From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1XJuTe-0001wJ-T0 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 20 Aug 2014 01:14:14 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of petertodd.org designates 62.13.148.112 as permitted sender) client-ip=62.13.148.112; envelope-from=pete@petertodd.org; helo=outmail148112.authsmtp.co.uk; Received: from outmail148112.authsmtp.co.uk ([62.13.148.112]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) id 1XJuTd-000668-PH for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 20 Aug 2014 01:14:14 +0000 Received: from mail-c235.authsmtp.com (mail-c235.authsmtp.com [62.13.128.235]) by punt17.authsmtp.com (8.14.2/8.14.2/) with ESMTP id s7K1E7G0038141; Wed, 20 Aug 2014 02:14:07 +0100 (BST) Received: from android-61a40235731d80b6.lan (76-10-178-110.dsl.teksavvy.com [76.10.178.110]) (authenticated bits=0) by mail.authsmtp.com (8.14.2/8.14.2/) with ESMTP id s7K1E45U022237 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 20 Aug 2014 02:14:05 +0100 (BST) User-Agent: K-9 Mail for Android In-Reply-To: References: <0C0EF7F9-DBBA-4872-897D-63CFA3853726@ricmoo.com> <33D4B2E3-DBF0-444E-B76A-765C4C17E964@ricmoo.com> <53F37635.5070807@riseup.net> <53F38AC9.4000608@corganlabs.com> <53F3DFF7.9070709@jrn.me.uk> <3476b0a1-e08a-46bf-9ee4-ef56fcb02d72@email.android.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 From: Peter Todd Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 21:14:02 -0400 To: William Yager Message-ID: X-Server-Quench: 47ce80e6-2807-11e4-b396-002590a15da7 X-AuthReport-Spam: If SPAM / abuse - report it at: http://www.authsmtp.com/abuse X-AuthRoute: OCd2Yg0TA1ZNQRgX IjsJECJaVQIpKltL GxAVKBZePFsRUQkR aAdMdAIUGUATAgsB AmIbW1ZeUVl7WWU7 bAxPbAVDY01GQQRr UFdNRFdNFUsrBmcA cxobNxlwdQdFfzB5 bUZjEHRcDxFydRN7 X0xcFWobZGY1bH1N U0leagNUcgZDfk5E bwQuUz1vNG8XDQg5 AwQ0PjZ0MThBJSBS WgQAK04nCX4RGSY7 XBkGT30CG0YfVj0v ZxYnNlUbHUBZN0gp KlIuVElw X-Authentic-SMTP: 61633532353630.1023:706 X-AuthFastPath: 0 (Was 255) X-AuthSMTP-Origin: 76.10.178.110/465 X-AuthVirus-Status: No virus detected - but ensure you scan with your own anti-virus system. X-Spam-Score: -1.5 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record X-Headers-End: 1XJuTd-000668-PH Cc: Bitcoin Development Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal: Encrypt bitcoin messages X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2014 01:14:15 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 19 August 2014 20:59:14 GMT-04:00, William Yager wrote: >What, exactly, do we hope to achieve from having end-to-end encryption? > >Even if it worked perfectly, it wouldn't be very useful. > >But it won't work perfectly, because we don't have any method of >authentication. Don't let perfect be the enemy of good. > The bitcoin network is trivially MITMable. It's >designed to >work even in the face of that, but any encryption we implement will >just >get blown away by anyone who cares enough to stand in the middle of two >nodes. > >As far as I can see, we get a microscopic obfuscatory advantage over a >very >weak passive attacker, at the cost of hugely increased software >complexity >(and possibly increased CPU time). You realize that by your own definition even the NSA is mostly a "weak passive attacker" They do *not* have the ability to attack more than a small, targeted, subset of connection for both technical and political reasons. For starters, MITM attacks are easily detected - "Bitcoin network attacked by unknown agents! Has your ISP been compromised?" would make for great headlines and would soon see the problem fixed both technically and politically. In any case, my suggestion of enabling hidden service support by default adds both encryption and reasonably good authentication. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: APG v1.1.1 iQFQBAEBCAA6BQJT8/ZaMxxQZXRlciBUb2RkIChsb3cgc2VjdXJpdHkga2V5KSA8 cGV0ZUBwZXRlcnRvZGQub3JnPgAKCRAZnIM7qOfwhV5UCAC0wVMyKtCedZuUKXrw Mg6qvbkDzGyzn7fgASTnMh8hF+p+p5MoOz3K0FGTdLph+ulptz9ITatGmmi+av+u 0Fc8xXYgxiYcIwtMVumNrHR16bjG7NoShnqMujuUZ7a+xigeHxV2/tG0VRb9Km8W GFYNdY4mOFubFu7qfqymmxGsIgP42rPsN6c41B75wqqaGzSX7BRmlxNsYVSUO3Fi fwNU7y7hLC9BN+WQCmVK+Rk57XpXcoydfvsz9a/SLhiQKssEdcDbUq4gLtnDHs92 JBsUqzG/wDgcQFiLuAm/A/ZvDAERwPr6jtunt3CCDt+UdLwlGAj5RTnuHgY72PNS Ma2O =2qdX -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----