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Mon, 09 Jun 2025 03:10:24 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 2002:a05:6808:399a:b0:409:c6:c147 with SMTP id 5614622812f47-409051b6a89mr9242914b6e.6.1749463824322; Mon, 09 Jun 2025 03:10:24 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 2002:a05:6808:5068:b0:3fa:da36:efcd with SMTP id 5614622812f47-408f0237c79msb6e; Thu, 5 Jun 2025 08:23:05 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 2002:a05:690c:399:b0:70d:f673:1412 with SMTP id 00721157ae682-710d997e6bemr92166307b3.0.1749136973316; Thu, 05 Jun 2025 08:22:53 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2025 08:22:52 -0700 (PDT) From: Leo Wandersleb To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List Message-Id: In-Reply-To: References: <2c3b7e1c-95dd-4773-a88f-f2cdb37acf4a@gmail.com> <33f67e84-5d1c-4c14-80b9-90a3fec3cb36@gmail.com> <5e393f57-ac87-40fd-93ef-e1006accdb55n@googlegroups.com> <5d9f6ac9-a623-4636-8a91-ee7c057bc08an@googlegroups.com> <44b5aa4c-a71b-49ed-beee-071140b16aacn@googlegroups.com> Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Pre-emptive commit/reveal for quantum-safe migration (poison-pill) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----=_Part_118864_863109812.1749136972813" X-Original-Sender: LWandersleb@gmail.com Precedence: list Mailing-list: list bitcoindev@googlegroups.com; contact bitcoindev+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 786775582512 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: , List-Unsubscribe: , X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) ------=_Part_118864_863109812.1749136972813 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_Part_118865_26444108.1749136972813" ------=_Part_118865_26444108.1749136972813 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi conduition, I see the confusion - let me clarify step 3: The "reveal" is an on-chain announcement that includes the full transaction= =20 data, but it's not executed as a spending transaction yet. Think of it as: ``` Block N: Announcement TX containing: - Full spending transaction (with signatures, witness data) - Merkle proof linking to prior commitment - Reference to target UTXO ``` This announcement transaction gets mined immediately (paying fees with=20 other inputs), but the vulnerable UTXO remains unspent. It's essentially=20 storing the transaction data on-chain for the contest period. After 144 blocks, the winning transaction (oldest valid commitment) can be= =20 executed as a normal spend. No double-spending or special states needed -= =20 the UTXO simply can't be spent until the contest period ends and we know=20 which commitment won. So yes, we're storing the transaction data twice (once in announcement,=20 once in actual execution), but this avoids any consensus-breaking changes= =20 while protecting against quantum attacks. Regards, Leo --- On Thursday, 5 June 2025 at 17:10:46 UTC+2 conduition wrote: > Hi Leo, > > When a user reveals a transaction + commitment proof, are you > assuming it will be included in a block? Or is the reveal TX > somehow put "on ice" for those 144 blocks, and only then mined?=20 > > > If the former, this implies your protocol would need to allow > double-spending of UTXOs even after many confirmations, as > Tim has noted. Otherwise having an older announcement wouldn't > give any advantage. I don't see how you'd implement this without > breaking many founding assumptions of Bitcoin, maybe introducing > some new special "confirmed-but-pending" state specifically > for the outputs of these reveal TXs. > > If the latter, and the TX isn't immediately mineable, then how > exactly do nodes know when to consider it consensus-valid? > Imagine you're a node and you receive a reveal transaction > with a valid (old enough) commitment proof. The TX claims > to have been created 144 blocks ago and thus should be > mineable. But how do you verify that, if the TX wasn't > included in a past block? > > regards, > conduition > > On Thursday, June 5th, 2025 at 7:55 AM, Leo Wandersleb =20 > wrote: > > > Hi Boris, hi list, > > I think the weak announcement is a bad idea once EC crypto is broken to= =20 > the point where an attacker can break the key before the transaction gets= =20 > mined but the strong announcements should still hold as they have less=20 > urgency. If the attacker sees the transaction in a strong announcement wi= th=20 > a full transaction, he cannot win even if he gets into a block first, as= =20 > the strong announcement proves a prior commitment to that transaction and= =20 > would win even if it gets mined only some blocks later. > >=20 > > > A scheme where the announcement does not contain the full transaction i= s=20 > problematic as the transaction might then turn out to not be valid. Then= =20 > nodes would wait for the "winning" wtxid blocking the UTXO forever. > >=20 > > > So the scheme is: > >=20 > > > After activation at block height X: > >=20 > > > 1. **Vulnerable UTXOs cannot be spent directly** - they require a prior= =20 > announcement > > 2. **Commitment** to a wTXID that spends the vulnerable UTXO. Multiple= =20 > wTXIDs can be stored in a hash tree in an OP_RETURN > > 3. **Reveal** full transaction with proof of prior commitment but not a= s=20 > a normal transaction yet > > 4. **Counter Reveal**: For 144 blocks, others can reveal older=20 > commitments. This protects exposed pubkeys! > > 5. **After 144 blocks**: The UTXO can be spent according to the=20 > strongest announcement (oldest commitment of valid transaction wins). > >=20 > > > As (5) is just the normal transaction, the scheme is a soft fork and=20 > compatible with pre-recorded transactions where the keys were lost. It=20 > would at least double the on-chain costs for these vulnerable UTXOs as th= ey=20 > would have to store the full transaction twice. We can make the=20 > announcements prunable again though. > >=20 > > > Best, > >=20 > > > Leo > > On Wednesday, 4 June 2025 at 20:40:32 UTC+2 Boris Nagaev wrote: > >=20 > > > > Hi Leo, > > >=20 > > > > I think it is possible to provide privacy for Satoshi and also reduce= =20 > the size of a weak announcement (strong announcements can already be smal= l:=20 > just a txid or a Merkle root of many txids). > > >=20 > > > > Importantly, we cannot include the whole signed transaction in the=20 > weak announcement. Doing so would leak the EC public key immediately,=20 > allowing an attacker to create their own valid weak announcement. We must= =20 > avoid revealing the public key until the actual spending transaction is= =20 > broadcast. > > >=20 > > > > We need a scheme where the EC public key is not leaked in a weak=20 > announcement, but the legitimate owner can verify it, while no one else= =20 > can. Also, once the EC public key is revealed, anyone should be able to= =20 > verify a past weak announcement (to validate the transaction when it is= =20 > broadcast). This reduces to the following requirement: we need a proof of= =20 > knowledge of the EC public key that can be verified if the public key is= =20 > known and provides no information otherwise. > > >=20 > > > > I think this is called a zero-knowledge proof. One simple approach=20 > could be to apply a tagged hash function to the concatenation of the EC= =20 > public key and the future wTXID, and include this in the weak announcemen= t.=20 > The structure would be: > > >=20 > > > > - UTXO (previous TXID and output index) > > > - future spending wTXID > > > - proof :=3D tagged_hash(EC public key || wTXID) > > >=20 > > > > The wTXID is included in the concatenation to bind the proof to a=20 > particular future transaction. Otherwise, someone could copy a weak=20 > announcement and substitute their own wTXID. > > >=20 > > > > Satoshi could publish a strong announcement now and then monitor all= =20 > weak announcements involving his UTXOs. If someone publishes a weak=20 > announcement for one of his coins, he could verify the "proof" field. If = it=20 > is valid, it would mean someone has cracked his key with a quantum=20 > computer, and he would need to use his strong announcement immediately to= =20 > reclaim the funds before the attacker does. > > >=20 > > > > Best, > > > Boris > > >=20 > > > > On Wednesday, June 4, 2025 at 2:40:53=E2=80=AFPM UTC-3 Leo Wandersleb= wrote: > > >=20 > > > > > Hi Boris, > > > > the announcements, weak and strong would have to not be transaction= s=20 > yet to be compatible with legacy nodes and thus keep it a soft-fork. They= =20 > could be OP_RETURN data. Only after the 144 blocks, the upgraded full nod= es=20 > would allow the inclusion of the actual transaction. This would mean the= =20 > transaction would be both in full in the OP_RETURN strong announcement an= d=20 > without the witness part later, so it would be a bit expensive this way b= ut=20 > maybe we can do better? > > > >=20 > > > > > A node that gets updated would have to re-index all the blockchain= =20 > to find announcements if we don't introduce a time frame for actually usi= ng=20 > the announcements. We could also say that any announcement has to be used= =20 > within another 1000 blocks. Then the upgrading node would have to re-inde= x=20 > the last 1000 blocks. > > > >=20 > > > > > The legitimate owner of a UTXO might wait for an attack for privacy= =20 > reasons. My proposal would allow Satoshi himself to make all his UTXOs=20 > quantum safe without any of us learning about him being active. He could= =20 > add one 64B OP_RETURN in 2027 and when QC becomes an issue, we would lear= n=20 > about him having been active in 2027 in 2040 when actually somebody tried= =20 > to attack and not in 2027 when people started to panic because of imminen= t=20 > quantum breakthroughs. > > > > Hmm ... a problem is the weak announcement doesn't require keys, so= =20 > anybody could provoke Satoshi to come forward. Maybe we have to add key= =20 > ownership as a requirement for the "weak" announcement, too. So it should= =20 > also contain a serialized transaction. > > > >=20 > > > > > Best, > > > >=20 > > > > > Leo > > > >=20 > > > > > On Wednesday, 4 June 2025 at 04:15:59 UTC+2 Nagaev Boris wrote: > > > >=20 > > > > > > Hi Leo, > > > > >=20 > > > > > > Thanks for the clarifications, much appreciated! > > > > > I have a couple of questions: > > > > >=20 > > > > > > 1. How is a weak announcement stored in the blockchain and in the= =20 > UTXO set? > > > > > I assume it must be a transaction, correct? And it should somehow= =20 > mark > > > > > the UTXO as planned to be spent for 144 blocks? > > > > > How would older (non-upgraded) nodes interpret a transaction > > > > > containing a weak announcement? Would they just skip over it=20 > without > > > > > any special processing? > > > > > If so, is there a problem for nodes that upgrade after the fork:= =20 > would > > > > > they have to reprocess all blocks since the fork to find and inde= x=20 > all > > > > > missed weak announcements? > > > > >=20 > > > > > > 2. In the case of reclaiming a UTXO after a weak announcement by = an > > > > > attacker: why would the legitimate owner wait for a weak=20 > announcement > > > > > at all? > > > > > If the EC public key was already leaked, it seems they should=20 > publish > > > > > a strong announcement themselves rather than wait. If the EC publ= ic > > > > > key wasn't leaked, there's nothing to worry about even if someone > > > > > publishes a weak announcement: they are most likely bluffing, sin= ce > > > > > they wouldn't have the actual public key. > > > > >=20 > > > > > > Best, > > > > > Boris > > > > >=20 > > > > > > On Tue, Jun 3, 2025 at 3:29=E2=80=AFPM Leo Wandersleb =20 > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > Hi conduition, > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks for your careful analysis - excellent catches. > > > > > > > > > > > > You're absolutely right about the txid vulnerability. The=20 > commitment must be to the complete transaction including witness data=20 > (wTXID or equivalent) to prevent an attacker from pre-committing to=20 > unsigned transactions. This is essential - otherwise an attacker could=20 > indeed enumerate the UTXO set and create commitments without knowing the= =20 > private keys. > > > > > > > > > > > > Regarding updates: You're correct that frequent updates would b= e=20 > needed as wallets receive new UTXOs. However, I don't see this as a major= =20 > issue - users could batch their commitments periodically (say, monthly)= =20 > rather than after every transaction. The scheme is particularly important= =20 > for existing UTXOs that already have exposed pubkeys (old P2PK, reused=20 > addresses, etc.). For new UTXOs, wallets should ideally migrate to=20 > quantum-safe addresses once available. OpenTimestamps aggregation would= =20 > indeed help with scaling and provide plausible deniability about the numb= er=20 > of UTXOs being protected. > > > > > > > > > > > > The time delay serves a different purpose than you might expect= .=20 > It's not about preventing commitment forgery after pubkey exposure, but= =20 > rather about allowing priority based on commitment age when multiple=20 > parties claim the same UTXO: > > > > > > > > > > > > 1. Weak announcement starts the 144-block window > > > > > > 2. During this window, anyone with a strong commitment can=20 > reveal it > > > > > > 3. The oldest valid commitment wins > > > > > > > > > > > > This creates the "poison pill" effect: an attacker might crack = a=20 > key and try to spend a UTXO, but if the original owner has an older=20 > commitment, they can reclaim it during the window. The uncertainty about= =20 > which UTXOs have poison pills makes attacking large "lost" UTXOs risky -= =20 > hence less disruptive to the network. > > > > > > > > > > > > The delay essentially allows a "commitment priority contest"=20 > where age determines the winner, protecting users who prepared early whil= e=20 > still allowing these users to not move their funds. > > > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > > > > > > > Leo > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the=20 > Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > > > > > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from= =20 > it, send an email to bitcoindev+...@googlegroups.com. > > > > > > To view this discussion visit=20 > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/5e393f57-ac87-40fd-93ef-e100= 6accdb55n%40googlegroups.com > . > > > > >=20 > > > > > >=20 > > > > > >=20 > > > > > > -- > > > > > Best regards, > > > > > Boris Nagaev > >=20 > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google=20 > Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send= =20 > an email to bitcoindev+...@googlegroups.com. > > To view this discussion visit=20 > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/ea71bbd5-1325-445b-977f-a52b= 8017eab4n%40googlegroups.com > . --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an e= mail to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/= d6196c29-267f-4172-8b39-9e2abd344378n%40googlegroups.com. ------=_Part_118865_26444108.1749136972813 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi conduition,

I see the confusion - let me clarify step 3:
=
The "reveal" is an on-chain announcement that includes the full trans= action data, but it's not executed as a spending transaction yet. Think of = it as:

```
Block N: Announcement TX containing:
- Full= spending transaction (with signatures, witness data)
- Merkle proof l= inking to prior commitment
- Reference to target UTXO
```
This announcement transaction gets mined immediately (paying fees with = other inputs), but the vulnerable UTXO remains unspent. It's essentially st= oring the transaction data on-chain for the contest period.

Afte= r 144 blocks, the winning transaction (oldest valid commitment) can be exec= uted as a normal spend. No double-spending or special states needed - the U= TXO simply can't be spent until the contest period ends and we know which c= ommitment won.

So yes, we're storing the transaction data twice = (once in announcement, once in actual execution), but this avoids any conse= nsus-breaking changes while protecting against quantum attacks.
<= br />
Regards,

Leo

---

On Thursday, 5 June 2025 at 17:10:46 UTC+2 conduition wrote:
=
Hi Leo,

When a user reveals a transaction + commitment proof, are you
assuming it will be included in a block? Or is the reveal TX
somehow put "on ice" for those 144 blocks, and only then mine= d?=20


If the former, this implies your protocol would need to allow
double-spending of UTXOs even after many confirmations, as
Tim has noted. Otherwise having an older announcement wouldn't
give any advantage. I don't see how you'd implement this withou= t
breaking many founding assumptions of Bitcoin, maybe introducing
some new special "confirmed-but-pending" state specifically
for the outputs of these reveal TXs.

If the latter, and the TX isn't immediately mineable, then how
exactly do nodes know when to consider it consensus-valid?
Imagine you're a node and you receive a reveal transaction
with a valid (old enough) commitment proof. The TX claims
to have been created 144 blocks ago and thus should be
mineable. But how do you verify that, if the TX wasn't
included in a past block?

regards,
conduition

On Thursday, June 5th, 2025 at 7:55 AM, Leo Wandersleb <lwand...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi Boris, hi list,
> I think the weak announcement is a bad idea once EC crypto is brok= en to the point where an attacker can break the key before the transaction = gets mined but the strong announcements should still hold as they have less= urgency. If the attacker sees the transaction in a strong announcement wit= h a full transaction, he cannot win even if he gets into a block first, as = the strong announcement proves a prior commitment to that transaction and w= ould win even if it gets mined only some blocks later.
>=20

> A scheme where the announcement does not contain the full transact= ion is problematic as the transaction might then turn out to not be valid. = Then nodes would wait for the "winning" wtxid blocking the UTXO f= orever.
>=20

> So the scheme is:
>=20

> After activation at block height X:
>=20

> 1. **Vulnerable UTXOs cannot be spent directly** - they require a = prior announcement
> 2. **Commitment** to a wTXID that spends the vulnerable UTXO. Mult= iple wTXIDs can be stored in a hash tree in an OP_RETURN
> 3. **Reveal** full transaction with proof of prior commitment but = not as a normal transaction yet
> 4. **Counter Reveal**: For 144 blocks, others can reveal older com= mitments. This protects exposed pubkeys!
> 5. **After 144 blocks**: The UTXO can be spent according to the st= rongest announcement (oldest commitment of valid transaction wins).
>=20

> As (5) is just the normal transaction, the scheme is a soft fork a= nd compatible with pre-recorded transactions where the keys were lost. It w= ould at least double the on-chain costs for these vulnerable UTXOs as they = would have to store the full transaction twice. We can make the announcemen= ts prunable again though.
>=20

> Best,
>=20

> Leo
> On Wednesday, 4 June 2025 at 20:40:32 UTC+2 Boris Nagaev wrote:
>=20

> > Hi Leo,
> >=20

> > I think it is possible to provide privacy for Satoshi and als= o reduce the size of a weak announcement (strong announcements can already = be small: just a txid or a Merkle root of many txids).
> >=20

> > Importantly, we cannot include the whole signed transaction i= n the weak announcement. Doing so would leak the EC public key immediately,= allowing an attacker to create their own valid weak announcement. We must = avoid revealing the public key until the actual spending transaction is bro= adcast.
> >=20

> > We need a scheme where the EC public key is not leaked in a w= eak announcement, but the legitimate owner can verify it, while no one else= can. Also, once the EC public key is revealed, anyone should be able to ve= rify a past weak announcement (to validate the transaction when it is broad= cast). This reduces to the following requirement: we need a proof of knowle= dge of the EC public key that can be verified if the public key is known an= d provides no information otherwise.
> >=20

> > I think this is called a zero-knowledge proof. One simple app= roach could be to apply a tagged hash function to the concatenation of the = EC public key and the future wTXID, and include this in the weak announceme= nt. The structure would be:
> >=20

> > - UTXO (previous TXID and output index)
> > - future spending wTXID
> > - proof :=3D tagged_hash(EC public key || wTXID)
> >=20

> > The wTXID is included in the concatenation to bind the proof = to a particular future transaction. Otherwise, someone could copy a weak an= nouncement and substitute their own wTXID.
> >=20

> > Satoshi could publish a strong announcement now and then moni= tor all weak announcements involving his UTXOs. If someone publishes a weak= announcement for one of his coins, he could verify the "proof" f= ield. If it is valid, it would mean someone has cracked his key with a quan= tum computer, and he would need to use his strong announcement immediately = to reclaim the funds before the attacker does.
> >=20

> > Best,
> > Boris
> >=20

> > On Wednesday, June 4, 2025 at 2:40:53=E2=80=AFPM UTC-3 Leo Wa= ndersleb wrote:
> >=20

> > > Hi Boris,
> > > the announcements, weak and strong would have to not be = transactions yet to be compatible with legacy nodes and thus keep it a soft= -fork. They could be OP_RETURN data. Only after the 144 blocks, the upgrade= d full nodes would allow the inclusion of the actual transaction. This woul= d mean the transaction would be both in full in the OP_RETURN strong announ= cement and without the witness part later, so it would be a bit expensive t= his way but maybe we can do better?
> > >=20

> > > A node that gets updated would have to re-index all the = blockchain to find announcements if we don't introduce a time frame for= actually using the announcements. We could also say that any announcement = has to be used within another 1000 blocks. Then the upgrading node would ha= ve to re-index the last 1000 blocks.
> > >=20

> > > The legitimate owner of a UTXO might wait for an attack = for privacy reasons. My proposal would allow Satoshi himself to make all hi= s UTXOs quantum safe without any of us learning about him being active. He = could add one 64B OP_RETURN in 2027 and when QC becomes an issue, we would = learn about him having been active in 2027 in 2040 when actually somebody t= ried to attack and not in 2027 when people started to panic because of immi= nent quantum breakthroughs.
> > > Hmm ... a problem is the weak announcement doesn't r= equire keys, so anybody could provoke Satoshi to come forward. Maybe we hav= e to add key ownership as a requirement for the "weak" announceme= nt, too. So it should also contain a serialized transaction.
> > >=20

> > > Best,
> > >=20

> > > Leo
> > >=20

> > > On Wednesday, 4 June 2025 at 04:15:59 UTC+2 Nagaev Boris= wrote:
> > >=20

> > > > Hi Leo,
> > > >=20

> > > > Thanks for the clarifications, much appreciated!
> > > > I have a couple of questions:
> > > >=20

> > > > 1. How is a weak announcement stored in the blockch= ain and in the UTXO set?
> > > > I assume it must be a transaction, correct? And it = should somehow mark
> > > > the UTXO as planned to be spent for 144 blocks?
> > > > How would older (non-upgraded) nodes interpret a tr= ansaction
> > > > containing a weak announcement? Would they just ski= p over it without
> > > > any special processing?
> > > > If so, is there a problem for nodes that upgrade af= ter the fork: would
> > > > they have to reprocess all blocks since the fork to= find and index all
> > > > missed weak announcements?
> > > >=20

> > > > 2. In the case of reclaiming a UTXO after a weak an= nouncement by an
> > > > attacker: why would the legitimate owner wait for a= weak announcement
> > > > at all?
> > > > If the EC public key was already leaked, it seems t= hey should publish
> > > > a strong announcement themselves rather than wait. = If the EC public
> > > > key wasn't leaked, there's nothing to worry= about even if someone
> > > > publishes a weak announcement: they are most likely= bluffing, since
> > > > they wouldn't have the actual public key.
> > > >=20

> > > > Best,
> > > > Boris
> > > >=20

> > > > On Tue, Jun 3, 2025 at 3:29=E2=80=AFPM Leo Wandersl= eb <lwand...@gmail.com>= ; wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > Hi conduition,
> > > > >
> > > > > Thanks for your careful analysis - excellent c= atches.
> > > > >
> > > > > You're absolutely right about the txid vul= nerability. The commitment must be to the complete transaction including wi= tness data (wTXID or equivalent) to prevent an attacker from pre-committing= to unsigned transactions. This is essential - otherwise an attacker could = indeed enumerate the UTXO set and create commitments without knowing the pr= ivate keys.
> > > > >
> > > > > Regarding updates: You're correct that fre= quent updates would be needed as wallets receive new UTXOs. However, I don&= #39;t see this as a major issue - users could batch their commitments perio= dically (say, monthly) rather than after every transaction. The scheme is p= articularly important for existing UTXOs that already have exposed pubkeys = (old P2PK, reused addresses, etc.). For new UTXOs, wallets should ideally m= igrate to quantum-safe addresses once available. OpenTimestamps aggregation= would indeed help with scaling and provide plausible deniability about the= number of UTXOs being protected.
> > > > >
> > > > > The time delay serves a different purpose than= you might expect. It's not about preventing commitment forgery after p= ubkey exposure, but rather about allowing priority based on commitment age = when multiple parties claim the same UTXO:
> > > > >
> > > > > 1. Weak announcement starts the 144-block wind= ow
> > > > > 2. During this window, anyone with a strong co= mmitment can reveal it
> > > > > 3. The oldest valid commitment wins
> > > > >
> > > > > This creates the "poison pill" effec= t: an attacker might crack a key and try to spend a UTXO, but if the origin= al owner has an older commitment, they can reclaim it during the window. Th= e uncertainty about which UTXOs have poison pills makes attacking large &qu= ot;lost" UTXOs risky - hence less disruptive to the network.
> > > > >
> > > > > The delay essentially allows a "commitmen= t priority contest" where age determines the winner, protecting users = who prepared early while still allowing these users to not move their funds= .
> > > > >
> > > > > Best,
> > > > >
> > > > > Leo
> > > > >
> > > > > --
> > > > > You received this message because you are subs= cribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" gr= oup.
> > > > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiv= ing emails from it, send an email to bitcoindev+...@googlegroups.com.
> > > > > To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/5e393f57-ac8= 7-40fd-93ef-e1006accdb55n%40googlegroups.com.
> > > >=20

> > > >=20

> > > >=20

> > > > --
> > > > Best regards,
> > > > Boris Nagaev
>=20

> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google= Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, = send an email to bitcoindev+...@= googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion visit ht= tps://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/ea71bbd5-1325-445b-977f-a52b8017= eab4n%40googlegroups.com.

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