[bitcoindev] Re: [Draft BIP] Quantum-Resistant Transition Framework for Bitcoin

["'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List" <bitcoindev@googlegroups.com>]

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I appreciate your enthusiasm for quantum resilience, but there are many 
things wrong with this proposal. 


- *"50 logical qubits - sufficient to break 256-bit ECDSA"* - The number of 
logical qubits required to break 256-bit ECC discrete log is on the order 
of thousands or millions, and nobody is even close yet. AFAIK the best 
known algorithm requires about 1536 qubits [0]. Please cite sources if you 
have been informed otherwise.
- *"0-bit security"* ROFL, what does that even mean? Also you have the 
wrong big-O complexity for Shor's algorithm [1]
- The 256-bit flavors of SLH-DSA are overkill. Bitcoin addresses are 
already fundamentally limited to 128 bits of security (a little less, 
actually) under a naive SHA256 or secp256k1 birthday attack. [2] Trying to 
add more is unnecessary, especially given the YUGE signatures required.
- This proposal completely ignores other promising new cryptographic 
signing algorithms like ML-DSA [3] and SQISign [4] which would be needed 
for low-latency resource-constrained environments like LN nodes.
- Freezing UTXOs without some sort of unlocking path baked-in ahead of time 
will cause a hard fork if we ever want to rescue them in the future. This 
has been discussed on prior threads. [8]
- *"Each signature reveals 4 bits of private key material"*, that is not 
how SLH-DSA works. Each signature reveals some deterministically derived 
preimages, and commits to them in a carefully chosen chain of OTS 
certification signatures. The algorithm guarantees the probability of 
successful forgery stays below a certain threshold for up to `m` messages. 
In NIST SLH-DSA, m = 2^64. For the math see this script [5].
- Your "SPHINCS+ implementation" is just a wrapper around the python 
'pyspx' package from PyPi with some encoding mechanisms sprinkled on top. 
The `pyspx` module was last updated three years ago [6] and SLH-DSA was 
only fully standardized two years ago, so your code is actually 
non-compliant with your own proposal.
- *"This BIP draft prioritizes technical accuracy over visual polish"*. I 
think i'll stop now.

If you're interested in meaningfully contributing to upgrading Bitcoin to 
be quantum resilient, I would suggest you stop trying to write your own 
spec single-handed, and start by reviewing BIP360 [7] and reading mailing 
list archives on post quantum upgrade proposals. There have been many...

regards,
conduition


[0]: https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0301141 (see section 6.2)
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shor%27s_algorithm
[2]: https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/118928/what-does-it-mean-that-the-security-of-bitcoin-public-keys-and-256-bit-ecdsa-is/
[3]: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.204.pdf
[4]: https://sqisign.org/
[5]: https://gist.github.com/conduition/469725009397c08a2d40fb87c8ca7baa
[6]: https://pypi.org/project/PySPX/#history
[7]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/1670
[8]: https://groups.google.com/g/bitcoindev/c/uEaf4bj07rE/m/0Facb-SvBwAJ


On Thursday, August 7, 2025 at 5:26:07 PM UTC-7 Bitcoin Foundation wrote:

> BIP: TBD
> Layer: Consensus (soft fork)
> Title: Quantum-Resistant Transition Framework for Bitcoin 
> Author: Bitcoin Post-Quantum Working Group <pq-re...@bitcoin.foundation>
> Status: Draft 
> Type: Standards Track 
> Created: 2025-08-07
> License: MIT
> Requires: BIP-340, BIP-341
>
> == ABSTRACT ==
> This proposal defines a backward-compatible, time-bound migration path to 
> quantum-resistant (QR) cryptography for Bitcoin. Through phased deprecation 
> of ECDSA/Schnorr signatures and mandatory adoption of NIST-standardized 
> post-quantum algorithms, it ensures Bitcoin's survival against quantum 
> attacks while minimizing disruption to existing infrastructure.
>
> == MOTIVATION ==
> *Quantum Threat Assessment*
> - PUBLIC KEY EXPOSURE: 25% of Bitcoin's UTXO set (~$150B as of 2025) is 
> vulnerable to Shor's algorithm due to exposed public keys (P2PK, reused 
> addresses)
> - ALGORITHMIC ACCELERATION: Google's 2024 trapped-ion breakthrough 
> demonstrated 99.99% gate fidelity with 50 logical qubits - sufficient to 
> break 256-bit ECDSA in <8 hours
> - STEALTH ATTACK VECTORS: Quantum adversaries could precompute keys and 
> execute timed thefts during mempool propagation
>
> *Fundamental ECDSA Vulnerability*
> ECDSA security relies on the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem 
> (ECDLP). Shor's quantum algorithm solves it in O((log n)³) time:
> 1. For secp256k1: n ≈ 2²⁵⁶
> 2. Classical security: 128-bit
> 3. Quantum security: 0-bit (broken by Shor)
> 4. Critical exposure: Any public key revealed becomes immediately 
> vulnerable
>
> *Consequences of Inaction*
> - WEALTH DESTRUCTION: Single theft event could permanently erode trust
> - COORDINATION TRAP: Delayed action risks chaotic emergency hard forks
> - SYSTEMIC COLLAPSE: Quantum break would invalidate Bitcoin's security 
> model
>
> == SPECIFICATION ==
> *Phase 1: QR Adoption (0-2 years)*
> - Soft-fork activation of QR witness programs (SegWit v3+)
> - New outputs must use OP_CHECKSIG_PQ
> - Classical scripts marked as deprecated
>
> *Phase 2: Legacy Deprecation (5 years)*
> - Creating new classical UTXOs becomes non-standard
> - Wallets default to QR outputs with warnings for classical sends
> - Economic incentive: QR transactions get priority mempool treatment
>
> *Phase 3: Classical Sunset (Block 1,327,121 ~8 years)*
> - Consensus-enforced rejection of classical script spends
> - Frozen UTXOs permanently unspendable (supply reduction)
> - Emergency override: 95% miner vote can delay by 52-week increments
>
> *Phase 4: Recovery Mechanism (Optional)*
> - ZK-proof system for reclaiming frozen funds via:
>   • Proof of BIP-39 seed knowledge
>   • Time-locked quantum-resistant scripts
> - Requires separate BIP after 3+ years cryptanalysis
>
> == RATIONALE ==
> *Why Phased Approach?*
> - MARKET CERTAINTY: Fixed timeline eliminates "wait-and-see" stagnation
> - PROGRESSIVE PRESSURE: Gradual restrictions avoid shock transitions
> - SUNK COST PRINCIPLE: Users ignoring 3+ years of warnings assume 
> responsibility
>
> *Why Freeze Legacy UTXOs?*
> - Prevents quantum arms race for exposed coins
> - Preserves Bitcoin's "lost coins" scarcity principle
> - Avoids centralized redistribution committees
> - Eliminates moral hazard of rewarding late migrators
> - Reduces quantum attack surface
>
> *Algorithm Choice: SPHINCS+-SHAKE256f (SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f)*
> SECURITY PARAMETERS:
>   n: 256
>   Hash: SHAKE256
>   Classical Security: 2²⁵⁶
>   Quantum Security: 2¹²⁸
>   Private Key: 128 bytes
>   Public Key: 64 bytes
>   Signature: 49,856 bytes
>
> QUANTUM ATTACK RESISTANCE:
> | Attack Type         | Standard Bitcoin | This System   | Security Factor 
> |
>
> |---------------------|------------------|---------------|-----------------|
> | Shor's Algorithm    | Broken           | Not applicable| ∞               
> |
> | Grover's Algorithm  | O(2¹²⁸)         | O(2⁵¹²)      | 2³⁸⁴ advantage  |
> | Collision Search    | O(2⁸⁵)          | O(2⁸⁵)       | Equivalent      |
>
> KEY SECURITY (SK 128 bytes):
> - Private key entropy: 1024 bits (2¹⁰²⁴ possibilities)
> - Quantum brute-force: √(2¹⁰²⁴) = 2⁵¹² ≈ 10¹⁵⁴ operations
> - Time required at 1 quintillion ops/sec (10¹⁸): 10¹³⁶ seconds ≈ 3 × 10¹²⁸ 
> years
>
> SEED SECURITY (SEED 96 bytes):
> - Possible seeds: 2⁷⁶⁸ ≈ 10²³¹  
> - Quantum brute-force: √(2⁷⁶⁸) = 2³⁸⁴ ≈ 10¹¹⁵ operations  
> - Time required at 1 billion ops/sec: 10¹⁰⁶ seconds ≈ 3 × 10⁹⁸ years
>
> INFORMATION THEORETIC ADVANTAGES:
> - Each signature reveals 4 bits of private key material
> - After 20 signatures:
>   • ECDSA: Private key fully compromised
>   • SPHINCS+: 80 bits revealed (7.81% of key)
>   • Security margin remains: 944 bits (92.19%)
>
> == BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY ==
> Phase | Legacy Wallets       | QR Wallets
> ------|---------------------|------------------------
> 1     | Full functionality  | Can receive/send both types
> 2     | Can only send to QR | Full functionality
> 3+    | Frozen funds        | Only QR transactions valid
>
> == DEPLOYMENT ==
> Activation Mechanism:
> - Speedy Trial (BIP-8) with 18-month timeout
> - 90% miner signaling threshold
>
> Monitoring:
> - QR adoption metrics published quarterly
> - Sunset delay requires proof of:
>   • <70% exchange/wallet adoption
>   • Fundamental flaws in NIST PQC standards
>
> == STAKEHOLDER IMPACT ==
> Group           | Action Required               | Timeline
> ----------------|-------------------------------|-------------------
> Miners          | Upgrade nodes for QR rules    | Phase 1 activation
> Exchanges       | Implement QR withdrawals     | Within 18 months of Phase 
> 1
> Hardware Wallets| Firmware updates for QR sigs | Before Phase 2
> Light Clients   | SPV proofs for QR scripts    | Phase 3 readiness
>
> == REFERENCES ==
> - SPHINCS+ Implementation: 
> https://github.com/bitcoin-foundation/Quantum-Resistant-Bitcoin
> - (FIPS 205) SLH-DSA: 
> https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.205.pdf
> - Schnorr Signatures: BIP-0340
>
> == COPYRIGHT ==
> MIT License
>
> ---
>
>
> This BIP presents an alternative quantum-resistant migration approach, 
> primarily distinguished by its extended transition timeline to facilitate 
> more comprehensive ecosystem adaptation.
>
> Key features:
> - Includes reference implementation of SPHINCS+-SHAKE256f 
> (SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f)
> - Provides comparative analysis against Bitcoin's current ECDSA scheme
> - Detailed technical specifications:
> https://github.com/bitcoin-foundation/Quantum-Resistant-Bitcoin
>
> Formatting note: This BIP draft prioritizes technical accuracy over visual 
> polish. After incorporating feedback from this discussion, the final 
> version will be published to GitHub with proper Markdown formatting.
>
> Feedback welcome from wallet developers, exchanges, miners, and security 
> researchers.
>

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