From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C0AB5C000E for ; Tue, 26 Oct 2021 08:56:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A2546401C8 for ; Tue, 26 Oct 2021 08:56:23 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 1.101 X-Spam-Level: * X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.101 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.8, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, FROM_LOCAL_NOVOWEL=0.5, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H4=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: smtp2.osuosl.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=protonmail.com Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp2.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id QyqVukZKP1FL for ; Tue, 26 Oct 2021 08:56:22 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from mail-40130.protonmail.ch (mail-40130.protonmail.ch [185.70.40.130]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 420264010B for ; Tue, 26 Oct 2021 08:56:21 +0000 (UTC) Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 08:56:10 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=protonmail.com; s=protonmail; t=1635238579; bh=2xyvnF1w9hVQox38eGBya7LmHkdI7yIjVVfkmZPz6BE=; h=Date:To:From:Cc:Reply-To:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=mT+fPjkuEjBXDAgI8QGYGwNZUj6fZferJnvIepG7xi4gpcTjEn+w05Wzea8twCZBx mi3xBrlluiYUqeJBmFQ1xrn6/qdegjIS4CquwV9/VGz1FXTHlJKfKiJBMbEWaeXQcP B9Wwm4IU4SAepQFYaJp69Nqs4bjrX64OEGP4zQ4w= To: "eric@voskuil.org" From: ZmnSCPxj Reply-To: ZmnSCPxj Message-ID: In-Reply-To: <009901d7ca43$d9dd2f50$8d978df0$@voskuil.org> References: <009901d7ca43$d9dd2f50$8d978df0$@voskuil.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Cc: 'Bitcoin Protocol Discussion' , 'lisa neigut' Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] death to the mempool, long live the mempool X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 08:56:23 -0000 Good morning e, and lisa, > Agree ZmnSCPxj > > Hi lisa, > > I'm all for removing it from memory. :) Did that a while ago. We just cal= l it the transaction pool. > > There will always be unconfirmed transactions floating around (even just = from reorgs). Best to store them somewhere. Disk is cheap, block distributi= on (e.g. compact) works better if you have them already prevalidated, even = if you aren't going to mine on them. > > How you get them technically is not so important. There will always be a = set of unconfirmed transactions, it's conceptual. But above all, anonymity = is very important - on both ends. This is why transactions have integral fe= es. Anyone can get paid to mine, just need the txs. > > Mining may be semi-restricted set is today, it may not be tomorrow. Imagi= ne China everywhere, just like financial controls already are. That's when = you see what Bitcoin can do from a security standpoint. > > Treating miners as someone else is a poor security architecture. Everyone= should look like a potential miner on the network, and a potential spender= . > > I think you are thinking of it a bit backwards. A node is a big pool of c= onnected transactions. Block headers come along occasionally, and impose or= der on a subset of them. On the subject of thinking backwards.... The current design gossips txes. I believe much of what lisa wants would be doable by gossiping mining endpo= ints instead of txes. Then transactors can connect to mining endpoints. Tx gossip is limited by fees (which is why the RBF rules even exist in the = first place). Thus, mining endpoint gossip must be limited by something as well, such as = by requiring some trivial stake of BTC. (BTC exchanges are commonplace enough, I believe, that requiring completely= new miners (i.e. those who currently own 0 BTC) to acquire some trivial st= ake of BTC would be feasible; for most people it would be easier to buy BTC= than to acquire a mining rig and the supporting infrastructure needed for = a mine.) We could have the endpoint encoded in some sign-to-contract or pay-to-contr= act construction. Miners can change their identity by spending their stake (which makes nodes= drop their endpoint record). Then, they can use now-common anonymity techniques --- mostly CoinJoin, but= also the upcoming CoinSwap implementation --- to acquire a new stake whose= identity is not easily traceable to the previous stake. (This is not proof-of-stake, BTW --- the stake only attests the mining endp= oint (in much the same way published Lightning channels are attested by the= ir funding tx outpoints), and has no effect on block validity, only on goss= iping of mining endpoints.) The advantage here is that we expect the set of miner identities to change = less often than the set of txes, thus reducing global bandwidth usage, Against the above, we must notice that the anonymity-preserving regular cha= nging of staked identity is more expensive than having a persistent identit= y. WE should really design systems where anonymity-preservation should be as c= heap as possible, but onchain activity is no longer cheap at all, given the= growing importance of Bitcoin. -- Also: > A direct communication channel between block template construction venues= and transaction proposers also provides a venue for direct feedback wrt ac= ceptable feerates at the time, which both makes transaction confirmation ti= melines less variable Unless you contact ***all*** miners globally, there is always some non-zero= probability that one of the miners you did *not* contact (and thus does no= t have your tx, and thus will not be able to confirm your tx) gets the next= block. Since miners can enter and leave the network at any time, it is entirely po= ssible that this mechanism *increases* variability rather than decreases it= . Regards, ZmnSCPxj