Re: [bitcoin-dev] Time-dilation Attacks on the Lightning Network

[Aymeric Vitte <vitteaymeric@gmail.com>]

Le 08/06/2020 à 06:56, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev a écrit :
> Running both Bitcoin and Lightning nodes on clearnet automatically links them, making them easier to attack, whereas running Lightning on Tor does not.
> Of course, they could still be linked by onchain transaction monitoring, but at least this increases the effort to attack, hopefully it becomes marginally less desirable to attack you.
Or makes it easier in fact, correcting what I said in my previous
answer, stating a "yes" for a mixed bitcoin and/or LN node in clearnet
and Tor, with or without different IPs, it's probably not difficult for
the Tor attacker to identify you (for example pinging the nodes with a
new received tx to see who has it in mempool)

Similar to "Deanonymizing the VPN peers"
https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live, this is not public but the method
uses the clearnet/VPN "mixity" and unexpectedly the more you try to hide
the better you can get deanonymized

The conclusion is always the same: do not use the Tor network for
services it is not designed for