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From: alicexbt <alicexbt@protonmail.com>
To: Elias Rohrer <btcdevml@tnull.de>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BGP hijacking on Bitcoin p2p network
Date: Tue, 05 Jul 2022 20:30:24 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <eF_rgj57EQkCwsazacWVA6XeLZHXJVAP7RUpHLCeBWOjEJ-L9RPYqQZ0HVzqxCEkWrGMp66qP_aEzugCJokvFHFhp4phrtwzogI-2CZxljA=@protonmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <31411E6C-B1BF-45B7-848A-0AC8ECDFFCB3@tnull.de>

Hi Elias,

Thanks for sharing the links.

I have also started working on a simple chrome extension which connects to local bitcoin core and checks IP address of all peers for prefix length and other things. I would highlight peers with different colors based on certain things in this extension.

https://github.com/1440000bytes/bitcoin-core-extension

/dev/fd0


Sent with Proton Mail secure email.

------- Original Message -------
On Friday, June 10th, 2022 at 6:44 AM, Elias Rohrer <btcdevml@tnull.de> wrote:


> Hi alicexbt,
>
> Routing attacks have actually been studied quite a bit in literature.
>
> You may be interested in the research articles of Maria Apostolaki et al.[1,2], Muoi Tran et al.[3], and related works.
>
> Best,
>
> Elias
>
> 1: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1605.07524.pdf
> [2]: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.06254.pdf
> [3]: https://allquantor.at/blockchainbib/pdf/tran2020stealthier.pdf
>
> On 9 Jun 2022, at 20:24, alicexbt via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>
> > Hi Bitcoin Developers,
> >
> > Based on this answer from 2014, bitcoin nodes are vulnerable to BGP hijacking. There was an incident in March 2022, twitter prefix was hijacked and details are shared in 2 blog posts:
> >
> > https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28488
> >
> > https://www.manrs.org/2022/03/lesson-learned-twitter-shored-up-its-routing-security/
> >
> > 'nusenu' had written an article about Tor network being vulnerable to BGP hijacking attacks: https://nusenu.medium.com/how-vulnerable-is-the-tor-network-to-bgp-hijacking-attacks-56d3b2ebfd92
> >
> > After doing some research I found that RPKI ROA and BGP prefix length can help against BGP hijacking attacks. I checked BGP prefix length and RPKI ROA for first 10 IP addresses returned in `getnodeaddresses` in bitcoin core and it had vulnerable results.
> >
> > https://i.stack.imgur.com/KD7jH.png
> >
> > Has anyone written a detailed blog post or research article like nusenu? If not I would be interested to write one in next couple of weeks?
> > Looking for some "technical" feedback, links if this was already discussed in past with some solutions.
> >
> > /dev/fd0
> >
> > Sent with Proton Mail secure email.
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


      reply	other threads:[~2022-07-05 20:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-06-09 18:24 [bitcoin-dev] BGP hijacking on Bitcoin p2p network alicexbt
2022-06-10  6:44 ` Elias Rohrer
2022-07-05 20:30   ` alicexbt [this message]

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