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[109.224.244.28]) by gmr-mx.google.com with ESMTPS id ada2fe7eead31-7d69df4b0e4si71408137.8.2026.11.17.07.51.34 for (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 17 Nov 2026 07:51:35 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of conduition@proton.me designates 109.224.244.28 as permitted sender) client-ip=109.224.244.28; Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 15:51:27 +0000 To: Cory Fields From: "'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List" Cc: Bitcoin Development Mailing List Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Quantum Landmines and Vulnerable Coin Auctions Message-ID: In-Reply-To: <40a9f73d-481f-47e6-a64b-acfb2c7f4fa8n@googlegroups.com> References: <40a9f73d-481f-47e6-a64b-acfb2c7f4fa8n@googlegroups.com> Feedback-ID: 72003692:user:proton X-Pm-Message-ID: bb14eaf3a818c01aec3c1f07cfea5924a6fae94f MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg=pgp-sha512; boundary="------812a2e7e65d22119716bda93caffee8df514dd50568264d39b8ad19a22bef71d"; charset=utf-8 X-Original-Sender: conduition@proton.me X-Original-Authentication-Results: gmr-mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@proton.me header.s=protonmail2 header.b=voa5GseM; spf=pass (google.com: domain of conduition@proton.me designates 109.224.244.28 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=conduition@proton.me; dmarc=pass (p=QUARANTINE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=proton.me X-Original-From: conduition Reply-To: conduition Precedence: list Mailing-list: list bitcoindev@googlegroups.com; contact bitcoindev+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 786775582512 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: , List-Unsubscribe: , X-Spam-Score: -1.0 (-) This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --------812a2e7e65d22119716bda93caffee8df514dd50568264d39b8ad19a22bef71d Content-Type: multipart/mixed;boundary=---------------------ef07dcf0b8e9bfce42e00395e1cbac91 -----------------------ef07dcf0b8e9bfce42e00395e1cbac91 Content-Type: multipart/alternative;boundary=---------------------921cea6a0c88535f031543108c64c324 -----------------------921cea6a0c88535f031543108c64c324 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Hi Cory, > Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also emb= edded within it a proof-of-knowledge. If alice was online and aware enough to take such proactive action prior to= Q-day, why wouldn't she simply move her 1 BTC legacy output to an quantum-= safe wallet? Unless you're saying she is leaving coins vulnerable intention= ally to bait a future quantum attacker, which I'd argue is the wrong thing = to incentivize. regards, conduition On Wednesday, November 4th, 2026 at 2:14 PM, Cory Fields wrote: > I've had fun discussing these rough ideas regarding post-quantum migratio= n to a few people in the last week. Rather than describing mechanics of how= to do any of the below via soft fork, which I do believe to be possible, I= 'm leaving those details to a future exercise. The purpose of this post is = just to introduce the ideas as thought experiments. >=20 > For the below, I'm assuming a future where: > - We have a new quantum-safe output type pre-qday > - Some new validation rules are activated post-qday (Something like Tripw= ire and/or manually) > - Post qday, all legacy output spends must be fully collateralized in ord= er to be spent (more on this later) > - Post qday, all legacy output spends must be have outputs that meet cert= ain conditions (time-locks and alternate spend paths) >=20 > Note that the last two requirements are similar to vault/covenant constru= ctions, but in this case their behavior could be enforced implicitly by sof= t-fork rules. >=20 > ## Quantum Landmines >=20 > This is a commit/reveal scheme, similar to those which have been discusse= d here, but with the addition of a payout in the case of proven theft. >=20 > Alice has 3 unspent outputs: 1btc in a legacy output type, 1btc in a quan= tum-safe output, and a trivial amount of btc in another quantum-safe output= (the landmine). Let's say that her legacy output is p2pk, though any legac= y output type would work. >=20 > Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also emb= edded within it a proof-of-knowledge. For the sake of example, imagine this= is a taproot-like tree. So in addition to its script-spend-path, it also c= ontains a leaf which commits to a new quantum-safe pubkey and is signed by = her legacy p2pk private key. The existence of this leaf is never revealed u= nless/until it is used as a proof. >=20 > Post-qday, in order to spend her legacy p2pk coin, recall that the new ru= les require that it must be fully collateralized. So she creates a transact= ion consisting of both of her 1btc inputs and a 2btc quantum-safe output. T= he output has the following implicit spending conditions: > - If re-spent within (say) 30 days, a proof of pre-qday knowledge of the = private key is sufficient to spend > - If a proof is provided, the output's pubkey must be the same as the one= signed for in the above proof > - If re-spent after the time-out, no proof is required and it can be spen= t as usual. >=20 > To see why this is useful, let's now consider the same scenario, except t= hat a quantum attacker is attempting to steal her p2pk coin after finding h= er private key. >=20 > The attacker creates a transaction consisting of their own quantum-safe 1= btc coin (for collateral) as well as Alice's vulnerable 1btc as inputs, and= a 2btc output with the same required spending conditions described above. = Because they have no pre-qday proof-of-knowledge of Alice's key, the attack= er would have to wait the 30 days before they can re-spend the output. Howe= ver, Alice notices the transaction in the meantime and spends the in-limbo = output to her committed-to key by including her landmine as an input and re= vealing the proof. In doing so, she moves her own coins while also taking t= he attacker's collateral. >=20 > Unbeknownst to the attacker, Alice's trivial output, which looked just li= ke any other quantum-safe output, actually contained a landmine. >=20 > This scheme is especially interesting because it actually incentivizes Al= ice to bait a quantum attacker pre-qday in order to double her vulnerable c= oins later, and thus makes quantum attackers wary of stealing coins as they= may be secretly guarded by mines. It also muddies the waters so that on qd= ay, it's not possible to analyze how many coins are vulnerable to theft. >=20 > ## Staked Auction >=20 > The obvious problem with relying on landmines alone is that the associate= d private keys for many vulnerable outputs are believed to be lost, thus a = quantum attacker could reasonably assume that they are not guarded by landm= ines. >=20 > But what if we could devise a similar collateral/commit/reveal scheme to = empower users who stake their coins pre-qday in order to thwart a quantum a= ttacker post-qday and take their collateral? >=20 > Let's add a new required spending condition, so there are now 3 ways to s= pend a legacy output: > - If re-spent before the initial landmine timeout, a proof of pre-qday kn= owledge of the private key is sufficient to spend > - If re-spent after the landmine timeout but before the auction timeout, = a bid is sufficient to spend > - If re-spent after the auction time-out, no proof is required and it can= be spent as usual. >=20 > Bob suspects that an old legacy unspent output of 50btc has no associated= landmine and thus a quantum attacker will try to steal it in the future. >=20 > Pre-qday, He creates a quantum-safe output of 50btc with a secret leaf, b= ut in this case it commits to a the vulnerable output, a bid amount of 40bt= c, and a new pubkey. This unspent transaction represents a staked bid of 40= btc in the event that a particular vulnerable output is ever spent. In orde= r to keep bidding sane, the allowed depth of bid-leaves could be constraine= d. >=20 > Post-qday, a quantum attacker finds the private key associated with the v= ulnerable 50btc unspent output and spends it, along with the required 50btc= of their own as collateral, to an output which has the above spending cond= itions and is worth 95btc. This represents a bid of 45btc. >=20 > Because no landmine exists, the initial timeout comes and goes. Now an au= ction begins and continues until a second time-out. During this auction per= iod, Bob reveals his staked 50btc output with a 40btc bid, and uses it to t= ake 40btc of the attacker's collateral. The original stolen coins are lost,= the attacker loses some or all of their collateral, and the auction contin= ues. If nobody outbids him, Bob takes the 40btc as profit. >=20 > Carol sees Bob's winning bid and repeats the same process, using her stak= ed 50btc to reveal her secret bid of 30btc. The auction continues, but nobo= dy outbids her and the auction times out. She can now claim the 30 coins as= profit. >=20 > The staking requirement limits how many vulnerable coins a future quantum= attacker can bid on before qday. >=20 > There are many ways this could be designed. Bob could get his coins back = so that a bid carries no risk, or be slashed for a losing bid. Unused colla= teral could be burned, or given to Carol, or given to miners, or thrown int= o a pot for later use. Staking requirements could be 1:1 or x:y. Staked tim= e (coin age) could be taken into consideration. Etc. >=20 > Notice that in this design, as long as there is a landmine or a staked lo= wer bid on the vulnerable coins, they are never successfully stolen by the = quantum attacker. The vulnerable coins are burned, and it's the attacker's = collateral that is claimed by the auction winner. The attacker only ever ma= kes away with the stolen coins if no one outbids them. Thus they're incenti= vized to make a very conservative bid. >=20 > ## Sats Auction >=20 > When describing the above auction scheme to Neha Narula, she suggested th= at the well-understood Dollar Auction game [0] could be used as well. See t= he link for more details and intuition, but I'll summarize briefly how it c= ould be used here. >=20 > In this case, there's no need for pre-qday staking. The spending/timeout = mechanics are similar to a Staked Auction. >=20 > Every spend of legacy coins triggers an auction after the landmine timeou= t. The highest bid wins the coins minus the bid, and the second-highest bid= loses its bid and collects nothing. The auction continues until there are = no more bids. Participants may keep bidding more in order to prevent themse= lves from ending up as the second-highest bid and thus having to pay. As a = result, it's possible that a quantum attacker trying to spend a vulnerable = 50btc output ends up losing all their collateral. Bidders could even attach= additional inputs to keep the auction going beyond the value of the vulner= able output. >=20 > This is interesting because, as the Wikipedia article mentions, the logic= al conclusion is for the attacker not to play. Also, because there is no pr= e-qday commitment requirement, the original coin owner (outwardly indisting= uishable from an attacker) would actually have a chance at partial recovery= if they chose to start the auction themselves. >=20 > Similar to auction A, there are lots of knobs and levers here: > - Collateral ratio > - Min/Max bids and intervals > - Where do the loser's coins go? >=20 > ## Desired Auction Outcome >=20 > Having thought about these for a week or so, it's clear that there are lo= ts of interesting ways to dissuade a quantum attack via a vulnerable coin a= uction using incentives and game theory. However, it's unclear what the bes= t design would be because it's not even clear to me what the most desirable= outcome would be. >=20 > - Attempt to prevent a quantum attacker from ever attempting to steal in = the first place? > - Attempt to encourage staking via auctions, with quantum attackers somet= imes winning to encourage the process? > - Attempt to redistribute the coins as randomly as possible? If so, an au= ction could be designed to work more like a lottery, where every unspent ou= tput is a lottery ticket or authorization to bid. >=20 > To complicate things even further, the most desirable outcome may even ch= ange as time goes on after qday, as the vulnerable coin spender is increasi= ngly likely to be an attacker as opposed to the original owner. >=20 > [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dollar_auction >=20 > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups= "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an= email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoinde= v/40a9f73d-481f-47e6-a64b-acfb2c7f4fa8n%40googlegroups.com. --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an e= mail to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/= eOU8hptEwRmWqXhtvW0jh5hf3jDya8G-Uw2t2SPPWS8FLDuCx4K56XczgyVhUzj3_fAUG2hrhnA= Fz7pLiQJhRURHr93f_-AyPWHzoGVI95I%3D%40proton.me. -----------------------921cea6a0c88535f031543108c64c324 Content-Type: multipart/related;boundary=---------------------382e74214a658e328bd8da9b7022c925 -----------------------382e74214a658e328bd8da9b7022c925 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Cory,

Pre-qday, when = Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also embedded within it a= proof-of-knowledge.

If alice was online and aware enough = to take such proactive action prior to Q-day, why wouldn't she simply move = her 1 BTC legacy output to an quantum-safe wallet? Unless you're saying she= is leaving coins vulnerable intentionally to bait a future quantum attacke= r, which I'd argue is the wrong thing to incentivize.

regards,
conduition



On Wednesday, November 4th, 2026 at 2:14 PM, Cory Fields <foss@c= oryfields.com> wrote:
I've had fun discussing these rough ideas regarding post-quantu= m migration to a few people in the last week. Rather than describing mechan= ics of how to do any of the below via soft fork, which I do believe to be p= ossible, I'm leaving those details to a future exercise. The purpose of thi= s post is just to introduce the ideas as thought experiments.

For th= e below, I'm assuming a future where:
- We have a new quantum-safe outpu= t type pre-qday
- Some new validation rules are activated post-qday (Som= ething like Tripwire and/or manually)
- Post qday, all legacy output spe= nds must be fully collateralized in order to be spent (more on this later)<= br>- Post qday, all legacy output spends must be have outputs that meet cer= tain conditions (time-locks and alternate spend paths)

Note that the= last two requirements are similar to vault/covenant constructions, but in = this case their behavior could be enforced implicitly by soft-fork rules.
## Quantum Landmines

This is a commit/reveal scheme, similar t= o those which have been discussed here, but with the addition of a payout i= n the case of proven theft.

Alice has 3 unspent outputs: 1btc in a l= egacy output type, 1btc in a quantum-safe output, and a trivial amount of b= tc in another quantum-safe output (the landmine). Let's say that her legacy= output is p2pk, though any legacy output type would work.

Pre-qday,= when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also embedded withi= n it a proof-of-knowledge. For the sake of example, imagine this is a tapro= ot-like tree. So in addition to its script-spend-path, it also contains a l= eaf which commits to a new quantum-safe pubkey and is signed by her legacy = p2pk private key. The existence of this leaf is never revealed unless/until= it is used as a proof.

Post-qday, in order to spend her legacy p2pk= coin, recall that the new rules require that it must be fully collateraliz= ed. So she creates a transaction consisting of both of her 1btc inputs and = a 2btc quantum-safe output. The output has the following implicit spending = conditions:
- If re-spent within (say) 30 days, a proof of pre-qday know= ledge of the private key is sufficient to spend
- If a proof is provided= , the output's pubkey must be the same as the one signed for in the above p= roof
- If re-spent after the time-out, no proof is required and it can b= e spent as usual.

To see why this is useful, let's now consider the = same scenario, except that a quantum attacker is attempting to steal her p2= pk coin after finding her private key.

The attacker creates a transa= ction consisting of their own quantum-safe 1btc coin (for collateral) as we= ll as Alice's vulnerable 1btc as inputs, and a 2btc output with the same re= quired spending conditions described above. Because they have no pre-qday p= roof-of-knowledge of Alice's key, the attacker would have to wait the 30 da= ys before they can re-spend the output. However, Alice notices the transact= ion in the meantime and spends the in-limbo output to her committed-to key = by including her landmine as an input and revealing the proof. In doing so,= she moves her own coins while also taking the attacker's collateral.
Unbeknownst to the attacker, Alice's trivial output, which looked just li= ke any other quantum-safe output, actually contained a landmine.

Thi= s scheme is especially interesting because it actually incentivizes Alice t= o bait a quantum attacker pre-qday in order to double her vulnerable coins = later, and thus makes quantum attackers wary of stealing coins as they may = be secretly guarded by mines. It also muddies the waters so that on qday, i= t's not possible to analyze how many coins are vulnerable to theft.

= ## Staked Auction

The obvious problem with relying on landmines alon= e is that the associated private keys for many vulnerable outputs are belie= ved to be lost, thus a quantum attacker could reasonably assume that they a= re not guarded by landmines.

But what if we could devise a similar c= ollateral/commit/reveal scheme to empower users who stake their coins pre-q= day in order to thwart a quantum attacker post-qday and take their collater= al?

Let's add a new required spending condition, so there are now 3 = ways to spend a legacy output:
- If re-spent before the initial landmine= timeout, a proof of pre-qday knowledge of the private key is sufficient to= spend
- If re-spent after the landmine timeout but before the auction t= imeout, a bid is sufficient to spend
- If re-spent after the auction tim= e-out, no proof is required and it can be spent as usual.

Bob suspec= ts that an old legacy unspent output of 50btc has no associated landmine an= d thus a quantum attacker will try to steal it in the future.

Pre-qd= ay, He creates a quantum-safe output of 50btc with a secret leaf, but in th= is case it commits to a the vulnerable output, a bid amount of 40btc, and a= new pubkey. This unspent transaction represents a staked bid of 40btc in t= he event that a particular vulnerable output is ever spent. In order to kee= p bidding sane, the allowed depth of bid-leaves could be constrained.
Post-qday, a quantum attacker finds the private key associated with the v= ulnerable 50btc unspent output and spends it, along with the required 50btc= of their own as collateral, to an output which has the above spending cond= itions and is worth 95btc. This represents a bid of 45btc.

Because n= o landmine exists, the initial timeout comes and goes. Now an auction begin= s and continues until a second time-out. During this auction period, Bob re= veals his staked 50btc output with a 40btc bid, and uses it to take 40btc o= f the attacker's collateral. The original stolen coins are lost, the attack= er loses some or all of their collateral, and the auction continues. If nob= ody outbids him, Bob takes the 40btc as profit.

Carol sees Bob's win= ning bid and repeats the same process, using her staked 50btc to reveal her= secret bid of 30btc. The auction continues, but nobody outbids her and the= auction times out. She can now claim the 30 coins as profit.

The st= aking requirement limits how many vulnerable coins a future quantum attacke= r can bid on before qday.

There are many ways this could be designe= d. Bob could get his coins back so that a bid carries no risk, or be slashe= d for a losing bid. Unused collateral could be burned, or given to Carol, o= r given to miners, or thrown into a pot for later use. Staking requirements= could be 1:1 or x:y. Staked time (coin age) could be taken into considerat= ion. Etc.

Notice that in this design, as long as there is a landmine= or a staked lower bid on the vulnerable coins, they are never successfully= stolen by the quantum attacker. The vulnerable coins are burned, and it's = the attacker's collateral that is claimed by the auction winner. The attack= er only ever makes away with the stolen coins if no one outbids them. Thus = they're incentivized to make a very conservative bid.

## Sats Auctio= n

When describing the above auction scheme to Neha Narula, she sugge= sted that the well-understood Dollar Auction game [0] could be used as well= . See the link for more details and intuition, but I'll summarize briefly h= ow it could be used here.

In this case, there's no need for pre-qday= staking. The spending/timeout mechanics are similar to a Staked Auction.
Every spend of legacy coins triggers an auction after the landmine ti= meout. The highest bid wins the coins minus the bid, and the second-highest= bid loses its bid and collects nothing. The auction continues until there = are no more bids. Participants may keep bidding more in order to prevent th= emselves from ending up as the second-highest bid and thus having to pay. A= s a result, it's possible that a quantum attacker trying to spend a vulnera= ble 50btc output ends up losing all their collateral. Bidders could even at= tach additional inputs to keep the auction going beyond the value of the vu= lnerable output.

This is interesting because, as the Wikipedia artic= le mentions, the logical conclusion is for the attacker not to play. Also, = because there is no pre-qday commitment requirement, the original coin owne= r (outwardly indistinguishable from an attacker) would actually have a chan= ce at partial recovery if they chose to start the auction themselves.
Similar to auction A, there are lots of knobs and levers here:
- Colla= teral ratio
- Min/Max bids and intervals
- Where do the loser's coins= go?

## Desired Auction Outcome

Having thought about these fo= r a week or so, it's clear that there are lots of interesting ways to dissu= ade a quantum attack via a vulnerable coin auction using incentives and gam= e theory. However, it's unclear what the best design would be because it's = not even clear to me what the most desirable outcome would be.

- Att= empt to prevent a quantum attacker from ever attempting to steal in the fir= st place?
- Attempt to encourage staking via auctions, with quantum atta= ckers sometimes winning to encourage the process?
- Attempt to redistrib= ute the coins as randomly as possible? If so, an auction could be designed = to work more like a lottery, where every unspent output is a lottery ticket= or authorization to bid.

To complicate things even further, the mos= t desirable outcome may even change as time goes on after qday, as the vuln= erable coin spender is increasingly likely to be an attacker as opposed to = the original owner.

[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dollar_auction

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