From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp4.osuosl.org (smtp4.osuosl.org [140.211.166.137]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D2E89C000E for ; Sun, 27 Jun 2021 12:01:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp4.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C1150402CA for ; Sun, 27 Jun 2021 12:01:31 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.699 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.699 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_05=-0.5, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: smtp4.osuosl.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=tutanota.de Received: from smtp4.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp4.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id WYPFo3Rop1QL for ; Sun, 27 Jun 2021 12:01:29 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from w1.tutanota.de (w1.tutanota.de [81.3.6.162]) by smtp4.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 947D7402C9 for ; Sun, 27 Jun 2021 12:01:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: from w3.tutanota.de (unknown [192.168.1.164]) by w1.tutanota.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id A1A69FBF551; Sun, 27 Jun 2021 12:01:27 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1624795287; s=s1; d=tutanota.de; h=From:From:To:To:Subject:Subject:Content-Description:Content-ID:Content-Type:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Cc:Cc:Date:Date:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:MIME-Version:Message-ID:Message-ID:Reply-To:References:Sender; bh=f7310v29kP68cyDDIqBorFdNrbfOOUkT8AFfvuXPe+4=; b=pkW4MNBjKyPSWJKuuK6mVAh1gltLRr+PBfCy+hrWTHe2RNm4CnWQ68S9DgZADzSd 0MNFIlOF5hu1Xn1ZnJMg5lFds41Oo/OConTjMT9vkCCxiHynx1iQ06b9LXfwihk2cMy K07VVpQ57EfJc9tNNLwfIaLz07cSxMu37f/bBWndJYLFeHRvMs6kvZCBHrvxhKxPzEM wGdIBf6sDAb4wO3AooIWoCrdj+3gJvS1GlqPpPoQ0ZFOA5CQ0SxS26pXvbG0XbZ9eGp K/GCns0pMvdbzzmrjuBnuAua7lNccBwrEKO2InJNt8toKqddx46jxx5KrXSLF67FnVx whQl4cjD1A== Date: Sun, 27 Jun 2021 14:01:27 +0200 (CEST) From: Prayank To: eric@voskuil.org Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_Part_465974_536232075.1624795287645" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sun, 27 Jun 2021 12:19:38 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 27 Jun 2021 12:01:31 -0000 ------=_Part_465974_536232075.1624795287645 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hello Eric, I have few questions: >=C2=A0Without majority hash power support, activation simply means you are= off on a chain split.=20 So majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in chai= n split? Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody wa= nts to use? What are different things possible in this case based on game t= heory?=C2=A0 >=C2=A0And activation without majority hash power certainly does not =E2=80= =9Censure=E2=80=9D this. Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling for = a soft fork begins? Can they still mine something else post activation even= if signaling readiness for soft fork?=C2=A0 >=C2=A0If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or otherwise censor) this is ac= complished by mining (or paying others to do so). Anyone can mine, so every= one gets a say. Mining is trading capital now for more later. If enough peo= ple want to do that, they can enforce a soft fork. It=E2=80=99s time Bitcoi= ners stop thinking of miners as other people. Anyone can mine, and that=E2= =80=99s your vote. Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or Miners? Is soft fork signaling same as voting? According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules enforced b= y full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work. Signaling is not voti= ng although lot of people consider it voting including some mining pools an= d exchanges. --=20 Prayank ------=_Part_465974_536232075.1624795287645 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hello Eric,

I have = few questions:

>&= nbsp;Without majority hash power support, activation simply means you are o= ff on a chain split.

So majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in ch= ain split? Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody = wants to use? What are different things possible in this case based on game= theory? 

>&= nbsp;And activation without majority hash power certainly does not =E2=80= =9Censure=E2=80=9D this.

Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling= for a soft fork begins? Can they still mine something else post activation= even if signaling readiness for soft fork? 

> If one wants to enforce a soft fork= (or otherwise censor) this is accomplished by mining (or paying others to = do so). Anyone can mine, so everyone gets a say. Mining is trading capital = now for more later. If enough people want to do that, they can enforce a so= ft fork. It=E2=80=99s time Bitcoiners stop thinking of miners as other peop= le. Anyone can mine, and that=E2=80=99s your vote.

Who enforces consensus rules technically in = Bitcoin? Full nodes or Miners?

Is soft fork signaling same as voting?

According to my understanding, miners follow = the consensus rules enforced by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for the= ir work. Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it voting = including some mining pools and exchanges.

<= /div>

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Prayank
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