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From: rhavar@protonmail.com
To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>,
	Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
	<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Revisiting BIP 125 RBF policy.
Date: Fri, 09 Mar 2018 13:40:34 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZmiZUf6iUcddY1CKMADBa8FryCgrZ1235R4bHParR8NpwibjA-EY38D_GElA9jv4Z-zPZE9juQKgJjpd4MFfjg9ySFvO51dOHNoObHdaLjo=@protonmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180309182803.GE2786@fedora-23-dvm>

> Still, re-reading your initital post, I'm convinced that the weakening of the
> DoS protections is probably not a huge problem, so maybe lets try this in a
> release and see what happens.

Awesome! I very much agree. The relaxation of some of these DoS prevention rules I think will really open up a lot of use cases and adoption 

> Notably, if people actually use this new replacement behavior, the institutions
> doing these sweeps of unconfirmed outputs might stop doing that! 

Agree, I'm pretty sure it's unintentional. I know a lot of services struggle with coin selection, so what they do is conceptually have a receive wallet from which they can sweep to their hot wallet (or cold storage) to keep their utxo manageable.

Currently some of them are sweeping unconfirmed inputs with it, but I don't think it's a conscious design choice, just something that happens to be working well now.

(FWIW I observed this behavior like 6+ months ago, I haven't kept track of if it's still happening or how often. But at the time I had to write off the idea of low-fee rbf batch transactions as it was happening too often to be feasible)


​-Ryan​

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐

On March 9, 2018 1:28 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> ​​
> 
> On Thu, Mar 08, 2018 at 03:07:43PM -0500, Russell O'Connor wrote:
> 
> > On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 1:34 PM, Peter Todd pete@petertodd.org wrote:
> > 
> > > But that's not a good argument: whether or not normal users are trying to
> > > 
> > > attack each other has nothing to do with whether or not you're opening up
> > > 
> > > an
> > > 
> > > attack by relaxing anti-DoS protections.
> > 
> > I'm not suggesting removing the anti-DoS protections. I'm suggesting that
> > 
> > replaced transaction require a fee increase of at least the min-fee-rate
> > 
> > times the size of all the transactions being ejected (in addition to the
> > 
> > other proposed requirements).
> 
> Fair: you're not removing them entirely, but you are weakening them compared to
> 
> the status quo.
> 
> > > Equally, how often are normal users who aren't attacking each other
> > > 
> > > creating
> > > 
> > > issues anyway? You can always have your wallet code just skip use of RBF
> > 
> > replacements in the event that someone does spend an unconfirmed output that
> > 
> > > you sent them; how often does this actually happen in practice?
> > 
> > Just ask rhavar. It happens regularly.
> > 
> > Not many wallets let you spend unconfirmed outputs that you didn't create.
> > 
> > > 
> > 
> > The problem is with institutional wallets sweeping incoming payments. It
> > 
> > seems that in practice they are happy to sweep unconfirmed outputs.
> 
> Pity, that does sound like a problem. :(
> 
> > Setting all of the above aside for a moment. We need to understand that
> > 
> > rational miners are going to prefer to transactions with higher package fee
> > 
> > rates regardless of whatever your personal preferred RBF policy is. If we
> > 
> > do not bring the RBF policy to alignment with what is economically
> > 
> > rational, then miners are going to change their own policies anyways,
> > 
> > probably all in slightly different ways. It behooves everyone to develop a
> > 
> > reasonable standard RBF policy, that is still robust against possible DoS
> > 
> > vectors, and aligns with miner incentives, so that all participants know
> > 
> > what behaviour they can reasonably expect. It is simply a bonus that this
> > 
> > change in RBF policy also partially mitigates the problem of pinned
> > 
> > transactions.
> 
> Miners and full nodes have slightly different priorities here; it's not clear
> 
> to me why it matters that they implement slightly different policies.
> 
> Still, re-reading your initital post, I'm convinced that the weakening of the
> 
> DoS protections is probably not a huge problem, so maybe lets try this in a
> 
> release and see what happens.
> 
> Notably, if people actually use this new replacement behavior, the institutions
> 
> doing these sweeps of unconfirmed outputs might stop doing that! That's
> 
> probably a good thing, as respends of potentially conflicted unconfirmed
> 
> outputs can be dangerous in reorgs; we're better off if outputs are buried
> 
> deeply before being spent again.
> 
> 
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'\[:-1\]@petertodd.org
> 
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> 
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> 
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev




  reply	other threads:[~2018-03-09 18:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-12 15:52 [bitcoin-dev] Revisiting BIP 125 RBF policy Russell O'Connor
2018-02-12 17:30 ` rhavar
2018-02-12 22:58 ` Peter Todd
2018-02-12 23:19   ` Russell O'Connor
2018-02-12 23:42     ` Peter Todd
2018-02-12 23:46       ` Russell O'Connor
2018-02-14 14:08       ` Russell O'Connor
2018-02-14 14:16         ` Greg Sanders
2018-02-27 16:25       ` Russell O'Connor
2018-03-01 15:11         ` Peter Todd
2018-03-08 15:39           ` Russell O'Connor
2018-03-08 18:34             ` Peter Todd
2018-03-08 20:07               ` Russell O'Connor
2018-03-09 18:28                 ` Peter Todd
2018-03-09 18:40                   ` rhavar [this message]
2018-02-12 23:23   ` rhavar
2018-02-13 18:40     ` Peter Todd
2018-02-14  2:07       ` rhavar

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