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charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Good afternoon ZmnSCPxj, I have posted some discussion on the need for this proposal and, some refin= ements to the proposal explanation (not changes to the intended operation) = to the bitcoin-discuss list. I didn't exactly mean to double post but thoug= ht it could use the discussion and, not to post it again, I will link to it= when (if) it turns up, or will post it back here as an update on request. = Currently, that post is awaiting moderator approval. I have also rewritten = the solution operation section a bit in that post, not the idea that is bei= ng conveyed. I have added an additional step, reject blocks that do not mee= t the target block size for the current block. I suggest it still should be added to the solution operation, to broadcast = the next target block size with the current block when it is solved. Using = that method may answer a part of your concern. As I understand it, each node would be aware independently of x transaction= s waiting for confirmation, the transaction pool. Each node would no doubt = have its own idea about how many waiting transactions there are and which p= articular transactions exist. I do not see why each node could not just wor= k with the information at hand, it is my understanding that is what happens= now, even with solved blocks vs the longest chain. I have not followed why= you foresee from my proposal the need for fullnodes to back confirm the pr= evious blocks in that manner. If next blocksize is broadcast with the completed block it would be a simpl= e matter to back confirm that. With transaction weight (transaction priorit= y) I am suggesting that value gives the likelihood of a transaction being i= ncluded, presuming an element of randomness as to whether any particular tr= ansaction is then included or not. Back confirmations on a transaction basi= s would be impossible anyway, all that could be confirmed is that a particu= lar block has transactions that conform to a probability curve, if the vari= ables are known, fee amount and time waiting in the pool, then the transact= ion priority can be recreated to establish that the probability of a partic= ular block conforms. I certainly do not foresee including the full transact= ion pool in each block. I am also presuming blocksize as a number of transactions rather than KB. My suggestion, if adopted, is to directly make the operation of transaction= priority a part of the operational standard - even without verification th= at it is being followed. The result of full transactional reliability is ac= tually in the interests of miners as much as anyone. The benefit of the proposal, not directly stated, is variable sized blocks = (uncapped block size). Yes, I have learned not to recycle terminology. My apologies, I had not bee= n made aware that terminology already had use. Perhaps it would be simpler = to call the proposal that I am putting forward here Transaction Priority. Regards, Damian Williamson ________________________________ From: ZmnSCPxj Sent: Wednesday, 6 December 2017 4:46:45 PM To: Damian Williamson Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight = For Ordering Transactions In Blocks Good morning Damian, The primary problem in your proposal, as I understand it, is that the "tran= saction pool" is never committed to and is not part of consensus currently.= It is unlikely that the transaction pool will ever be part of consensus, = as putting the transaction pool into consensus is effectively lifting the b= lock size to include the entire transaction pool into each block. The issu= e is that the transaction pool is transient and future fullnodes cannot fin= d the contents of the transaction pool at the time blocks were made and can= not verify the correctness of historical blocks. Also, fullnodes using -bl= ocksonly mode have no transaction pool and cannot verify incoming blocks fo= r these new rules. Applying a patch that follows this policy into Bitcoin Core without enforci= ng it in all fullnodes will simply lead to miners removing the patch in sof= tware they run, making it an exercise in futility to write, review, and tes= t this code in the first place. In addition, you reuse the term "weight" for something different than its c= urrent use. Current use, is that the "weight" of a transaction, is the com= puted weight from the SegWit weight equation, measured in virtual units cal= led "sipa", using the equation (4sipa / non-witness byte + 1sipa/witness by= te). Regards, ZmnSCPxj Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email. -------- Original Message -------- Subject: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For = Ordering Transactions In Blocks Local Time: December 6, 2017 3:38 AM UTC Time: December 5, 2017 7:38 PM From: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org # BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For Ordering Transactions= In Blocks I admit, with my limited experience in the operation of the protocol, the s= ection entitled 'Solution operation' may not be entirely correct but you wi= ll get the idea. If I have it wrong, please correct it back to the list. ## The problem: Everybody wants value. Miners want to maximize revenue from fees. Consumers= want transaction reliability and, (we presume) low fees. Current transaction bandwidth limit is a limiting factor for both. ## Solution summary: Provide each transaction with a transaction weight, being a function of the= fee paid (on a curve), and the time waiting in the transaction pool (also = on a curve) out to n days (n=3D30 ?); the transaction weight serving as the= likelihood of a transaction being included in the current block, and then = use a target block size. Protocol enforcement to prevent high or low blocksize cheating to be handle= d by having the protocol determine the target size for the current block us= ing; current transaction pool size x ( 1 / (144 x n days ) ) =3D transactio= ns to be included in the current block. The curves used for the weight of transactions would have to be appropriate= . ## Pros: * Maximizes transaction reliability. * Maximizes possibility for consumer and business uptake. * Maximizes total fees paid per block without reducing reliability; because= of reliability, confidence and uptake are greater; therefore, more transac= tions and more transactions total at priority fees. * Market determines fee paid for transaction priority. * Fee recommendations work all the way out to 30 days or greater. * Provides additional block entropy and greater security since there is les= s probability of predicting the next block. ## Cons: * ? * Must be first be programmed. * Anything else? ## Solution operation: As I have said, my simplistic view of the operation. If I have this wrong, = please correct it back to the list. 1. The protocol determines the target block size. 2. Assign each transaction in the pool a transaction weight based on fee an= d time waiting in the transaction pool. 3. Begin selecting transactions to include in the current block using trans= action weight as the likelihood of inclusion until target block size is met= . 4. Solve block. Regards, Damian Williamson --_000_PS2P216MB0179BC1CDE30F00D73DAA10F9D320PS2P216MB0179KORP_ Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Good afternoon ZmnSCPxj,

 
I have posted some discussion on the need for this proposal and, some = refinements to the proposal explanation (not changes to the intended operat= ion) to the bitcoin-discuss list. I didn't exactly mean to double post but = thought it could use the discussion and, not to post it again, I will link to it when (if) it turns up, or wil= l post it back here as an update on request. Currently, that post is awaiti= ng moderator approval. I have also rewritten the solution operation section= a bit in that post, not the idea that is being conveyed. I have added an additional step, reject blocks tha= t do not meet the target block size for the current block.

I suggest it still should be added to the solution operation, to broadcast = the next target block size with the current block when it is solved. Using = that method may answer a part of your concern.

As I understand it, each node would be aware independently of x transaction= s waiting for confirmation, the transaction pool. Each node would no doubt = have its own idea about how many waiting transactions there are and which p= articular transactions exist. I do not see why each node could not just work with the information at hand,= it is my understanding that is what happens now, even with solved blocks v= s the longest chain. I have not followed why you foresee from my proposal t= he need for fullnodes to back confirm the previous blocks in that manner.

If next blocksize is broadcast with the completed block it would be a simpl= e matter to back confirm that. With transaction weight (transaction priorit= y) I am suggesting that value gives the likelihood of a transaction being i= ncluded, presuming an element of randomness as to whether any particular transaction is then included or no= t. Back confirmations on a transaction basis would be impossible anyway, al= l that could be confirmed is that a particular block has transactions that = conform to a probability curve, if the variables are known, fee amount and time waiting in the pool, then = the transaction priority can be recreated to establish that the probability= of a particular block conforms. I certainly do not foresee including the f= ull transaction pool in each block.

I am also presuming blocksize as a number of transactions rather than KB.
My suggestion, if adopted, is to directly make the operation of transaction= priority a part of the operational standard - even without verification th= at it is being followed. The result of full transactional reliability is ac= tually in the interests of miners as much as anyone.

The benefit of the proposal, not directly stated, is variable sized blocks = (uncapped block size).

Yes, I have learned not to recycle terminology. My apologies, I had not bee= n made aware that terminology already had use. Perhaps it would be simpler = to call the proposal that I am putting forward here Transaction Priority.
Regards,
Damian Williamson

From: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj= @protonmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, 6 December 2017 4:46:45 PM
To: Damian Williamson
Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction = Weight For Ordering Transactions In Blocks
 
Good morning Damian,

The primary problem in your proposal, as I understand it, is that the = "transaction pool" is never committed to and is not part of conse= nsus currently.  It is unlikely that the transaction pool will ever be= part of consensus, as putting the transaction pool into consensus is effectively lifting the block size to include the e= ntire transaction pool into each block.  The issue is that the transac= tion pool is transient and future fullnodes cannot find the contents of the= transaction pool at the time blocks were made and cannot verify the correctness of historical blocks.  Al= so, fullnodes using -blocksonly mode have no transaction pool and cannot ve= rify incoming blocks for these new rules.

Applying a patch that follows this policy into Bitcoin Core without en= forcing it in all fullnodes will simply lead to miners removing the patch i= n software they run, making it an exercise in futility to write, review, an= d test this code in the first place.

In addition, you reuse the term "weight" for something diffe= rent than its current use.  Current use, is that the "weight"= ; of a transaction, is the computed weight from the SegWit weight equation,= measured in virtual units called "sipa", using the equation (4sipa / non-witness byte + 1sipa/witness byte).

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj




Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight= For Ordering Transactions In Blocks
Local Time: December 6, 2017 3:38 AM
UTC Time: December 5, 2017 7:38 PM
From: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxf= oundation.org>


# BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use T= ransaction Weight For Ordering Transactions In Blocks


I admit, with my limited experience in the operation of the protocol, = the section entitled 'Solution operation' may not be entirely correct but y= ou will get the idea. If I have it wrong, please correct it back to the lis= t.


## The problem:


Everybody wants value. Miners wa= nt to maximize revenue from fees. Consumers want transaction reliability an= d, (we presume) low fees.


Current transaction bandwidth limit is a limiting factor for both.


## Solution summary:


Provide each transaction with a = transaction weight, being a function of the fee paid (on a curve), and the = time waiting in the transaction pool (also on a curve) out to n days (n=3D3= 0 ?); the transaction weight serving as the likelihood of a transaction being included in the current block, an= d then use a target block size.


Protocol enforcement to prevent high or low blocksize cheating to be h= andled by having the protocol determine the target size for the current blo= ck using; current transaction pool size x ( 1 / (144 x n days ) ) =3D trans= actions to be included in the current block.

The curves used for the weight of transactions would have to be approp= riate.


## Pros:


* Maximizes transaction reliability.
* Maximizes possibility for consumer and business uptake.
* Maximizes total fees paid per block without reducing reliability; be= cause of reliability, confidence and uptake are greater; therefore, more tr= ansactions and more transactions total at priority fees.
* Market determines fee paid for transaction priority.

* Fee recommendations work all t= he way out to 30 days or greater.

* Provides additional block entropy and greater security since there i= s less probability of predicting the next block.


## Cons:


* ?
* Must be first be programmed.
* Anything else?


## Solution operation:


As I have said, my simplistic vi= ew of the operation. If I have this wrong, please correct it back to the li= st.


1. The protocol determines the target block size.

2. Assign each transaction in th= e pool a transaction weight based on fee and time waiting in the transactio= n pool.

3. Begin selecting transactions = to include in the current block using transaction weight as the likelihood = of inclusion until target block size is met.

4. Solve block.


Regards,

Damian Williamson


--_000_PS2P216MB0179BC1CDE30F00D73DAA10F9D320PS2P216MB0179KORP_--