From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org (smtp1.osuosl.org [140.211.166.138]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 10159C002D for ; Tue, 6 Dec 2022 05:39:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BDF3A8139E for ; Tue, 6 Dec 2022 05:39:48 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp1.osuosl.org BDF3A8139E Authentication-Results: smtp1.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key, unprotected) header.d=messagingengine.com header.i=@messagingengine.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=fm1 header.b=t0wD3/8z X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.603 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.603 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp1.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id s1peXFoVas7V for ; Tue, 6 Dec 2022 05:39:46 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp1.osuosl.org DD98F812CD Received: from wout1-smtp.messagingengine.com (wout1-smtp.messagingengine.com [64.147.123.24]) by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DD98F812CD for ; Tue, 6 Dec 2022 05:39:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from compute1.internal (compute1.nyi.internal [10.202.2.41]) by mailout.west.internal (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9D3583200A09; Tue, 6 Dec 2022 00:39:43 -0500 (EST) Received: from mailfrontend1 ([10.202.2.162]) by compute1.internal (MEProxy); Tue, 06 Dec 2022 00:39:44 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d= messagingengine.com; h=cc:cc:content-type:date:date:feedback-id :feedback-id:from:from:in-reply-to:in-reply-to:message-id :mime-version:references:reply-to:sender:subject:subject:to:to :x-me-proxy:x-me-proxy:x-me-sender:x-me-sender:x-sasl-enc; s= fm1; t=1670305183; x=1670391583; bh=OzLvjIl63caioq1ZGKGHmxjEyJ26 8LRGgnXCQKuBG3U=; b=t0wD3/8zl1pIn+Zmiy5ss5fbja1rR/cnjxayreNprdSX Ei8QiwQg/vjijuEuIaE0CzBCFs80e6no/wMMEXE3M6rz5YZS59mjH2w23w6D/MIE zxmNI24Bx9HBRAKCwB8gKdI1CjrX8BEc+sJQTvqRdVe7BNxVF7KxbuAP+tMZ0jTe izLVDp0EtVm1fXr9Mv4/kI0OXtVJkuf+vO5YL9cX82W4NF5TzsC6uD5F9Mo37TJC NQ3wPW5a1Cn7P9L3cyIy+KdnfJdoeciehlDCqw83x9flNA2LH4lbXZWsclqPiI7q zI7CiAGcI/dL5Wd4dJ50UPuxzK+0M9n1Sfkjpqk3hg== X-ME-Sender: X-ME-Received: X-ME-Proxy-Cause: gggruggvucftvghtrhhoucdtuddrgedvhedrudehgdekiecutefuodetggdotefrodftvf curfhrohhfihhlvgemucfhrghsthforghilhdpqfgfvfdpuffrtefokffrpgfnqfghnecu uegrihhlohhuthemuceftddtnecusecvtfgvtghiphhivghnthhsucdlqddutddtmdenuc fjughrpeffhffvvefukfhfgggtuggjsehgtderredttddvnecuhfhrohhmpefrvghtvghr ucfvohguugcuoehpvghtvgesphgvthgvrhhtohguugdrohhrgheqnecuggftrfgrthhtvg hrnheptddtgedtffetueekfffhffekkeeihfetuddvteejueejffegveeghfduteejhfev necuffhomhgrihhnpehgihhthhhusgdrtghomhdpphgvthgvrhhtohguugdrohhrghenuc evlhhushhtvghrufhiiigvpedtnecurfgrrhgrmhepmhgrihhlfhhrohhmpehpvghtvges phgvthgvrhhtohguugdrohhrgh X-ME-Proxy: Feedback-ID: i525146e8:Fastmail Received: by mail.messagingengine.com (Postfix) with ESMTPA; Tue, 6 Dec 2022 00:39:42 -0500 (EST) Received: by localhost (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 9D9D85F83F; Tue, 6 Dec 2022 00:39:40 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2022 00:39:40 -0500 From: Peter Todd To: El_Hoy Message-ID: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="cQJNYgALGzN5h1SE" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion , Daniel Lipshitz Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Announcement: Full-RBF Miner Bounty X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 06 Dec 2022 05:39:49 -0000 --cQJNYgALGzN5h1SE Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Mon, Dec 05, 2022 at 09:20:58AM -0300, El_Hoy wrote: > The only option I see against the attack Peter Todd is doing to opt-in RBF > and 0Conf bitcoin usage is working on a bitcoin core implementation that > stops propagation of full-rbf replaced blocks. Running multiple of such > nodes on the network will add a risk to miners that enable full-rbf that > would work as an incentive against that. >=20 > Obviously that would require adding an option on bitcoin core (that is not > technically but politically difficult to implement as Petter Todd already > have commit access to the main repository). For the record, I do not and have never had commit access to anything under https://github.com/bitcoin The last time I contributed to Bitcoin Core was in Mar 1st 2017, and that w= as to add an explanatory comment. Pretty much the only reason why you know my = name is I'm very good at argument and critique, I come up with some good ideas, = and conference organizers love to put me on stage. > That said, a sufficiently incentivized actor (like Daniel Lipshitz or Muun > wallet developers) could work on a fork and run several nodes with such > functionality. As far as I understand the percolation model, with 10 to 20 > nodes running such a rule would create a significant risk for full-rbf > miners. You do not understand the percolation model. 10 or 20 nodes is completely meaningless. Pools run nodes themselves, which= by default connect to 8 outgoing peers. There's about 5000 IPv4 listening node= s on the network. When a node learns of a new block, it tells all it's peers that the new block exists. For your censorship to work, there has to be a substantial propability that= a miner *only* runs a single node (they don't), that has no incoming peers, a= nd all 8 peers of that node happen to be one of your 20 censoring nodes. Obviously, since the probability of a given peer being a censoring node is 20/5000, all 8 being censored is extraordinarily unlikely. Even if you ran so many nodes that 20% of the entire network was censoring,= the probability of all 8 outgoing peers being censors is only 0.2^8 =3D 0.00025= 6% This is an example of information being hard to censor and easy to spread. = In fact, for full-rbf this same math works in our favor: for a node to have a = 50% chance of connecting to at least one full-rbf peer, just 8.3% of the network needs to run full-rbf. 5000 IPv4 nodes * 8% =3D 400 nodes. The percolation threshold doesn't need to be met for this to be succesful, because someone to just run a full-rbf node that connects to every single listening node simultaneously. Anyway, as others' have pointed out, you're idea is also broken in other wa= ys. But I thought it'd be worth pointing out how futile it is to even try. --=20 https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org --cQJNYgALGzN5h1SE Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE0RcYcKRzsEwFZ3N5Lly11TVRLzcFAmOO1ZwACgkQLly11TVR LzeHNBAAnauniwTceKCB86F8HY/ufMyVQngDtXMe4bPTR7mfQ5XhZelE6D6zUgyj yImwIQ5QND/BOvooZBI9YRHIc9hNqj1jdkEEorCPhoOcGkaT/IqWcC0/+lx7y7cy +OLUnvttQWyRJPsEilRYMLnQbUb5iLd3SzuG/5EZuVa1wcUAAkLTavRWh8deEgb7 sWsAuJwxjk508Q+/Gkfn/nA2WsGJHaq4Rnkycr+3dVP0yXq0bSqY4xRcomOXwvVH dFL2QzLutMOYezRh3q+X/zWLvVAg69gnmfgxiszW3LPnLvNfM1O1TPp7g0gk9X7J pduOyVS0bF98bFsd9rlHV3f4dHAlkdK8vKgEHFe/baEoyxYlRy4swod03olZGt8u ETtF22aNZFv9XxtHQCvTYMVmKE3/9P+aiCAPzhNgItBRmb6SGpNshBBAQ5ZwYcjM ecdNLrvw0HbZdjORKYSZD2LYFkkGkxXsgChjbmI/vb4rChyiNr1s9K01jFFMNGSy GThjWIJccQtgMDUrqtPN7AoIH9QU8ZkNs+/RXHUr9Nfp7JDyMnFVeTzqYf9lkWbk 36SSuBxWaGSxmT7bOBJG9B3z5BvVSj1CRz6g76yopRNrktX1UuQ0ol5Mdeum3nLp C5lDlKeC1/W73nYy5ddleWyUcaXiJVD3nCHj91pRep7SCidcBR0= =BH9F -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --cQJNYgALGzN5h1SE--