From: Prayank <prayank@tutanota.de>
To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Nuke *notify options from Bitcoin Core
Date: Sat, 1 Jan 2022 22:03:11 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <MsMS0F9--3-2@tutanota.de> (raw)
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Hello World,
What?
Remove all *notify options from Bitcoin Core (full node implementation used by 99% nodes)
Or one of the below:
notifications.dat
not use system() in runCommand()
Use a new setting in settings.json file, notifypolicy which is 0 by default (restricted) and can be set to 1 (unrestricted)
Why?
They can help attackers in doing almost anything on machines running Bitcoin Core with some social engineering.
How?
Everything is explained several times in different issues, PRs etc. to different people including few reviewers who even NACKed a PR that would help in adding such options but with some documentation. I won't comment much about the reviewers but some of them were clueless about issue and how things work.
Example: Calling something misleading and ludicrous when you don't even know what works in Windows shortcut and could not share one example of financial application https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/23412#issuecomment-1003496126
TL;DR
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/23395#issuecomment-956353035
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/23412#issuecomment-970480769
To be honest, neither I have energy left to highlight the importance of these issues nor most of the people look interested in this space to address it. This email is a part of my efforts to share things with everyone which I even tried with documentation. There is something seriously wrong if few people including maintainers acknowledge the issues with *notify options but nobody wants to fix it or document it, I will leave it for people to form their own opinions about it.
Last but not least I was even asked to not review and comment in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/23395 when I was just responding to others.
This will be helpful in my security project which was already shared in mailing list to highlight what users expect from developers and future of money, review process etc. and what is the ground reality.
Happy New Year
--
Prayank
A3B1 E430 2298 178F
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next reply other threads:[~2022-01-01 21:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-01-01 21:03 Prayank [this message]
2022-01-01 22:57 ` [bitcoin-dev] Nuke *notify options from Bitcoin Core Daniel Edgecumbe
2022-01-01 23:29 Prayank
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