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Making the case for the capabilities enabled by CTV+CSFS MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----=_Part_394932_1604566161.1751237448425" X-Original-Sender: antoine.riard@gmail.com Precedence: list Mailing-list: list bitcoindev@googlegroups.com; contact bitcoindev+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 786775582512 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: , List-Unsubscribe: , X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) ------=_Part_394932_1604566161.1751237448425 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_Part_394933_265039629.1751237448425" ------=_Part_394933_265039629.1751237448425 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi, I agree with Sanders and Poinsot on the perspective that enabling too much powerful script primitves or powerful capabilities could definitely increas= e risk surface, be it MEV-style in the open competition of miners themselves or towards deployed second-layers e.g lightning. I don't think CTV+CSFS let you do TxWithdhold or to design "evil" smart contracts [0] (well I'm still a bit reserved for CSFS as you can pass on the stack a transaction-as-message which has spent _another_ utxo...). And somehow the gradual approach to change bitcoin scripts sounds more wise rather than the drop a full replacmeent approach. Those days, people are mentionning BTCLisp, few years ago it was Simplicity, tomorrow it will be another one...and it sounds there is always a gap between the properties of those new Script machines and what is effectively needed to make second-layers secure, said even less performant. In my opinion, it would be wiser to put more thoughts on mechanisms that would prevent adverserial MEV at the consensus-level (e.g prevent an UTXO to inspect the 2-of-2 funding UTXO of a lightning channel to attack it), rather than chasing hypothetical "just land 5000 LoC in the consensus engine kind of changes as a new Script interpreter". Given there is more and more works realized to enable performant verification of "compute anything" on bitcoin, we might have to be wary of breaks in layers abstraction down the line (e.g what if sophisticated off-chain contracts among a majority of miners to prevent a minority of miners to spend their coinbase utxos, stuff like that...?). In fine, I'm still thinking it's better to priotize in terms of design, review and testing the set of fixes gathered in BIP54 over CTV+CSFS. While in theory with BIP9 we can have multiple soft-fork concurrently assigned to different block nVersion bits, the amount of skilled eyes and hands to review soft-fork is not super elastic and we can never exclude defavorable interactions to be found between the 2 set of changes. Defavorable=20 interactions that would requires to fix each other in consequence... So very personally, I favor the optic we go to activate first as much fixes we can among the set of BIP54 ones, then we go to consider for activation CTV alone or CTV+CSFS together. Once BIP54 and CTV+CSFS are technically=20 ready, making the 2 activating within a 18-months window sounds realistic from=20 what has been done historically. Anyone is free to allocate his time as one wish in bitcoin open-source, and anyone is free to put one's name at the back of a letter and other=20 signed endorsment for all style of "politics". But at some point a bit of focus and clarity on what is on the table in matters of consensus changes and wha= t we all converge on as a community, that would be very welcome... Seriously reviewing and testing a consensus change doesn't happen overnight= =20 :( Best, Antoine OTS hash: c94bf70c0cf2fae2d790184af5879dda5695a4d8f0c0ff7bf7bcb1a86a838a17 [0] https://blog.bitmex.com/txwithhold-smart-contracts/ Le jeudi 26 juin 2025 =C3=A0 18:15:29 UTC+1, Greg Sanders a =C3=A9crit : > Hi Josh, > > It's definitely an interesting primitive, and imo would be best offered= =20 > through an explicit method of committing to sibling prevouts. A bit of=20 > discussion that touched on TXHASH/bllish/ancestry proofs was on delving a= =20 > bit ago:=20 > https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/how-ctv-csfs-improves-bitvm-bridges/1591/8 .= =20 > I am interested to add more compelling uses to more programmable versions= =20 > of commitment hashes like TXHASH, because I feel the space has been very= =20 > unexplored outside of single-tx exogenous fees patterns, and this one=20 > specific use. It's a pretty thin playbook for something that feels quite= =20 > powerful. > > As I've mentioned elsewhere if it's a desired capability, we should=20 > actually validate a number potential script enhancements against it rathe= r=20 > than get tunnel vision on any specific proposal that just so happens to= =20 > kinda-not-really do it.=20 > > Greg > > On Thursday, June 26, 2025 at 12:03:57=E2=80=AFPM UTC-4 Josh Doman wrote: > >> > The ability to commit to the exact transaction spending an output is= =20 >> useful to reduce interactivity in second-layer >> protocols. >> >> Where do you stand on explicit commitments to neighbor prevouts? My=20 >> understanding is that this capability would be extremely useful, for Bit= VM=20 >> and for making offers to buy UTXOs. If the goal is to commit to the "exa= ct=20 >> transaction spending an output," CTV alone wouldn't quite get you there. >> On Wednesday, June 25, 2025 at 5:28:02=E2=80=AFPM UTC-4 Ethan Heilman wr= ote: >> >>> > Why not even CAT, which is a neat tool in many situations and would= =20 >>> let ZK people experiment with validation rollups? And at this point, it= =20 >>> would seem wiser to just work on a sane Bitcoin Script replacement rath= er=20 >>> than throwing buckets of opcodes at it and hoping it holds off.=20 >>> >>> A Bitcoin Script replacement is likely to be a lot of work and many of= =20 >>> the features will be informed by what people are building at the time= =20 >>> it is designed. Merging a low implementation complexity opcode like=20 >>> OP_CAT (BIP-347) would provide useful data to inform a Bitcoin Script= =20 >>> replacement.=20 >>> >>> In addition to allowing ZK people to experiment, OP_CAT also has many= =20 >>> simple use cases that improve everyday boring tapscripts.=20 >>> >>> > Sure, but I=E2=80=99d argue that the presence of risk now is a reason= to be=20 >>> more cautious about adding to it, rather than accepting it as inevitabl= e.=20 >>> >>> Addressing MEVil, if addressing MEVil is considered an important goal,= =20 >>> requires being proactive and enabling the ability to build better=20 >>> protocols on Bitcoin. This is because, all things being equal,=20 >>> building a protocol that doesn't care about MEVil resistance is easier= =20 >>> and requires less scripting functionality than one that does.=20 >>> >>> On Wed, Jun 25, 2025 at 12:54=E2=80=AFPM 'Antoine Poinsot' via Bitcoin= =20 >>> Development Mailing List wrote:=20 >>> >=20 >>> > Thanks for sharing some objections. Here is my attempt at addressing= =20 >>> them.=20 >>> >=20 >>> > > ISTM even something as simple as a rate-limit requires more=20 >>> full-featured introspection than only=20 >>> > > "commit to the exact next transaction" can provide. For example, a= =20 >>> trivial construction would be=20 >>> > > something which requires that transactions spending an output have= =20 >>> an output which claims at least=20 >>> > > Amount - Rate, which requires both more full-featured introspection= =20 >>> as well as a bit of math.=20 >>> >=20 >>> > Yes. These capabilities are really only useful for reducing=20 >>> interactivity in second-layer protocols.=20 >>> > They do not (reasonably) help for vaults and we do not claim it as a= =20 >>> use case.=20 >>> >=20 >>> > Previous efforts to promote opcodes implementing those capabilities= =20 >>> have unfortunately fallen into=20 >>> > the trap of overpromising and claiming use cases they do not really= =20 >>> enable. But this should not make=20 >>> > us overlook what they are really good at: interactivity reduction.=20 >>> >=20 >>> > Do you think that the use cases presented in OP, if demonstrated, are= =20 >>> not enough to warrant soft=20 >>> > forking in a primitive enabling them?=20 >>> >=20 >>> > > Given one of the loudest groups advocating for the additional=20 >>> features of CTV+CSFS are enterprise=20 >>> > > or large-value personal custody providers=20 >>> >=20 >>> > Yes. We intentionally do not mention vaults as a use case in our=20 >>> steelman. We should not change=20 >>> > Bitcoin on the basis of misleading use cases. If people are intereste= d=20 >>> in vaults, they should=20 >>> > sponsor efforts on a different set of capabilities. Probably=20 >>> "programmable forwarding of value from=20 >>> > inputs to outputs", "programmable forwarding of spending conditions= =20 >>> from inputs to outputs" and maybe=20 >>> > "commit to the exact transaction spending an output" (or more powerfu= l=20 >>> introspection).=20 >>> >=20 >>> > The lack of a similar enthusiasm for proposals enabling most or all o= f=20 >>> these functionalities (like=20 >>> > Salvatore Ingala's BIP334 or previously James O'Beirne's and Greg=20 >>> Sanders' BIP345) suggests such=20 >>> > loud support are in fact in favour of "just doing something" and=20 >>> rationalize nice-sounding use cases=20 >>> > backward from this proposal (but vaults!) because it appears to them= =20 >>> to be "further down the road".=20 >>> > I think this view is very dangerous and is part of our motivation for= =20 >>> redirecting discussions toward=20 >>> > what these capabilities actually enable.=20 >>> >=20 >>> > > it seems somewhat of a loss to not work our way towards really basi= c=20 >>> features for this use-case.=20 >>> >=20 >>> > I personally grew more skeptical of the reactive security model of=20 >>> vaults after working on it. Your=20 >>> > mileage may vary and that's fine if people want to work on=20 >>> capabilities that actually enable vaults,=20 >>> > but i don't think they should be a required use cases and block=20 >>> introducing primitives that=20 >>> > substantially improve existing layer 2s and make new ones possible.= =20 >>> >=20 >>> > > Indeed, ISTM many use-cases for a construction like TXHASH become a= =20 >>> lot more substantial with Math=20 >>> > > [...], I'm quite skeptical that *just* looking at an individual for= k=20 >>> on its own is the right=20 >>> > > benchmark.=20 >>> >=20 >>> > I agree that modularity and forward composability with potential=20 >>> future upgrades are arguments in=20 >>> > favour of a more flexible approach. But those need to be balanced wit= h=20 >>> the additional risk and=20 >>> > implementation complexity such an approach entails. I'm happy to be= =20 >>> convinced if supporters of this=20 >>> > approach demonstrate the added flexibility does enable important use= =20 >>> cases and the risks associated=20 >>> > are manageable. But if nobody is interested in doing so, i don't thin= k=20 >>> it's reasonable to hold off a=20 >>> > safer upgrade as long as it is demonstrated to provide substantial=20 >>> benefits.=20 >>> >=20 >>> > It's also unclear that we should stop at "programmable introspection"= =20 >>> in this case. Why not also=20 >>> > include "programmable amount / spending condition forwarding" too,=20 >>> which would give you vaults? Why=20 >>> > not even CAT, which is a neat tool in many situations and would let Z= K=20 >>> people experiment with=20 >>> > validation rollups? And at this point, it would seem wiser to just=20 >>> work on a sane Bitcoin Script=20 >>> > replacement rather than throwing buckets of opcodes at it and hoping= =20 >>> it holds off. Which as we say=20 >>> > in OP i don't think is realistic.=20 >>> >=20 >>> > > I don't see how this results in a net reduction in risk to Bitcoin,= =20 >>> rather just means more total=20 >>> > > work and more cruft in Bitcoin's consensus.=20 >>> >=20 >>> > In theory, i agree. But by this token the same goes for every future= =20 >>> extension that introduces more=20 >>> > expressivity to Bitcoin Script. This ties back to the stopping point:= =20 >>> why add more cruft to the=20 >>> > existing interpreter when we could all focus on BTCLisp instead?=20 >>> >=20 >>> > It's also the case that even if future extensions introduce a superse= t=20 >>> of the capabilities being=20 >>> > discussed, it's unlikely that such simple ones like "just commit to= =20 >>> the next transaction" and=20 >>> > "verify a signature for an arbitrary message" would ever be made full= y=20 >>> redundant.=20 >>> >=20 >>> > Finally, when considering technical debt we should also weigh the=20 >>> actual cost of the implementation=20 >>> > of these simple capabilities. Signature verification on arbitrary=20 >>> message reuses existing signature=20 >>> > checking logic. Similarly, committing to the next transaction can=20 >>> heavily lean on existing Taproot=20 >>> > signature messages, only minimally departing when necessary, and be= =20 >>> implemented in a strictly=20 >>> > simpler manner than the existing CTV proposal. A minimal=20 >>> implementation of these capabilities would=20 >>> > not introduce significant technical debt.=20 >>> >=20 >>> > Interestingly, this argument applies more to introducing more involve= d=20 >>> capabilities like arbitrary=20 >>> > transaction introspection, because of the substantially larger=20 >>> technical debt it would impose to=20 >>> > first support in Bitcoin Script instead of focusing on a replacement= =20 >>> with transaction introspection=20 >>> > from the get go.=20 >>> >=20 >>> > > Indeed, more flexible introspection provides for a difference in=20 >>> risk to the system (though its=20 >>> > > worth noting we cannot both argue that there is no "demonstrated=20 >>> utility" *and* that the utility=20 >>> > > of a change is so substantially higher that it adds material risk t= o=20 >>> the system in the form of=20 >>> > > MEVil from its use-cases).=20 >>> >=20 >>> > Yes we can? It's reasonable to see how arbitrary introspection could= =20 >>> be useful in various handwavy=20 >>> > ways, and therefore how they can be used for undesirable applications= ,=20 >>> while also not having an=20 >>> > important use case it enables clearly defined, much less demonstrated= .=20 >>> >=20 >>> > > However, given the uses of the Bitcoin chain today, it seems=20 >>> entirely possible (assuming=20 >>> > > sufficient adoption) that we end up with a substantial MEVil risk= =20 >>> with or without any=20 >>> > > functionality expansion.=20 >>> >=20 >>> > Sure, but I=E2=80=99d argue that the presence of risk now is a reason= to be=20 >>> more cautious about adding to=20 >>> > it, rather than accepting it as inevitable.=20 >>> >=20 >>> > Best,=20 >>> > Antoine=20 >>> >=20 >>> >=20 >>> > On Tuesday, June 24th, 2025 at 12:00 PM, Matt Corallo < >>> lf-l...@mattcorallo.com> wrote:=20 >>> >=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > > Thanks, responding to one specific point:=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > > On 6/23/25 9:14 AM, 'Antoine Poinsot' via Bitcoin Development=20 >>> Mailing List wrote:=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > > > Yet another alternative is a set of more powerful capabilities,= =20 >>> enabling the use cases that "commit to next transaction"=20 >>> > > > and "verify a BIP340 signature for an arbitrary message" enable= =20 >>> and more. For instance replacing "commit to the exact=20 >>> > > > transaction which must spend this output" with "programmable=20 >>> introspection on the spending transaction's fields" has=20 >>> > > > been considered. However this approach increases implementation= =20 >>> complexity and broadens the risk surface[^8]=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > > Responded to below [1]=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > > > which=20 >>> > > > warrants a compelling demonstration that arbitrary transaction=20 >>> introspection does enable important use cases not=20 >>> > > > achievable with more minimal capabilities.=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > > I'm somewhat skeptical that showing this isn't rather simple, thoug= h=20 >>> I admit I've spent less time=20 >>> > > thinking about these concepts. ISTM even something as simple as a= =20 >>> rate-limit requires more=20 >>> > > full-featured introspection than only "commit to the exact next=20 >>> transaction" can provide. For=20 >>> > > example, a trivial construction would be something which requires= =20 >>> that transactions spending an=20 >>> > > output have an output which claims at least Amount - Rate, which=20 >>> requires both more full-featured=20 >>> > > introspection as well as a bit of math. Given one of the loudest=20 >>> groups advocating for the=20 >>> > > additional features of CTV+CSFS are enterprise or large-value=20 >>> personal custody providers, it seems=20 >>> > > somewhat of a loss to not work our way towards really basic feature= s=20 >>> for this use-case.=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > > More generally, more full-featured introspection like TXHASH=20 >>> provides a lot of flexibility in the=20 >>> > > constructs people can build. For example, allowing BYO fees in the= =20 >>> form of an additional input +=20 >>> > > output in a transaction, rather than fixing an anchor output in the= =20 >>> fixed "next transaction"=20 >>> > > commitment to allow for fees (and then requiring the same additiona= l=20 >>> input + output later). There's=20 >>> > > also open questions as to the incentive-compatibility of anchors in= =20 >>> a world with expensive block=20 >>> > > space, as OOB fees become much cheaper.=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > > Indeed, ISTM many use-cases for a construction like TXHASH become a= =20 >>> lot more substantial with Math=20 >>> > > (though, again, I spend less time thinking about the use-cases of= =20 >>> these things than most, so I'm=20 >>> > > sure others have more examples), I'm quite skeptical that just=20 >>> looking at an individual fork on=20 >>> > > its own is the right benchmark. Sure, functionality in proposed=20 >>> changes to Bitcoin's consensus need=20 >>> > > to be well-justified, but they don't need to be well-justified=20 >>> purely on their own. We add things=20 >>> > > like OP_SUCCESS opcodes in soft forks specifically to expand the se= t=20 >>> of things we can do later, not=20 >>> > > specifically in this fork.=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > > If we assume that we end up wanting things like velocity limits=20 >>> (which I imagine we would?) then it=20 >>> > > seems to me we should do a logical fork that adds features today,= =20 >>> but which will allow us to make=20 >>> > > minimal extensions in the future to further expand its use-cases=20 >>> later. Taking a more myopic view of=20 >>> > > the present and ignoring the future results in us doing one thing= =20 >>> today, then effectively replacing=20 >>> > > it later by adding more flexibility in a new opcode later, subsumin= g=20 >>> the features of what we do=20 >>> > > today. I don't see how this results in a net reduction in risk to= =20 >>> Bitcoin, rather just means more=20 >>> > > total work and more cruft in Bitcoin's consensus.=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > > [1]=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > > Responding to the MEVil question OOO because I think the above=20 >>> should go first :).=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > > Indeed, more flexible introspection provides for a difference in=20 >>> risk to the system (though its=20 >>> > > worth noting we cannot both argue that there is no "demonstrated=20 >>> utility" and that the utility of=20 >>> > > a change is so substantially higher that it adds material risk to= =20 >>> the system in the form of MEVil=20 >>> > > from its use-cases). However, given the uses of the Bitcoin chain= =20 >>> today, it seems entirely possible=20 >>> > > (assuming sufficient adoption) that we end up with a substantial=20 >>> MEVil risk with or without any=20 >>> > > functionality expansion. This mandates a response from the Bitcoin= =20 >>> development community in either=20 >>> > > case, and I'm confident that response can happen faster than any=20 >>> reasonable soft fork timeline.=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > > While its possible that existing CSV-based MEVil risk never grows= =20 >>> beyond its current anemic state=20 >>> > > (due to preferences for stronger trust models from their users), an= d=20 >>> that there's a particularly=20 >>> > > clever design using expanded introspection that improves the trust= =20 >>> model such that suddenly=20 >>> > > CSV-based protocol use explodes, ISTM given the risk and the need t= o=20 >>> mitigate it on its own, taking=20 >>> > > decisions that are sub-optimal for Bitcoin's consensus on this basi= s=20 >>> isn't accomplishing much and=20 >>> > > has real costs.=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > > Matt=20 >>> > >=20 >>> > > --=20 >>> > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google= =20 >>> Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group.=20 >>> > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,= =20 >>> send an email to bitcoindev+...@googlegroups.com.=20 >>> > > To view this discussion visit=20 >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/8a9a2299-ab4b-45a4-8b9d-95= 798e6bb62a%40mattcorallo.com.=20 >>> >>> >=20 >>> > --=20 >>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google=20 >>> Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group.=20 >>> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, sen= d=20 >>> an email to bitcoindev+...@googlegroups.com.=20 >>> > To view this discussion visit=20 >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/73PXNVcmgiN2Kba63P2SRZfs42= lvgME_8EF-DlYtkOSY8mLRxEXPEw5JAi5wtPU2MEMw1C6_EDFHKKrhaa1F53OgIJOcam-kbOUP3= aG2_e0%3D%40protonmail.com.=20 >>> >>> >> --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an e= mail to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/= fc065dd1-b151-4710-8d5a-5ed1ad54e0ccn%40googlegroups.com. ------=_Part_394933_265039629.1751237448425 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi,

I agree with Sanders and Poinsot on the perspective that ena= bling too much
powerful script primitves or powerful capabilities coul= d definitely increase
risk surface, be it MEV-style in the open compet= ition of miners themselves
or towards deployed second-layers e.g light= ning.

I don't think CTV+CSFS let you do TxWithdhold or to design= "evil" smart
contracts [0] (well I'm still a bit reserved for CSFS as= you can pass on
the stack a transaction-as-message which has spent _a= nother_ utxo...).
And somehow the gradual approach to change bitcoin s= cripts sounds more
wise rather than the drop a full replacmeent approa= ch. Those days, people
are mentionning BTCLisp, few years ago it was S= implicity, tomorrow it
will be another one...and it sounds there is al= ways a gap between the
properties of those new Script machines and wha= t is effectively needed
to make second-layers secure, said even less p= erformant.

In my opinion, it would be wiser to put more thoughts= on mechanisms
that would prevent adverserial MEV at the consensus-lev= el (e.g prevent
an UTXO to inspect the 2-of-2 funding UTXO of a lightn= ing channel to
attack it), rather than chasing hypothetical "just land= 5000 LoC in
the consensus engine kind of changes as a new Script inte= rpreter".
Given there is more and more works realized to enable perfor= mant
verification of "compute anything" on bitcoin, we might have to b= e wary
of breaks in layers abstraction down the line (e.g what if soph= isticated
off-chain contracts among a majority of miners to prevent a = minority of
miners to spend their coinbase utxos, stuff like that...?)= .

In fine, I'm still thinking it's better to priotize in terms o= f design,
review and testing the set of fixes gathered in BIP54 over C= TV+CSFS. While
in theory with BIP9 we can have multiple soft-fork conc= urrently assigned
to different block nVersion bits, the amount of skil= led eyes and hands to
review soft-fork is not super elastic and we can= never exclude defavorable
interactions to be found between the 2 set = of changes. Defavorable interactions
that would requires to fix each o= ther in consequence...

So very personally, I favor the optic we = go to activate first as much fixes
we can among the set of BIP54 ones,= then we go to consider for activation
CTV alone or CTV+CSFS together.= Once BIP54 and CTV+CSFS are technically ready,
making the 2 activatin= g within a 18-months window sounds realistic from what has
been done h= istorically.

Anyone is free to allocate his time as one wish in = bitcoin open-source,
and anyone is free to put one's name at the back = of a letter and other signed
endorsment for all style of "politics". B= ut at some point a bit of focus
and clarity on what is on the table in= matters of consensus changes and what
we all converge on as a communi= ty, that would be very welcome...

Seriously reviewing and testin= g a consensus change doesn't happen overnight :(

Best,
Anto= ine
OTS hash: c94bf70c0cf2fae2d790184af5879dda5695a4d8f0c0ff7bf7bcb1a8= 6a838a17

[0] https://blog.bitmex.com/txwithhold-smart-contracts/=

Le jeudi 26 juin 2025 =C3=A0 18:15:29 UTC+1, Greg Sanders a =C3=A9crit= =C2=A0:
Hi Jo= sh,


On Thursday, June 26, 2025 at 12:03:57=E2=80=AFPM UTC-= 4 Josh Doman wrote:
&g= t; The ability to commit to the exact transaction spending an output is use= ful to reduce interactivity in second-layer
protocols.

Where do you stand on explicit commitments to neighbor prevouts? My under= standing is that this capability would be extremely useful, for BitVM and f= or making offers to buy UTXOs. If the goal is to commit to the "exact = transaction spending an output," CTV alone wouldn't quite get you = there.
On Wednesday, June 25, 2025 at 5:28:02=E2=80=AFPM UTC-4 Ethan Heilman wr= ote:
> Why not eve= n CAT, which is a neat tool in many situations and would let ZK people expe= riment with validation rollups? And at this point, it would seem wiser to j= ust work on a sane Bitcoin Script replacement rather than throwing buckets = of opcodes at it and hoping it holds off.

A Bitcoin Script replacement is likely to be a lot of work and many of
the features will be informed by what people are building at the time
it is designed. Merging a low implementation complexity opcode like
OP_CAT (BIP-347) would provide useful data to inform a Bitcoin Script
replacement.

In addition to allowing ZK people to experiment, OP_CAT also has many
simple use cases that improve everyday boring tapscripts.

> Sure, but I=E2=80=99d argue that the presence of risk now is a rea= son to be more cautious about adding to it, rather than accepting it as ine= vitable.

Addressing MEVil, if addressing MEVil is considered an important goal,
requires being proactive and enabling the ability to build better
protocols on Bitcoin. This is because, all things being equal,
building a protocol that doesn't care about MEVil resistance is eas= ier
and requires less scripting functionality than one that does.

On Wed, Jun 25, 2025 at 12:54=E2=80=AFPM 'Antoine Poinsot' via = Bitcoin
Development Mailing List <bitco...@googlegroups.= com> wrote:
>
> Thanks for sharing some objections. Here is my attempt at addressi= ng them.
>
> > ISTM even something as simple as a rate-limit requires more f= ull-featured introspection than only
> > "commit to the exact next transaction" can provide.= For example, a trivial construction would be
> > something which requires that transactions spending an output= have an output which claims at least
> > Amount - Rate, which requires both more full-featured introsp= ection as well as a bit of math.
>
> Yes. These capabilities are really only useful for reducing intera= ctivity in second-layer protocols.
> They do not (reasonably) help for vaults and we do not claim it as= a use case.
>
> Previous efforts to promote opcodes implementing those capabilitie= s have unfortunately fallen into
> the trap of overpromising and claiming use cases they do not reall= y enable. But this should not make
> us overlook what they are really good at: interactivity reduction.
>
> Do you think that the use cases presented in OP, if demonstrated, = are not enough to warrant soft
> forking in a primitive enabling them?
>
> > Given one of the loudest groups advocating for the additional= features of CTV+CSFS are enterprise
> > or large-value personal custody providers
>
> Yes. We intentionally do not mention vaults as a use case in our s= teelman. We should not change
> Bitcoin on the basis of misleading use cases. If people are intere= sted in vaults, they should
> sponsor efforts on a different set of capabilities. Probably "= ;programmable forwarding of value from
> inputs to outputs", "programmable forwarding of spending= conditions from inputs to outputs" and maybe
> "commit to the exact transaction spending an output" (or= more powerful introspection).
>
> The lack of a similar enthusiasm for proposals enabling most or al= l of these functionalities (like
> Salvatore Ingala's BIP334 or previously James O'Beirne'= ;s and Greg Sanders' BIP345) suggests such
> loud support are in fact in favour of "just doing something&q= uot; and rationalize nice-sounding use cases
> backward from this proposal (but vaults!) because it appears to th= em to be "further down the road".
> I think this view is very dangerous and is part of our motivation = for redirecting discussions toward
> what these capabilities actually enable.
>
> > it seems somewhat of a loss to not work our way towards reall= y basic features for this use-case.
>
> I personally grew more skeptical of the reactive security model of= vaults after working on it. Your
> mileage may vary and that's fine if people want to work on cap= abilities that actually enable vaults,
> but i don't think they should be a required use cases and bloc= k introducing primitives that
> substantially improve existing layer 2s and make new ones possible= .
>
> > Indeed, ISTM many use-cases for a construction like TXHASH be= come a lot more substantial with Math
> > [...], I'm quite skeptical that *just* looking at an indi= vidual fork on its own is the right
> > benchmark.
>
> I agree that modularity and forward composability with potential f= uture upgrades are arguments in
> favour of a more flexible approach. But those need to be balanced = with the additional risk and
> implementation complexity such an approach entails. I'm happy = to be convinced if supporters of this
> approach demonstrate the added flexibility does enable important u= se cases and the risks associated
> are manageable. But if nobody is interested in doing so, i don'= ;t think it's reasonable to hold off a
> safer upgrade as long as it is demonstrated to provide substantial= benefits.
>
> It's also unclear that we should stop at "programmable in= trospection" in this case. Why not also
> include "programmable amount / spending condition forwarding&= quot; too, which would give you vaults? Why
> not even CAT, which is a neat tool in many situations and would le= t ZK people experiment with
> validation rollups? And at this point, it would seem wiser to just= work on a sane Bitcoin Script
> replacement rather than throwing buckets of opcodes at it and hopi= ng it holds off. Which as we say
> in OP i don't think is realistic.
>
> > I don't see how this results in a net reduction in risk t= o Bitcoin, rather just means more total
> > work and more cruft in Bitcoin's consensus.
>
> In theory, i agree. But by this token the same goes for every futu= re extension that introduces more
> expressivity to Bitcoin Script. This ties back to the stopping poi= nt: why add more cruft to the
> existing interpreter when we could all focus on BTCLisp instead?
>
> It's also the case that even if future extensions introduce a = superset of the capabilities being
> discussed, it's unlikely that such simple ones like "just= commit to the next transaction" and
> "verify a signature for an arbitrary message" would ever= be made fully redundant.
>
> Finally, when considering technical debt we should also weigh the = actual cost of the implementation
> of these simple capabilities. Signature verification on arbitrary = message reuses existing signature
> checking logic. Similarly, committing to the next transaction can = heavily lean on existing Taproot
> signature messages, only minimally departing when necessary, and b= e implemented in a strictly
> simpler manner than the existing CTV proposal. A minimal implement= ation of these capabilities would
> not introduce significant technical debt.
>
> Interestingly, this argument applies more to introducing more invo= lved capabilities like arbitrary
> transaction introspection, because of the substantially larger tec= hnical debt it would impose to
> first support in Bitcoin Script instead of focusing on a replaceme= nt with transaction introspection
> from the get go.
>
> > Indeed, more flexible introspection provides for a difference= in risk to the system (though its
> > worth noting we cannot both argue that there is no "demo= nstrated utility" *and* that the utility
> > of a change is so substantially higher that it adds material = risk to the system in the form of
> > MEVil from its use-cases).
>
> Yes we can? It's reasonable to see how arbitrary introspection= could be useful in various handwavy
> ways, and therefore how they can be used for undesirable applicati= ons, while also not having an
> important use case it enables clearly defined, much less demonstra= ted.
>
> > However, given the uses of the Bitcoin chain today, it seems = entirely possible (assuming
> > sufficient adoption) that we end up with a substantial MEVil = risk with or without any
> > functionality expansion.
>
> Sure, but I=E2=80=99d argue that the presence of risk now is a rea= son to be more cautious about adding to
> it, rather than accepting it as inevitable.
>
> Best,
> Antoine
>
>
> On Tuesday, June 24th, 2025 at 12:00 PM, Matt Corallo <lf-l...@mattcorallo.com> wrote:
>
> >
> >
> > Thanks, responding to one specific point:
> >
> > On 6/23/25 9:14 AM, 'Antoine Poinsot' via Bitcoin Dev= elopment Mailing List wrote:
> >
> > > Yet another alternative is a set of more powerful capabi= lities, enabling the use cases that "commit to next transaction"
> > > and "verify a BIP340 signature for an arbitrary mes= sage" enable and more. For instance replacing "commit to the exac= t
> > > transaction which must spend this output" with &quo= t;programmable introspection on the spending transaction's fields"= has
> > > been considered. However this approach increases impleme= ntation complexity and broadens the risk surface[^8]
> >
> >
> > Responded to below [1]
> >
> > > which
> > > warrants a compelling demonstration that arbitrary trans= action introspection does enable important use cases not
> > > achievable with more minimal capabilities.
> >
> >
> > I'm somewhat skeptical that showing this isn't rather= simple, though I admit I've spent less time
> > thinking about these concepts. ISTM even something as simple = as a rate-limit requires more
> > full-featured introspection than only "commit to the exa= ct next transaction" can provide. For
> > example, a trivial construction would be something which requ= ires that transactions spending an
> > output have an output which claims at least Amount - Rate, wh= ich requires both more full-featured
> > introspection as well as a bit of math. Given one of the loud= est groups advocating for the
> > additional features of CTV+CSFS are enterprise or large-value= personal custody providers, it seems
> > somewhat of a loss to not work our way towards really basic f= eatures for this use-case.
> >
> > More generally, more full-featured introspection like TXHASH = provides a lot of flexibility in the
> > constructs people can build. For example, allowing BYO fees i= n the form of an additional input +
> > output in a transaction, rather than fixing an anchor output = in the fixed "next transaction"
> > commitment to allow for fees (and then requiring the same add= itional input + output later). There's
> > also open questions as to the incentive-compatibility of anch= ors in a world with expensive block
> > space, as OOB fees become much cheaper.
> >
> > Indeed, ISTM many use-cases for a construction like TXHASH be= come a lot more substantial with Math
> > (though, again, I spend less time thinking about the use-case= s of these things than most, so I'm
> > sure others have more examples), I'm quite skeptical that= just looking at an individual fork on
> > its own is the right benchmark. Sure, functionality in propos= ed changes to Bitcoin's consensus need
> > to be well-justified, but they don't need to be well-just= ified purely on their own. We add things
> > like OP_SUCCESS opcodes in soft forks specifically to expand = the set of things we can do later, not
> > specifically in this fork.
> >
> > If we assume that we end up wanting things like velocity limi= ts (which I imagine we would?) then it
> > seems to me we should do a logical fork that adds features to= day, but which will allow us to make
> > minimal extensions in the future to further expand its use-ca= ses later. Taking a more myopic view of
> > the present and ignoring the future results in us doing one t= hing today, then effectively replacing
> > it later by adding more flexibility in a new opcode later, su= bsuming the features of what we do
> > today. I don't see how this results in a net reduction in= risk to Bitcoin, rather just means more
> > total work and more cruft in Bitcoin's consensus.
> >
> > [1]
> >
> > Responding to the MEVil question OOO because I think the abov= e should go first :).
> >
> > Indeed, more flexible introspection provides for a difference= in risk to the system (though its
> > worth noting we cannot both argue that there is no "demo= nstrated utility" and that the utility of
> > a change is so substantially higher that it adds material ris= k to the system in the form of MEVil
> > from its use-cases). However, given the uses of the Bitcoin c= hain today, it seems entirely possible
> > (assuming sufficient adoption) that we end up with a substant= ial MEVil risk with or without any
> > functionality expansion. This mandates a response from the Bi= tcoin development community in either
> > case, and I'm confident that response can happen faster t= han any reasonable soft fork timeline.
> >
> > While its possible that existing CSV-based MEVil risk never g= rows beyond its current anemic state
> > (due to preferences for stronger trust models from their user= s), and that there's a particularly
> > clever design using expanded introspection that improves the = trust model such that suddenly
> > CSV-based protocol use explodes, ISTM given the risk and the = need to mitigate it on its own, taking
> > decisions that are sub-optimal for Bitcoin's consensus on= this basis isn't accomplishing much and
> > has real costs.
> >
> > Matt
> >
> > --
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the G= oogle Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group.
> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from= it, send an email to bitcoindev+...@googlegroups.com.
> > To view this discussion visit http= s://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/8a9a2299-ab4b-45a4-8b9d-95798e6bb6= 2a%40mattcorallo.com.
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google= Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, = send an email to bitcoindev+...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion visit https://gro= ups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/73PXNVcmgiN2Kba63P2SRZfs42lvgME_8EF-DlYtk= OSY8mLRxEXPEw5JAi5wtPU2MEMw1C6_EDFHKKrhaa1F53OgIJOcam-kbOUP3aG2_e0%3D%40pro= tonmail.com.

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