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charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Good morning ZmnSCPxj, Actually, there is no incentive to cheat target block size by providing a n= ext block size that is higher or lower than the proposal would give. Under = the proposal the transaction pool can grow quite large. A low next block si= ze just defers collecting transaction fees, while a high next block size sh= rinks the transaction pool and thereby lowers fees. It seems like a standof= f. This is especially true if the curve for time waiting in the transaction= pool is extended beyond n days, since it is a curve, after waiting longer = than 60 days (if n =3D 60 days) a transaction would have a priority greater= than one-hundred and would therfore be the first transaction included with= no possibility of failing the likelihood, so, even low fee paying transact= ions would be included first if the pool size is growing through incorrectl= y providing the next block size. As it is now, I presume, a miner could include exactly one transaction in a= block and pad? Regards, Damian Williamson ________________________________ From: Damian Williamson Sent: Thursday, 7 December 2017 7:13:14 PM To: ZmnSCPxj Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight = For Ordering Transactions In Blocks Good morning ZmnSCPxj, it must be where you are, I suppose that we are each missing each other's point some. I understand that nodes would not be expected to agree on the transaction p= ool and do not propose validating that the correct transactions are include= d in a block. I speak of probability and likelihood of a transaction being = included in a block, implying a random element. I do not propose rejecting = blocks on the basis that the next block size is stated too large or too sma= ll for the transaction pool, only that the block received conforms to the n= ext block size given on the previous block. Yes, it could be cheated. Also,= various nodes may have at times wildly different amounts of transactions w= aiting in the transaction pool compared to each other and there could be a = great disparity between them. It would not be possible in any case I can th= ink of to validate the next block size is correct for the current transacti= on pool. Even as it is now, nodes may include transactions in a block that = no other nodes have even heard of, nodes have no way to validate that eithe= r. If the block is built on sufficiently, it is the blockchain. I will post back the revised proposal to the list. I have fleshed parts of = it out more, given more explanation and, tried this time not to recycle ter= minology. Regards, Damian Williamson ________________________________ From: ZmnSCPxj Sent: Thursday, 7 December 2017 5:46:08 PM To: Damian Williamson Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight = For Ordering Transactions In Blocks Good morning Damian, >As I understand it, each node would be aware independently of x transactio= ns waiting for confirmation, the transaction pool. Each long-running node would have a view that is roughly the same as the vi= ew of every other long-running node. However, suppose a node, Sleeping Beauty, was temporarily stopped for a day= (for various reasons) then is started again. That node cannot verify what= the "consensus" transaction pool was during the time it was stopped -- it = has no view of that. It can only trust that the longest chain is valid -- = but that means it is SPV for this particular rule. >If next blocksize is broadcast with the completed block it would be a simp= le matter to back confirm that. It would not. Suppose Sleeping Beauty slept at block height 500,000. On aw= akening, some node provides some purported block at height 500,001. This b= lock indicates some "next blocksize" for the block at height 500,002. How = does Sleeping Beauty know that the transaction pool at block 500,001 was of= the correct size to provide the given "next blocksize"? The only way, wou= ld be to look if there is some other chain with greater height that include= s or does not include that block: that is, SPV confirmation. How does Sleeping Beauty know it has caught up, and that its transaction po= ol is similar to that of its neighbors (who might be lying to it, for that = matter), and that it should therefore stop using SPV confirmation and switc= h to strict fullnode rejection of blocks that indicate a "next blocksize" t= hat is too large or too small according to your equation? OR will it simpl= y follow the longest chain always, in which case, it trusts miners to be ho= nest about how loaded (or unloaded) the transaction pool is? ------- As a general rule, consensus rules should restrict themselves to: 1. The characteristics of the block. 2. The characteristics of the transactions within the block. The transaction pool is specifically those transaction that are NOT in any = block, and thus, are not safe to depend on for any consensus rules. Regards, ZmnSCPxj --_000_PS2P216MB0179E4F0C7612263A59A20339D330PS2P216MB0179KORP_ Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Good morning ZmnSCPxj,


Actually, there is no incen= tive to cheat target block size by providing a next block size that is high= er or lower than the proposal would give. Under the proposal the transactio= n pool can grow quite large. A low next block size just defers collecting transaction fees, while a high next= block size shrinks the transaction pool and thereby lowers fees. It seems = like a standoff. This is especially true if the curve for time waiting in t= he transaction pool is extended beyond n days, since it is a curve, after waiting longer than 60 days (if = n =3D 60 days) a transaction would have a priority greater than one-hundred= and would therfore be the first transaction included with no possibility o= f failing the likelihood, so, even low fee paying transactions would be included first if the pool size is gr= owing through incorrectly providing the next block size.


As it is now, I presume, a = miner could include exactly one transaction in a block and pad?


Regards,

Damian Williamson

From: Damian Williamson <= ;willtech@live.com.au>
Sent: Thursday, 7 December 2017 7:13:14 PM
To: ZmnSCPxj
Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction = Weight For Ordering Transactions In Blocks
 

Good morning ZmnSCPxj, it must b= e where you are,


I suppose that we are each missi= ng each other's point some.


I understand that nodes would no= t be expected to agree on the transaction pool and do not propose validatin= g that the correct transactions are included in a block. I speak of probabi= lity and likelihood of a transaction being included in a block, implying a random element. I do not propose rej= ecting blocks on the basis that the next block size is stated too large or = too small for the transaction pool, only that the block received conforms t= o the next block size given on the previous block. Yes, it could be cheated. Also, various nodes may have at = times wildly different amounts of transactions waiting in the transaction p= ool compared to each other and there could be a great disparity between the= m. It would not be possible in any case I can think of to validate the next block size is correct for the cur= rent transaction pool. Even as it is now, nodes may include transactions in= a block that no other nodes have even heard of, nodes have no way to valid= ate that either. If the block is built on sufficiently, it is the blockchain.


I will post back the revised pro= posal to the list. I have fleshed parts of it out more, given more explanat= ion and, tried this time not to recycle terminology.


Regards,

Damian Williamson

From: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCP= xj@protonmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, 7 December 2017 5:46:08 PM
To: Damian Williamson
Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction = Weight For Ordering Transactions In Blocks
 
Good morning Damian,

>As I understand it, each node would be aware independently of x tr= ansactions waiting for confirmation, the transaction pool.

Each long-running node would have a view that is roughly the same as t= he view of every other long-running node.

However, suppose a node, Sleeping Beauty, was temporarily stopped for = a day (for various reasons) then is started again.  That node cannot v= erify what the "consensus" transaction pool was during the time i= t was stopped -- it has no view of that.  It can only trust that the longest chain is valid -- but that means it is SPV for= this particular rule.

>If next blocksize is broadcast with the completed block it would b= e a simple matter to back confirm that.

It would not. Suppose Sleeping Beauty slept at block height 500,000.&n= bsp; On awakening, some node provides some purported block at height 500,00= 1.  This block indicates some "next blocksize" for the block= at height 500,002.  How does Sleeping Beauty know that the transaction pool at block 500,001 was of the correct size to provide t= he given "next blocksize"?  The only way, would be to look i= f there is some other chain with greater height that includes or does not i= nclude that block: that is, SPV confirmation.

How does Sleeping Beauty know it has caught up, and that its transacti= on pool is similar to that of its neighbors (who might be lying to it, for = that matter), and that it should therefore stop using SPV confirmation and = switch to strict fullnode rejection of blocks that indicate a "next blocksize" that is too large or = too small according to your equation?  OR will it simply follow the lo= ngest chain always, in which case, it trusts miners to be honest about how = loaded (or unloaded) the transaction pool is?

-------

As a general rule, consensus rules should restrict themselves to:

1.  The characteristics of the block.
2.  The characteristics of the transactions within the block.

The transaction pool is specifically those transaction that are NOT in= any block, and thus, are not safe to depend on for any consensus rules.

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj

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