Den 3 maj 2017 16:05 skrev "Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev" <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>:
Wouldn't the solution be for nodes to use whatever mechanism an attacker uses to determine less commonly available blocks and choose to store a random percentage of them as well as their deterministic random set?> But as you've observed, the failure probabilities are rather high,
> especially if an active attacker targets nodes carrying less commonly
> available blocks.
IE X blocks end of chain (spv bootstrap), Y% deterministic random set, Z% patch/fill set to deter attacks
Then he uses Sybil attacks to obscure what's actually rare and not.
Even proof of storage isn't enough,you need proof of INDEPENDENT storage
, which is essentially impossible
, as well as a way of determining which nodes are run by the same people (all the AWS nodes should essentially count as one).
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