From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5C19F707 for ; Thu, 22 Jun 2017 13:27:29 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-qt0-f176.google.com (mail-qt0-f176.google.com [209.85.216.176]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B22BF18F for ; Thu, 22 Jun 2017 13:27:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-qt0-f176.google.com with SMTP id u12so11620642qth.0 for ; Thu, 22 Jun 2017 06:27:28 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=subject:to:cc:references:from:message-id:date:user-agent :mime-version:in-reply-to:content-language; bh=pDIlxje6CrDgffEfxKxfQeZ2YbO0Ij0ayV7wOAAUoAc=; b=QcsiRjTGJSE3TXmr4W2ONrtgq8ZpZ8GNggyAJzcf9jvPhQURtneWy40zB9fPdG7DYY p8bAuEy8FqoT7UH+D1G2VinjeXx4CPNm6BBkFCRk83loWw3FuUGofRGmpzlvasvb2uj8 ajhzupaSPdkFvHDbvgVPXcLDAZQaFEnVUf9TfIzNsHqg5/jS7apdXh5E7fAgba/xf866 zYgmbrT6tDl9B7/FC1DLkXjrcH4R7noYMUjdaN7R5IYplscnTWUtG8YuRkOZ7XJQDtgd ZPa7uwIO7RiIN0ulIcM1XT2399FHVvpALSy1VjmHdxbDmV9wHArd3q0SFpgeJNH5XiWH swwQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:subject:to:cc:references:from:message-id:date :user-agent:mime-version:in-reply-to:content-language; bh=pDIlxje6CrDgffEfxKxfQeZ2YbO0Ij0ayV7wOAAUoAc=; b=Z2maMpiXSt9eK2ovjKZUnA50r3534gd87FOJypBThA27vyk+D/9EUo5hZs/PqGwIw8 Wr2kioYrHFwWbUZ0y+zuoOS7LW7dCnOTFhtleC6yRESz2NlBgnRivoizm69ZFCsj3FCZ JKMf+pVJO+baLrYm/mXGMp6EqmRyfvPSj0DcPb8wH7Nrql0NY78KkZ/7xBbWf11JCjg0 rcaIfJZd6wL5CRtB4yUoXeOsXHT18Mg65d987LTEJIw4prEp7+PiTLYo/kjlBoB40R4S 6GXKCI8zWxk/oGIbtuXM9bGpaYmaF8f7gbk4R1nunOUxd4la8DzPpRIrDEZtJVia7iFu j2YQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AKS2vOxEPiTkNnCClJo8ac6bpaXWIsbMP2JA2BUpeLG7mQfd512EY4DC cnSV1zrlyCMX7Hlt X-Received: by 10.237.37.193 with SMTP id y1mr2865121qtc.140.1498138047628; Thu, 22 Jun 2017 06:27:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.1.101] (ool-45726efb.dyn.optonline.net. [69.114.110.251]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id o50sm1124500qto.55.2017.06.22.06.27.25 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 22 Jun 2017 06:27:26 -0700 (PDT) To: Erik Aronesty References: <24f2b447-a237-45eb-ef9f-1a62533fad5c@gmail.com> <83671224-f6ff-16a9-81c0-20ab578aec9d@gmail.com> <6764b8af-bb4c-615d-5af5-462127bbbe36@gmail.com> <33d98418-10f0-3854-a954-14985d53e04b@gmail.com> From: Paul Sztorc Message-ID: Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2017 09:27:25 -0400 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.2.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------18EC5FE2413BFD36B9013AA4" Content-Language: en-US X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Drivechain RfD -- Follow Up X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2017 13:27:29 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------18EC5FE2413BFD36B9013AA4 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Hi Erik, I don't think that your design is competitive. Why would users tolerate a depreciation of X% per year, when there are alternatives which do not require such depreciation? It seems to me that none would. Paul On 6/20/2017 9:38 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote: > - a proof-of-burn sidechain is the ultimate two-way peg. you have to > burn bitcoin *or* side-chain tokens to mine the side chain. the size > of the burn is the degree of security. i actually wrote code to do > randomized blind burns where you have a poisson distribution > (non-deterministic selected burn). there is no way to game it... > it's very similar to algorand - but it uses burns instead of staking > > - you can then have a secure sidechain that issues a mining reward in > sidechain tokens, which can be aggrregated and redeemed for bitcoins. > the result of this is that any bitcoins held in the sidechain > depreciate in value at a rate of X% per year. this deflation rate > pays for increased security > > - logically this functions like an alt coin, with high inflation and > cheap transactions. but the altcoin is pegged to bitcoin's price > because of the pool of unredeemed bitcoins held within the side chain. > > > > On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 7:54 AM, Paul Sztorc > wrote: > > Hi Erik, > > As you know: > > 1. If a sidechain is merged mined it basically grows out of the > existing Bitcoin mining network. If it has a different PoW > algorithm it is a new mining network. > 2. The security (ie, hashrate) of any mining network would be > determined by the total economic value of the block. In Bitcoin > this is (subsidy+tx_fees)*price, but since a sidechain cannot > issue new tokens it would only be (tx_fees)*price. > > Unfortunately the two have a nasty correlation which can lead to a > disastrous self-fulfilling prophecy: users will avoid a network > that is too insecure; and if users avoid using a network, they > will stop paying txn fees and so the quantity (tx_fees)*price > falls toward zero, erasing the network's security. So it is quite > problematic and I recommend just biting the bullet and going with > merged mining instead. > > And, the point may be moot. Bitcoin miners may decide that, given > their expertise in seeking out cheap sources of power/cooling, > they might as well mine both/all chains. So your suggestion may > not achieve your desired result (and would, meanwhile, consume > more of the economy's resources -- some of these would not > contribute even to a higher hashrate). > > Paul > > > > > On 6/19/2017 1:11 PM, Erik Aronesty wrote: >> It would be nice to be able to enforce that a drivechain *not* >> have the same POW as bitcoin. >> >> I suspect this is the only way to be sure that a drivechain >> doesn't destabilize the main chain and push more power to miners >> that already have too much power. >> >> > > --------------18EC5FE2413BFD36B9013AA4 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Hi Erik,

I don't think that your design is competitive. Why would users tolerate a depreciation of X% per year, when there are alternatives which do not require such depreciation? It seems to me that none would.

Paul

On 6/20/2017 9:38 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote:
- a proof-of-burn sidechain is the ultimate two-way peg.   you have to burn bitcoin *or* side-chain tokens to mine the side chain.   the size of the burn is the degree of security.    i actually wrote code to do randomized blind burns where you have a poisson distribution (non-deterministic selected burn).    there is no way to game it... it's very similar to algorand - but it uses burns instead of staking

- you can then have a secure sidechain that issues a mining reward in sidechain tokens, which can be aggrregated and redeemed for bitcoins.   the result of this is that any bitcoins held in the sidechain depreciate in value at a rate of X% per year.   this deflation rate pays for increased security

- logically this functions like an alt coin, with high inflation and cheap transactions.   but the altcoin is pegged to bitcoin's price because of the pool of unredeemed bitcoins held within the side chain.



On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 7:54 AM, Paul Sztorc <truthcoin@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi Erik,

As you know:

1. If a sidechain is merged mined it basically grows out of the existing Bitcoin mining network. If it has a different PoW algorithm it is a new mining network.
2. The security (ie, hashrate) of any mining network would be determined by the total economic value of the block. In Bitcoin this is (subsidy+tx_fees)*price, but since a sidechain cannot issue new tokens it would only be (tx_fees)*price.

Unfortunately the two have a nasty correlation which can lead to a disastrous self-fulfilling prophecy: users will avoid a network that is too insecure; and if users avoid using a network, they will stop paying txn fees and so the quantity (tx_fees)*price falls toward zero, erasing the network's security. So it is quite problematic and I recommend just biting the bullet and going with merged mining instead.

And, the point may be moot. Bitcoin miners may decide that, given their expertise in seeking out cheap sources of power/cooling, they might as well mine both/all chains. So your suggestion may not achieve your desired result (and would, meanwhile, consume more of the economy's resources -- some of these would not contribute even to a higher hashrate).

Paul




On 6/19/2017 1:11 PM, Erik Aronesty wrote:
It would be nice to be able to enforce that a drivechain *not* have the same POW as bitcoin.

I suspect this is the only way to be sure that a drivechain doesn't destabilize the main chain and push more power to miners that already have too much power.





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