:


On Thu, Dec 17, 2015 at 1:46 PM, jl2012 <jl2012@xbt.hk> wrote:
This is not correct.

As only about 1/3 of nodes support BIP65 now, would you consider CLTV tx are less secure than others? I don't think so. Since one invalid CLTV tx will make the whole block invalid. Having more nodes to fully validate non-CLTV txs won't make them any safer. The same logic also applies to SW softfork.


Yes - the logic applies to all soft forks.  Each soft fork degrades the security of non-upgraded nodes.

The core design of bitcoin is that trustless nodes validate the work of miners, not trust them.

Soft forks move in the opposite direction.  Each new soft-forked feature leans very heavily on miner trust rather than P2P network validation.


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