From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from silver.osuosl.org (smtp3.osuosl.org [140.211.166.136]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7C9D1C0177 for ; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 13:31:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by silver.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6355520471 for ; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 13:31:42 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org Received: from silver.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id cJ6E7otPJXhG for ; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 13:31:40 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail4.protonmail.ch (mail4.protonmail.ch [185.70.40.27]) by silver.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2D55C203F9 for ; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 13:31:40 +0000 (UTC) Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2020 13:31:29 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=protonmail.com; s=default; t=1582896697; bh=1kMuwud+oDmiZydpOmzdUHMZuV31Tq7w0sbBNZHydxU=; h=Date:To:From:Reply-To:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:Feedback-ID: From; b=p7GFVEM2DTB4ApZp4d1HwaUiTHM6OE12LtVaqS5k66Sx1meA/T+F3t6hvLydm5c5r xb0Gv5L1+W+9/mBcXQ8lqmgnu5qbfg7Vg9oAp1SMNF8IqZLn1EzCjo7G5vjbst2+YZ F0aRO4ry44TcbSiMAzuMq7suVzBEc0uH44Dc/+to= To: Stepan Snigirev , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion From: ZmnSCPxj Reply-To: ZmnSCPxj Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Feedback-ID: el4j0RWPRERue64lIQeq9Y2FP-mdB86tFqjmrJyEPR9VAtMovPEo9tvgA0CrTsSHJeeyPXqnoAu6DN-R04uJUg==:Ext:ProtonMail MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Nonce blinding protocol for hardware wallets and airgapped signers X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2020 13:31:42 -0000 Good morning Stepan, > This topic appeared in the list a few times so I would like to discuss it= in more detail and maybe push forward to standardization. > > We have to accept that any hardware wallet or an air-gapped computer we u= se to sign transactions can be compromised. It may happen via a supply chai= n attack or malicious firmware update. > > If the signer is isolated (faraday cage, airgap and so on), it still can = leak private keys to the outside world by choosing nonces for signatures in= a funny way such that the attacker can calculate our private keys. Back in= the days, I wrote a small post [1] and a proof-of-concept demo [2] of this= attack. > > Deterministic nonce generation can be verified only if we have private ke= ys somewhere else. It doubles the attack surface - now we need to maintain = two independent signers from different vendors that use the same private ke= y and the same deterministic algorithm for a nonce generation. In addition = to that, as Pieter mentioned in the Schnorr-BIP, deterministic nonces are v= ulnerable to glitch attacks [3]. > > A simple way to fix it is by forcing the signer to use additional entropy= from the host. This protocol takes away the privilege of picking nonce fro= m the signer and doesn't require any secret material outside the signer. > > I suggest the following implementation of the protocol for signing a mess= age `m`: > > 1. Host picks a random number `n` and sends its hash together with the me= ssage `m` to the signer. > 2. Signer computes a nonce `k` it wants to use for signing. It can be eit= her a deterministic scheme or using RNG. Signer commits to the chosen nonce= by sending the corresponding point `R=3DkG` to the host. I think it would be unsafe to use a deterministic scheme, that takes as inp= ut the message m and the privkey only. Let us consider the case where the hardware signer has its power supply com= ing from USB and the communication channel is over USB as well. Thus, the host can selectively turn on/off the hardware signer (e.g. a hack= er with physical access can just unplug it). With R determined from m and the privkey, then the host knows the R that th= e signer will use, and can arrange an n that cancels that R and adds a spec= ific R it wants to target. It could, for example, arrange to have two different `m` signed with the sa= me `R'`. What would have to be done would be derive `k` from the message `m` plus th= e `sha256(n)` and the privkey. Perhaps you considered this already, but it may be useful to have it explic= itly stated that this has to be mixed as well, i.e. if `k` is generated det= erministically it has to be `k =3D f(sha256(n), m, privkey)` where `f()` is= some suitable hashing function. Otherwise a completely-random `k` would be much better, but the signer migh= t not have enough resources to gather sufficient entropy. Regards, ZmnSCPxj