From: alicexbt <alicexbt@protonmail.com>
To: Michael Folkson <michaelfolkson@protonmail.com>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>,
Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Swift Activation - CTV
Date: Tue, 02 Jan 2024 16:43:22 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ISvX58I2-K-suhB33yY9A-zeW7xEFpF83jUgYClJH-nu469Gqa4V-YoikUfSb4BPVdFEHJh_JpH7b6OGPZdPQm_HI9_LtKRd_6vno0HdLRI=@protonmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Zzpp9sp69_QmkUre4YUawBxOLECIfHHUf_OoD8UXXZ8Xwtmr5R62_rlGV2iwLivkST-vWusc0X9horY9qHEHKP2g4GR2ppCAuIE57VANUP0=@protonmail.com>
> Your knowledge is incorrect. As far as I know in the getting on for 2 years since the first CTV activation talk/attempt literally no one has built out a CTV use case and demonstrated it on signet with the possible exception of James O'Beirne's OP_VAULT which requires other new opcodes in addition to CTV.
This is not true.
https://github.com/AdamISZ/pathcoin-poc
/dev/fd0
floppy disk guy
Sent with Proton Mail secure email.
On Tuesday, January 2nd, 2024 at 1:52 PM, Michael Folkson via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> In the interests of time I'll just pick two to respond to but I don't agree with any of your points.
>
> > Covenants allow trustless utxos sharing and also are needed for vaulting. The numerous use cases are documented, built out and on signet to my knowledge. Check out utxos.org for a good list
>
> Your knowledge is incorrect. As far as I know in the getting on for 2 years since the first CTV activation talk/attempt literally no one has built out a CTV use case and demonstrated it on signet with the possible exception of James O'Beirne's OP_VAULT which requires other new opcodes in addition to CTV. I wish this wasn't the case. It is pitiful that we have these individuals (such as yourself) that are so convinced CTV should be activated but refuse to address any concerns raised by others and refuse to work on any of the speculated use cases, instead choosing to just beat the activation drum over and over again.
>
> > 4. "Best tool for the job" is not the bar. "Safe for all" and "useful for some" is the bar. Like any opcodes or tech Bitcoin has deployed in the past. Changing the bar is not up for discussion.
>
> If you want to avoid a chain split with an activation attempt (it is possible you don't care but if you do) you have to address concerns others have with a particular proposal. Just because Satoshi was able to make whatever changes he liked in the early days of Bitcoin's history and smaller groups of contributors then were able to activate changes without much scrutiny (Bitcoin was worth a fraction of what it is today and was only supporting a tiny ecosystem back then) doesn't mean we can do the same today. Appointing Erik as the new Satoshi who can make whatever changes he likes, who defines the bar with ultimate certainty and decides what is and what isn't up for discussion also isn't a viable option.
>
> Thanks
> Michael
>
> --
> Michael Folkson
> Email: michaelfolkson at protonmail.com
> GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F
>
>
> Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin
>
>
> On Monday, 1 January 2024 at 17:11, Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com> wrote:
>
>
> > 1. Claiming that something that isn't activated (unusable) isn't used as a non-argument
> > 2. Talking about activation methods is orthogonal. Bip8 is fine.
> >
> > 3. Covenants allow trustless utxos sharing and also are needed for vaulting. The numerous use cases are documented, built out and on signet to my knowledge. Check out utxos.org for a good list
> >
> > 3. No need to discuss wild extremes that are unrelated to ctvs well documented utility. Plus multi-sig allows governments to encumber (or accidentally ruin) destination addresses just like covenants.
> >
> > 4. "Best tool for the job" is not the bar. "Safe for all" and "useful for some" is the bar. Like any opcodes or tech Bitcoin has deployed in the past. Changing the bar is not up for discussion.
> >
> >
> > CTV has already been demonstrated "useful for some". The question that needs to be answered is whether there are any specific objections to safety.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Mon, Jan 1, 2024, 11:37 AM Michael Folkson <michaelfolkson@protonmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > Hi Erik
> > >
> > >
> > > > So what exactly are the risks of CTV over multi-sig?
> > >
> > >
> > > It is a strange comparison. Multisig is active onchain and is being used today for all sorts of things including Lightning and setups that address risk of single key loss or malicious signing. When discussing risks of CTV there are all sorts of risks that don't apply to multisig. These include that it is never used for any of its speculated use cases (multisig is being used today), other proposals end up being used instead of it (I'm not sure there were or are competing proposals so that multisig stops being used, MuSig2 maybe?), chain split risks with activation if there isn't consensus to activate it etc. Plus usage of complex (non covenant) scripts that fully utilize Taproot trees is still low today. Going straight to covenants (imposing restrictions on where funds can be sent) and not bothering with imposing all the restrictions you'd like on how funds can be spent in the first place seems to me to be putting the cart before the horse. Covenants don't ultimately solve the key management issue, they just move it from the pre spending phase to the post spending phase. So the benefits (although non-zero) aren't as obvious as some of the covenant advocates are suggesting. And although CTV is a limited covenant (some argue too limited) covenants taken to wild extremes could create all sorts of second order effects where funds can't be spent because of complex combinations of covenants. Even the strongest CTV proponent seems to suggest that the introduction of covenants wouldn't end with CTV.
> > >
> > >
> > > The way to reduce implementation risk for a use case of a particular proposal is to build out that use case and see if CTV is the best tool for the job. Repeatedly trying to activate CTV when there isn't consensus for it to be activated does not reduce that implementation risk in any way, shape or form.
> > >
> > >
> > > Thanks
> > > Michael
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Michael Folkson
> > > Email: michaelfolkson at protonmail.com
> > > GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F
> > >
> > >
> > > Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin
> > >
> > >
> > > On Saturday, 30 December 2023 at 08:59, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > > So what exactly are the risks of CTV over multi-sig?
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-02 16:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-20 1:44 [bitcoin-dev] Swift Activation - CTV alicexbt
2023-12-22 1:05 ` Luke Dashjr
2023-12-22 1:56 ` alicexbt
2023-12-22 22:34 ` alicexbt
2023-12-30 8:05 ` Anthony Towns
2023-12-30 8:59 ` Erik Aronesty
2024-01-01 16:37 ` Michael Folkson
2024-01-01 17:11 ` Erik Aronesty
2024-01-02 13:52 ` Michael Folkson
2024-01-02 14:32 ` Erik Aronesty
2024-01-02 16:24 ` Ryan Breen
2024-01-02 16:43 ` alicexbt [this message]
2023-12-30 13:54 ` Michael Folkson
2024-01-03 8:36 ` Anthony Towns
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