Yeah, sure.

> How much bandwidth is consumed by redundant tx INVs currently?

Currently, for an average public-IP node all INVs consume 0.05 Mbps or 540 megabytes per day. This number is based on current ratio public-IP nodes:private-IP nodes and transaction rate. This number is a sum of both incoming and outgoing aspects. Thus redundant INV’s on average consume 0.044 Mbps or 475 megabytes per day.

> What is this as a % of overall bandwidth usage?

This is hard to estimate because overall bandwidth includes helping other nodes to bootstrap from scratch. If we don’t consider this aspect, my very rough estimate, and a short experiment shows that INV’s are around 50% of overall bandwidth (it also depends on different factors like your hardware comparing to other public-IP nodes). I’m going to double-check this number soon.

> How would filtering txs through N=2 links affect network propagation?

Yes, network propagation for a new protocol definitely worth measuring. I’m going to look at it in the near future.

> Do you propose setting filters on inbound peers as well?

This is a good question.

I think some filter may be applied to inbound connections. Theoretically, a symmetrical filter does not make much sense — it might be eventually the same filter for all of the connections except first 8 outgoing ones, so it’s better to use independent filters.

However, I’m not entirely sure it is needed. Filters on inbound peers will reduce a download aspect. It might be much less critical than upload (if we assume that private-IP nodes hear about transactions later because those have much fewer connections). I think this question needs another experiment.

On Apr 3, 2018, 10:45 AM -0700, Jim Posen <jim.posen@gmail.com>, wrote:

Hey. This idea sounds quite interesting. It'd be helpful to see some more numbers to evaluate it.

- How much bandwidth is consumed by redundant tx INVs currently? What is this as a % of overall bandwidth usage?

- How would filtering txs through N=2 links affect network propagation? This probably requires simulation to determine.

- Do you propose setting filters on inbound peers as well?

On Mon, Apr 2, 2018 at 3:18 PM, Gleb Naumenko via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

Hi all,

I have a couple of ideas regarding transaction relay protocol and wanted to share it with and probably get some feedback.

I did some emulation and simulation and found out that around 90% of INV messages sent by public-IP nodes are idle (duplicate), obviously because each node creates 8 connections. I also realized that sending INV messages is a significant part of the overall bandwidth consumed by a public-IP node. At a larger scale, this will result in people not able to run a public-IP node.

My idea is in some sense similar to BIP37 but applied to public-IP nodes. Here I want to emphasize that all the nodes will still receive *all* of the transactions. A new protocol should also keep the same zero-trust, robustness, decentralization guarantees and latency.

Idea: while joining the network, a new node agrees on some filter with each of 8 nodes it connects to. So that NewNode <-> Node_A will be used to relay only a subset of transactions, NewNode <-> Node_B for another subset. This will significantly decrease the redundancy.

To keep the guarantees, I would keep some redundancy (for example, each transaction INV is sent over 2 links).

To make it robust to attacks, I have 2 extensions in my mind:

1. Set reconciliation (for a subset of transactions) with *other* nodes. Getting a bloom filter of a subset of the mempool transactions from Node_B may help to figure out whether Node_A is malicious, very slow, etc.

2. Rotating the filters every N minutes (N < 10)

I can see some issues with latency here, but I believe this problem has a solution.

Feedback is appreciated!

If you want to look at a draft of the proposal — please let me know.

If there were any similar ideas — please let me know.

Best,

Gleb

_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev