Re: [bitcoin-dev] Defending against empty or near empty blocks from malicious miner takeover?

[CANNON <cannon@cannon-ciota.info>]

On 03/24/2017 07:00 PM, Aymeric Vitte wrote:
> I don't know what "Time is running short I fear" stands for and when 50%
> is supposed to be reached

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/24/2017 07:00 PM, Aymeric Vitte wrote: > I don't know what
"Time is running short I fear" stands for and when 50% > is supposed
to be reached

According to current hashrate distribution tracking site coin.dance,
very likely within less than four weeks according to current hashrate
takeover rate.

While a fork is very likely, that I dont really fear because worst
case scenario is that bitcoin still survives and the invalid chain
becomes an alt.  My fear is the centralized mining power being used
to attack the valid chain with intentions on killing it. [1]

Shouldn't this 50% attack they are threatening be a concern? If it
is a concern, what options are on the table. If it is not a concern
please enlightent me as to why.


[1] Source:
https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/6172s3/peter_rizun_tells_miners_to_force_a_hard_fork_by/

Text:

The attack quoted from his article:
https://medium.com/@peter_r/on-the-emerging-consensus-regarding-bitcoins-block-size-limit-insights-from-my-visit-with-2348878a16d8

    [Level 2] Anti-split protection  Miners will orphan the
    blocks of non-compliant miners prior to the first larger block
    to serve as a reminder to upgrade. Simply due to the possibility
    of having blocks orphaned, all miners would be motivated to
    begin signalling for larger blocks once support definitively
    passes 51%. If some miners hold out (e.g., they may not be
    paying attention regarding the upgrade), then they will begin
    to pay attention after losing approximately $15,000 of revenue
    due to an orphaned block.

    [Level 3] Anti-split protection  In the scenario where Levels
    1 and 2 protection fails to entice all non-compliant miners to
    upgrade, a small-block minority chain may emerge. To address the
    risk of coins being spent on this chain (replay risk), majority
    miners will deploy hash power as needed to ensure the minority
    chain includes only empty blocks after the forking point. This
    can easily be accomplished if the majority miners maintain a
    secret chain of empty blocks  built off their last empty
    block  publishing only as much of this chain as necessary
    to orphan any non-empty blocks produced on the minority chain.




- --
Cannon
PGP Fingerprint: 2BB5 15CD 66E7 4E28 45DC 6494 A5A2 2879 3F06 E832 
Email: cannon@cannon-ciota.info

NOTICE: ALL EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE NOT SIGNED/ENCRYPTED WITH PGP SHOULD 
BE CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY FORGED, AND NOT PRIVATE. 
If this matters to you, use PGP.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=R71g
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----