From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E6D69AB6 for ; Mon, 27 Mar 2017 17:58:17 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: delayed 00:08:00 by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from chap.plaimi.net (chap.plaimi.net [178.209.51.99]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 50E2A191 for ; Mon, 27 Mar 2017 17:58:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: by gent.plaimi.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 27A37124515; Mon, 27 Mar 2017 19:50:15 +0200 (CEST) To: Btc Ideas , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion References: From: Stian Ellingsen Message-ID: Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2017 19:50:12 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RP_MATCHES_RCVD autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 28 Mar 2017 14:31:55 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Encouraging good miners X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2017 17:58:18 -0000 On 27/03/17 18:12, Btc Ideas via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Add a preference for mined blocks to be the one with more > transactions. This comes into play when 2 blocks of the same height > are found. The first good block mined would be orphaned if it had > less transactions than another. Optionally, have this rule apply to > the current block and the previous one. This would encourage miners to make their own tiny junk transactions to fill up their blocks, perhaps leaving larger, more space-efficient transactions in the mempool. > This increases incentive for full blocks because a miner thinking > the faster propagation of a smaller block will win him the reward, > but that would no longer be a good assumption. > I read some miners could attack a chain by mining small or empty > blocks. This makes that a little more difficult, but they can still > attack the chain many ways. "Good" miners should probably build upon the block with a set of transactions more similar to what they themselves would include based on their mempool at the time. However, miners don't have an incentive to do so today. Instead, they may be better off building upon the block that leaves the most valuable transactions in the mempool, e.g. a small or empty block, and maybe leave some valuable transactions in the mempool for the next miner.[1] This issue could possibly be addressed by a soft-fork that requires miners to pay a portion of their fees to future miners. [1] https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2016/10/21/bitcoin-is-unstable-without-the-= block-reward/ --=20 Stian